University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
1-1-1967

Count and democrat ; Brockdorff-Rantzau as the Weimar
Republic's first foreign minister
Marilyn Senn Moll
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork

Recommended Citation
Moll, Marilyn Senn, "Count and democrat ; Brockdorff-Rantzau as the Weimar Republic's first foreign
minister" (1967). Student Work. 407.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/407

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

iI

"COUNT AND DEMOCRAT"

^

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU AS THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC'S FIRST FOREIGN MINISTER

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Marilyn Senn Moll
January 1967

UMI Number: EP73045

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

Dissertation Publishing

UMI EP73045
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346

Accepted for the faculty of the Graduate College
of the University of Omaha,

in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

Chairman

DepaJtmen t

t

Graduate Committee
^

Department

ULRICH,GRAF VON 3R0CKD0RFF-RANTZAU
1869 - 1928
This picture probably dates from the end
the First World War*
Source %

Outlook, CXXII (May 7, 1.919), 25

PREFACE
This thesis grew out of Dr* A * Stanley Trickett's
graduate history seminar at the University of Omaha,
ing into the Paris Peace Conference of 1919*

inquir

In the course

of a study of Germany's initial reaction to the Treaty of
Versailles
tion,

I

became interested in the German Peace Delega

and especially Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who, as the

Weimar Republic's first Foreign Minister, was the Delega
tion's leader.

My preliminary search for material unearthed

very little that was easily accessible.

Almost everything

from contemporary English language sources and journals was
written in a hate-the-Kaiser1s-Germany vein,

and the few

items concerning the German Foreign Minister were,
covered,

usually out of context,

say with little factual basis.

I dis

inaccurate, or merely hear
Many writers who mention him

tell only one vignette before dismissing the subject alto
gether: A portrait of his ancestor,

Josias Rantzau, who was

a Marshal of France, hung in the Galerie des Marechaux at
Versailles*

Asked by a French journalist (some say it was

a French officer) his opinion of the story that the Marshal
had actually been the father of Louis XIV,

the Count replied

that indeed,
there is a tradition in our family to that effect
dating back two hundred years*
What comforts one

iii

iv
about it is that, if the tradition is based on fact,
the Rantzaus are not illegitimate Bourbons, but the
Bourbons bastard Rantzaus
It is now possible to discuss the days of Versailles
more objectively and dispassionately*
means intended as an apologia.
fifty years later,

This thesis is by no

It is an attempt, nearly

to understand and interpret the German

response when the Treaty was presented to the Delegation at
Versailles,
leaders.

and the resulting repercussions among the Allied

To do this I have used materials usually inacces

sible or little known.
to documents, books,

This material I have tried to relate

and memoirs which,

although they are

well known and definitive works on the subject, have not
been used extensively to help shed light on this aspect of
the Paris Peace Conference.

My lifelong intense interest in

the German language has been indispensable.
Professor James T , Shotwell, noted historian of the
Peace Conference and its aftermath, has written that " . . .
prudence as well as a sense of fair play provided the German
negotiators with more support for a revision of the terms of
the Treaty than they seem to have appreciated.

This phase

of Peace Conference history has never been explored - . ."
Shotwell's observation can be applied to the Treaty writers
-^Kar 1 Friedrich Novak, Versailles
and Clarke Ltd., 1929), p. 259*

(New York: Payson

2James T Shotwe 1.1, At the Paris Peace Conference
(New York; The Macmillan Co.,, 1937), p. 47.

V

in Paris as well as the Germanso

In this work I have at

tempted to approach the question from both sides,

stressing

the origins of the German Delegation and the Foreign Mini
ster who led it--a history apparently little understood by
the Allied and Associated Powers and by those who are now
their descendants.
It is not unrealistic to ask the question;
not any Allied statesman,

"Would

in Brockdorff-Rantzau1s place,

have tried for as favorable a deal as possible for Germany?"
My search for material turned up a book written by the
British Lieutenant Colonel Stewart Roddie, who was posted
for seven years in Germany as a member of the Disarmament
Commission,

and knew and worked with all the government

officials and other dignitaries of the Weimar Republic.

In

a passage describing Reichspresident Ebert, Colonel Roddie
relates the following story;
It was in the Holtzendorff house in the victoria
Strasse; the question of extradition of "War Crim
inals" was being discussed, and Noske, the Minister
of Defence, put to me the embarrassing query, "Tell
us what you English would have done if we Germans
had won the war and demanded of you the surrender
for trial as criminals of your King George, your
Prince of Wales, your Field Marshal Haig, e t c 0 Tell
us— would you have let us have them?"
Then the President, who had been quietly listen
ing, laid his hand on my arm and said, "Don't answer
that question, Colonel, it's not a fair one--just
take it for granted that we know,"^
■^Stewart Roddie, Peace Patrol
nam's Sons, 1933), p 0 98*

(New York; G 0P 0 Put

There are many people who have helped me whom. I would
like to thanko

My family has put up with more than two years

of my complete preoccupation with this subject and consequent
neglect of their needs at times.

I would especially like to

thank Dr. Trickett for his inspiration and guidance,

and Miss

Ella Jane Dougherty of the staff of the Gene Eppley Library
at the University of Omaha for her tireless efforts to obtain
obscure books for me, a task at which she was 99% successful.
The University of Nebraska Library and the Omaha Public
Library were also very helpful.

I owe many thanks to Dr. Kurt

Rosenbaum of West Virginia University,

author of Community of

Fate; German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928, who furn
ished information on Erich Brandenburg's unpublished manu
script biography of the Count and other important leads to
valuable material.

I am grateful to

Dr. Alma Luckau Molin

and Dr. George Bonnin for answering questions for me.

I am in

debted to Dr. T'heo Christiansen of Schleswig, Germany, who pro
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other advice as to sources.

He and Frau Christiansen were

graciously hospitable to me during my few days in Schleswig
while visiting Germany in 1964.
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Much appreciation is due my typist, Mrs,, Earl D.

Wagner, who entered into this project with enthusiasm and
great competence.
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INTRODUCTION
It was May,

1919.

Germany had admitted military

feat in World War I over six months earlier.

de

German representa

tives had signed the armistice terms dictated by Marshal Foch
for the Allies.

When the guns became silent on November 11,

1918, Germany surrendered great quantities of arms, military
equipment,

rolling stock,

and her Allied prisoners of war, meet

ing Armistice deadlines as nearly as possible.

The Allied and

Associated Powers did not return their German war prisoners,

and

the Allies continued their blockade in the northern waters for
several m o n t h s ,
When the Kaiser fled to Holland on November 9, 1918,

the

old order had already collapsed in Germany.

Out of defeat, muti

nies, workers'

and the threat of

strikes,

starvation,

Bolshevism grew a German Republic.
ported,

despair,

Hastily proclaimed,

ill-sup

and with no precedent to guide it, the new Republic

faced scorn and mistrust at home and abroad.

It was rocked by

party conflicts from within and menaced by Bolshevik violence
from without.

In order to convene safely,

the members of its

National Constituent Assembly met in Weimar instead of riot-torn
Berlin, whence came the historical term "Weimar Republic."

To

this Government fell the multifarious task of picking up the
pieces after the Empire's surcease: convening a National Assem
bly, writing a constitution,

continuing the fight against Bol1

2
shevism, helping a starving,
-“and concluding peace,,

apathetic populace toward recovery,

The first confrontation with the harsh

peace terms of the Allied and Associated Powers fell to the Re
public's Foreign Minister, Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau.
"The Conference of Paris," wrote Professor James To
Shotwell,
was a meeting of the enemies of the Central Powers which,
dictated treaties for each of the ex-enemy States and
hardly listened at all to their protests against the con
ditions imposed upon them* . . . /The leaders of liberal
Germany_J7 had dared to hope that a peace based upon the
Wilsonian program would offer the new German Republic an
opportunity to co-operate to the full in building the
structure of a wor ld-community.
But this was not to be,

French Premier Georges Clamenceau

dominated the Conference proceedings.
sions, France's

Regarding policy deci

"Tiger," together with American President W o o d 

row Wilson, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George,
ian Premier Vittorio Orlando
overshadowed Orlando)

and Ital

(although the first three greatly

reigned supreme as the "Big Four."

In

the words of Lord Riddell, chief representative of the British
press at the Conference,

"No four kings or emperors could have

conducted the conference on more autocratic

lines.

The war psychosis had not abated one bit.

The dominant

European chiefs of state were in Paris on the premise that they
1James T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference
York; The Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 41.

(New

2Lord Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the
Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923 (London; Victor Gollancz
Ltd., 1933), p„ 48.
See also Lord Hankey, The Supreme Control
at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London; Allen and Unwin
L t d .,1963), C h s . XII and XIII especially, on the evolution of
"summit" control of the Peace Conference.
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would demand everything possible from Germany.
understandably,

In France,

this feeling verged upon hysteria.

Clemenceau

was a "moderate" compared to the really extremist desire to dis
member Germany politically, but he demanded the utmost in disar
mament and reparations.

To insure the acceptance by the others

of the League of Nations Covenant,

President Wilson altered his

views to accommodate much that the French, British,
national groups demanded.

In this way,

Fourteen Point program of January,

and other

the idealistic Wilsonian

1918, which Germany claimed

to be the basis of the armistice and coming peace negotiations,
was gradually eroded during four months of facing the realities
of European nationalism, war-hysteria, and practical politics.
The latitude of Wilson's swing of opinion can be appreciated by
comparing the Allied ultimatum to Germany on June 22, 1919,

de

manding that the German Government: accept unconditionally the
unnegotiated Treaty of Versailles within twenty-four hours, or
face the alternative of military invasion, with the words of
Wilson's speech of January 22, 1917,

seeking an end to the war

through a negotiated "peace without victor y":
Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's
terms imposed upon the vanquished.
it would be accepted
in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice,
and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory
upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but
only as upon quicksand.
Only a peace between equals can
last, only a peace the very principle of which is equality
and a common participation in a common benefit.3
3Arthur S. Link, Wilson; Campaigns for Progressivism
and Peace 1916-1917 (Princeton University Press, 1965), pp.
—

4
As for Lloyd George, Lord Riddell has described his
attitude on April 9, 1919s
To-day /Lloyd George__7 said that the Germans would have
to pay To the uttermost farthing.
He pushed aside eco
nomic difficulties and said that if the Germans decline
to fulfill their obligations, we can compel them by an
economic blockade.^
When the German Peace Delegation arrived at Versailles,
they were ostracized and treated contemptuously as the hateful
Boche.

The whole "spirit of Versailles" was revenge upon the

militaristic Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II; all the wrath, how
ever, descended upon the incipient Republic instead of the
tumbled E m p i r e .
During a ceremony at the Trianon Palace Hotel on May 7,
1919,

the peace treaty was presented to the German Delegation.

Germany's Foreign Minister made a speech on behalf of the Repub
lic.

Considered a fair-minded,

more years later,

even eloquent appeal twenty and

the Count's speech at the time had an incen

diary effect upon the "Big Three."
ing with Lord Riddell,

Leaving that historic meet

President Wilson said to him,

The Germans are really a stupid people.
They always do
the wrong thing.
They always did the wrong thing during
the war.
That is why I am here.
They don't understand
human nature.
This is the most tactless speech I have
ever heard.
It will set the whole world against them.^
The 80,000 word Treaty had strong critics among the
Allies.

Many Allied economic experts agreed with the American

General Tasker H« Bliss, who had stated on March 25,
"We cannot both cripple her and expect her to pay.
^Riddell, p. 48.

^Ibid., p . 74.

1919,
We must

5
offer terms which a responsible Government in Germany can expect
to carry out. "6
Lansing remarked,

on May 8, American Secretary of State Robert.
"The impression made by it is one of disap

pointment, of regret,

and of depression.

The terms of peace

appear immeasurably harsh and humiliating, while many of them
seem to me to be impossible of performance."^

Arthur Walworth,

one of Wilson's biographers, notes that the president said on
May 1% "if i were a German,

I think I should never sign it."®

The new German Republic wanted peace and a chance for
a new beginning among the community of nations.

Yet the man who

represented it at Versailles succeeded only in arousing the ire
of the "Big Three," who dictated peace terms so gever-6 that even
prominent Allied dignitaries critized them at the time.

What

stood behind the appointment of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau as the
first Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic?
as Lloyd George insisted,

an "insolent Junker"?

Was he really,
What brought

him to Versailles as chief plenipotentiary of the struggling
German Republic?
^Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement
(3 v o l s .; New York; Doubleday,- Doran and Co., 1922), II, 495.
^Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, A Personal
Narrative (Boston; Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1921), p. 272.
p

phet

Arthur Walworth, Woodrow W i l s o n , Vol. II: World Pro
(New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), p. 319.

CHAPTER I
"PER ROTE G R A F cc
One of the most unusual and forceful personalities of
modern German history was the man who became the first Foreign
Minister of the Weimar Republic.

The overwhelming problems

faced by Germany after the complete collapse of the old order
called for strength and decision in the leaders of the new Re 
public.

In Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau the Majority

Socialists found a man of experience,

conviction,,

and authority,

who, unlike many of his peers, was willing to work with them to
build a democratic Germany.
Dr. Edgar Stern-Rubarth, author of the only published
biography of the Count, has subtitled his study "Wanderer zwischen zwei W e l t e n , ,! because Brockdorf f-Rantzau bridged the gap
between the diplomacy of the German Empire and the Republic's
desperate struggle for recognition.,-*-

in February,

1919, Brock

dorf f-Rantzau concluded his first foreign policy speech before
the newly elected National Assembly in Weimar with the words;

"I

■*"Edgar Stern-Rubar t h , Graf Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Wanderer
zwischen zwei Welten (Berlin; Reimar Hobbing, 1.929), p. 18. This
phrase was used by Gustav Stresemann and Professor Otto Hoetzsch
in their eulogies after the Count's death in September, 1928.
There is also an unpublished biography by Professor Erich Bran
denburg, which is based upon Brockdorff-Rantzau1s private papers.
The German Foreign Office prevented its publication in the early
1930's.
This MS is available on microfilm as part of the Foreign
Office Documents captured during World War II.
It has been used
as a major reference for this thesis.
6

7
hope to prove to you that a man can be both a Count and a con
vinced

D e m o c r a t .

His war-time history of active and success

ful cooperation with various radicals and with Danish and German
trade unions, his friendship with the German Social Democratic
leaders Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann,
get along with all shades of liberal opinion,

his ability to

and his willing

ness to play a prominent part in the post-war republican experi
ment earned him the enmity of many members of his own class, of
militarists,

and of arch-conservatives generally.

From this pro

ceeded the epithet "der rote G r a f " and the sarcastic phrase 11le
comte malgre lui .113
The Red Count was an aristocrat and a German patriot.
He was one of the few men of his class who realized early that
the war could not be won and that far-reaching changes must be
made if Germany was to survive as a united nation.

In the words

of Gustav Hilger, who was a member of his staff at the German
Embassy in Moscow in the 1920's, Brockdorff-Rantzau:
combined a sharp sense of reality with fervent patriotism.
He knew that the majority of his own social set would call
him a traitor to his class for entering the "revolutionary"
cabinet.
But instead of deterring him, this attitude drew
only his scorn and derision.
These gentlemen were in his
opinion doing the same thing they constantly .attributed to
the Socialists: they put the presumed interests of their
class over those of the nation, whereas he had, with patri2Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente (Charlottenburg:
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik u. Geschichte, 1920),
p . 62 .
Stern-Rubarth, p. 18.

8
otic effort, put aside all instincts and predilections
in jblacing himself at the disposal of the Council of
Peoples Deputies.4
Early Years
On both sides, Brockdorff-Rantzau1s family can be traced
back to the Middle Ages.

Family background is of great impor

tance in understanding the personality and outlook of the Count.
His father's family was distinguished in the service of the
Kings of Denmark;

three Rantzaus were Danish Field Marshals,

and

Josias Rantzau became a Marshal of France under Louis XIII.5
Among his mother's forebears, Cai Lorenz,

as the first Count

Brockdorff, was one of the first Danish feudal

Lords.^

Ulrich Karl Christian and his twin brother, Ernst Lud
wig Emil, were born in Schleswig on May 29, 1869.

Their father,

Count Hermann zu Rantzau, was district judge and Prussian
assessor in Schleswig.

When he died unexpectedly in 1872,

Countess Juliana went to her father's estate in Holstein,
Schloss Kletkamp, with her four sons,
older than the twin brothers,

Friedrich was two years

and Christian,

somewhat younger.

Soon afterward, her uncle, Baron Ulrich von Brockdorff,
his namesake,

the young Count Ulrich?

adopted

He received the surname

von Brockdorff-Rantzau, so that he might eventually inherit the
uncle's estate in Schleswig,

called Annettenhoh, where he had

^Hilger, Gustav, and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible
Allies, A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941
(New York: The Macmillan C o . , 1953) , p~. 89.
^Stern-Rubarth, p. 21.
r

li

°Henning von Ru m ohr, Schlosser und Herrensitze in Schles
wig-Holstein und in Hamburg (Frankfurt a. Main: Wolfgang Weidlich,
1963) , pp. 81-82, 94.
His mother was Countess Juliana von Brock
dorf f-Kletkamp (1843-1923).

9
been born.

This accounts for the difference in surname from

his twin brother, Count Ernst zu Rantzau,
ance,

Identical in appear

the two brothers enjoyed a very close relationship all

their lives.

Ernst died in 1930,

two years after his brother.

Admiration for his great-uncle inclined the young
Count Ulrich toward a diplomatic career from his earliest
years.

Baron Brockdorff,

a cultivated man, had been the Danish

King's Ambassador in Madrid,

Paris,

and Berlin,

and had found

it hard to accept Prussian rule in Schleswig-Holstein after 1864.8
Count Ulrich's education was a preparation for the dip
lomatic service,

and he was a brilliant,

scholarly young man

with little inclination toward the "studentische Bummelei" then
so prevalent.

He completed the Gymnasium in Eutin in 1888,

studied at four Universities: Neuchatel

then

(where all work was in

French and he acquired many French cultural ties), Freiburg,
Berlin,

and Leipzig, where he became Doctor of Jurisprudence.

Having completed an outstanding student career at the age of
twenty-two,^ he faced the problem of what he should do,

for,

^Helgo Klatt, "Die Brockdorffs in der Stadt Schleswig
und auf Annettenhoh," Beitrage zur Schleswiger Stadtgeschichte,
Heft 6, (1962), pp. 15-16.
Ownership of the estate passed to
him in 1912, after the death of Baronin Brockdorff,
See National
Archives Record Group 242, World War II Collection of Seized
Enemy Records, Records of the German Foreign Ministry and the
Reichschancellery covering the Weimar Period, Microcopy No, T~
120, "Nachlass Brockdorff-Rantzau, 11 Serial 9101H/Roll 3435/Frame
H229 901.
Hereafter cited as "Nachlass B - R ;
, " serial/roll/frames.
8stern-Rubarth, pp. 32-33; Klatt, p. 16.
Baron Brock
dorff often spent the winter in France, and he had much to do
with planning his nephew's education before his death in 1875.
^Stern-Rubarth, pp. 34-35.
professor Friedburg of Leip
zig had his scholarly dissertation published in a journal of
canonical law.

10
"with every diploma in his pocket which was required or desir
able for the diplomatic service" he was three years too young
to enter i t . ^
The Army provided an ideal solution for the young noble
man.

Through his aunt, Countess Therese von Brockdorff who was

the K a i s e r i n 1s Mistress of the Robes, he obtained a commission
in the elite First Regiment of the Foot Guards.
Acmy years, becoming a Lieutenant in 1892.

He enjoyed his

After two years he

resigned and spent the six months prior to entering the diplo
matic service practicing law near Schleswig with his brother
E r n s t .^
Beginning of Diplomatic Career
In 1894 Brockdorff-Rantzau embarked upon his diplomatic
career which was to span over thirty years.
attache in Brussels for two years.

His first post was

In 1897 he passed various

further examinations and then went to St. Petersburg as a Lega
tion Secretary, where he remained until 1901, forming strong
friendships with German diplomats Prince Radolii* and Baron
Richard von Kuhlmann.

The next eight years he spent in Vienna,

where he became Counselor of Embassy in 1905.

For a short time

during the Vienna period he also served at The Hague as Coun
selor of Legation.
post,

In 1909 he received his first independent

that of Consul-General in Budapest,

and there he remained

until 1912, when an important vacancy occurred for which he was
•LQI b i d ., p. 35.
I]~Ibid., p . 37 .

The age requirement was twenty-five.

eligible,

and most desirous of obtaining:

Minister in Copenhagen.,

that of German

12

The Count was an extraordinary individual.
der,

Tall,

slen

impeccably tailored, he was the grand seigneur par excel

lence.

Visibly, one's first impression was that of refinement.

Paintings, photographs,
sharp-cut,

and word descriptions all stress his

aristocratic features— dark hair, high forehead,

deep-

set eyes, carefully trimmed Guardsman's mustache, pale counten
ance,

strong chin surmounting an ever present old-fashioned high

white collar.

He smoked cigarettes continually and greatly e n 

joyed fine wines and French cognac and champagne.
His mode of life was as distinctive as his appearance,
even bizarre by normal standards.

A lifelong bachelor, he had

time and interest only for his career and intellectual pursuits?
he was a connoisseur of art, a scholar of literature and his
tory,
style.

and anything he wrote was polished to a high literary
He completely reversed the hours kept by ordinary people.

Except for essential diurnal appointments, he preferred to sleep
until late in the day.
elegantly,

In the evening he dined sparingly but

and habitually worked at his desk throughout the

entire night.

when necessary, he could drive himself relent

lessly; during diplomatic and political crises he worked day and
■^National Archives, Washington D.C., Microcopy T-120,
"The Brandenburg Manuscript," 1689H/1012/396 686-87.
Hereafter
cited as BMS/serial/roll/frames. Bee also Stern-Rubarth, pp.
45-46.
13

Dr. Edvard Brandes^ "Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau und die
danische Neutralitat," Europaische Gesprache, VII (January, 1929)
pp. 33-34.
Stern-Rubarth, pp. 33-34, 132-33, 143, 150.

12
night„

Of himself,

the Count once said that " . . . mein Lebens-

element /Tst_7 di.e polit ike. All during his rather sequestered
life, his closest confidants were his mother, who died in 1923,
and his twin brother in Berlin
Reserved, but courteous to casual acquaintances, he most
enjoyed salon-type gatherings with old French cognac and his
few good friends.

Of this, Professor Moritz J„ Bonn observes,

"The nearer midnight,

the brighter his light was shining.

He

was a brilliant conversationalist as the hours went past, with
those he liked and trusted."15

Drawing on his long experience

in diplomatic circles, he was a trenchant and witty raconteur.
He was notorious for his ready wit, which took the form of
clever sarcasm "from which he spared no one,
self ."-*-6

including him

clever at coining stinging epithets, he often lashed

out at those present without warning,
others at a distance.

and this tended to keep

He also loved classical allusions and

references to historical writings such as the Memoirs of SaintSimon.

Wipert von Blhcher, who,

as a young member of the For-

l^BMS, 1691H/1013/397 349.
Living in Berlin, Graf
Ernst was recognized as Graf Ulrich's veritable alter ego and
as such was a vital link between Brockdorff-Rantzau and Berlin,
especially during the war years and later during his tenure as
Ambassador in Moscow from 1922 to 1928.
Graf Ernst had married
Carmelita von Noer in 1894.
Divorced in 1916, they had one son,
Graf Frederik-August zu Rantzau-Noer, who died in a Russian
prison camp in 1945.
Stern-Rubarth, p. 63; Klatt, p. 28.
Day Co.,

^ M o r i t z J. Bonn, Wandering Scholar
1948), p. 229.

(New York; The John

■^Wipert von Blucher, Deutschlands Weg nach Rapallo (Wies
baden: Limes Verlag, 1951), p. 43.
See also "Brockdorff-Rantzau:
Man of the Hour in Ger many," Current Opinion, LXVIX (July, 1919),
p. 21, and Otto Hoetzsch, "Botschafter Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau,"
Europjiische Gesprache, VII (January, 1929), p. 14; Novak, p. 185.
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eign Office in the early days of the Republic,
well,

knew the Count

includes an excellent sketch in Deutschlands Weg nach

Rap allo %
When /Brockdorff -RantzauJ7 was 1n Berlin he lived with
his twin brother in a house in the Viktoriastrasse, furn
ished with cultivated taste and ornamented with elegant
antiques.
Through Baron Lanqwerth I was, despite my youth,
brought into the group which met in the Viktoriastrasse.
It was an oval room in which the Foreign Minister received
guests with great pleasure and used to converse with them
as they sat in comfortable chairs along the walls.
The
intellectual lightning bolts flew here and there and the
most striking remarks and sharpest points were always made
by the hosto
Even when a guest had found a fortunately
precise expression, the master of the house always had a
superior,, more intensive answer.
It was an intellectual
effort to take part in this exchange of thoughts, and an
aesthetic pleasure to listen to him.
Personality Observations
Despite his charm and erudition, other aspects of his
personality proved to be serious drawbacks.
nervous,

finicky,

He was high-strung,

and oversensitive to real or imagined slights.

Often quick to anger, he who was aptly described after his
death as "der letzte R itt e r ”1® was only too quick to throw down
the gauntlet when his dignity was affronted.

Observations of

this nature show up in the ensuing quotations from those who
knew him. well.
While Minister in Copenhagen,
friendship with Maurice F. Egan,
Through Egan's eyes,
intellectual,

the Count enjoyed a warm.

the American Minister there.

Brockdorff-Rantzau appears as a charming

an aloof, very refined gentleman:

A more delightfully amusing, sophisticated, well-read man
of the world I have never m e t . He was one of the few Ger17Bluche r, p. 43.

l®Stern-Rubarth, p. 165.
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mans who knew a good cocktail from a bad one, and whose
taste in champagne was impeccable*
He was not generally
beloved by his "dear colleagues," although they never ex
pressed their disapprobation in loud tones. . . . Socially
an aristocrat, he was in politics rather liberal.
Tall,
graceful, he needed only to take a reasonable amount of
exercise to make him as handsome as he was distinguished.
One could talk with him of the coulisses de Rome as well
as of the intricacies of German party politics with great
pleasure s^
In a previous book, Egan predicted that the Count would later
have great influence in German politics,
startling opinion:

"Count Rantzau,

and expressed a rather

if he lives, will be heard

of later; he is one of the well-balanced among diplomatists."
Continuing this train of thought, Egan added,
If he lives, he ought to go far, as he is plastic, and
sees the signs of the times.
I found him delightful;
but he infuriated other people.
One day, when he is ut
terly tired of life, he will consciously exasperate
somebody to fury, in order to escape the trouble of com
mitting suicide himself*
I shall always miss him.
He
is the kind of man whose society you covet on this earth,
because if all signs prove true, you are not likely to
meet him in Heaven--until late in Eternity! ^0
Count Johann von Bernstorff,

cousin of Brockdorff-Rant

zau and Ambassador to Washington from. 1913-1917, offered a
brief but valid observation in his M e m o i r s :
Rantzau was very gifted and intelligent, but had
serious disabilities; his extreme suspiciousness, which
bordered on persecution mania, and his inability to
make even the briefest impromptu speech before a large
assembly.
Added to which there was his personal sensi
tiveness, which made him take every divergence of view
^ M a u r i c e F . Egan, Recollections of a Happy Life
York: George H . »Doran and Co,, 1924), pp. 263-64.

(New

7 0Maurice
F. Egan, Ten Years Near the German Frontier
(New York: George H= Doran and Co*, 1919), pp. 56, 270.
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as a personal matter.
When he mentioned anyone, he
never said: "He takes this or that view"; but "He is
for me or against m e . "21
Eugen Schiffer,
Scheidemann,
end of 1918.

Democrat and Vice Chancellor under

describes his first meeting with the Count at the
He was, wrote Schiffer,

an extremely elegant man, dark eyes in a pale counten
ance, impeccably attired, with almost overly polite
manners and courtly dexterity. . . . he belonged to the
feudal diplomacy, and as the nephew of the Chief Lady
in Waiting of the Kaiserin he had stood especially close
to the Court.
But he definitely made no use of these
advantages of birth.
In our following conversation
lasting far into the night., he reiterated that the posi
tion'of the Party made no difference to him and that he
was ready to serve any government that would allow him,
within agreed-upon limits, a free hand in foreign policy.
. . . He was sensitive and suspicious, of an easily
aroused nature, a real bundle of nerves.22
Professor Moritz J. Bonn, who became a trusted and v a l u 
able advisor to the German Delegation at Versailles, had some
incisive observations regarding Brockdorff-Rantzau,
came to know very well.

whom he

The Count was, wrote Bonn,

a liberal by temperament, not by conviction, as many of
his more intelligent colleagues have been.
Being an
individualist of almost anarchistic proclivities, he
disliked bureaucrats and soldiers.
A courtier rather
than a statesman, he was far better fitted to deal with
persons than with problems. . . . He could work equally
well with Communists and conservatives, pacifists and
nationalists, provided they respected his sensitive ego.
For he did not identify himself with a cause; he identi
fied the cause with himself; everything with him. was
personal.
His ambition was limitless--he would have
liked to be German chancellor or even president of the
Reich; he would not have minded the political color of
the party that chose him. . . . /ne was 7 an extremely
9^
“Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, The Memoirs of
Count Bernstorff (London: Heinemann, 1936), p. 254.
99
Eugen Schiffer, Ein Leben fur den Liberalismus (Berlin
Grunewald: F„Ao Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1951), pp. 222-23.
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interesting personality who needed but a small amount of
common sense and a little less egotism to achieve actual ^
greatnessc
He was a lonely man; few people trusted him.
Perhaps the best discussion of his personality and attitude by one who knew him well is given by Gustav Hilger,

who

wrote of him:
Rantzau was in no way preoccupied with "social justice"
and paid no allegiance to political ideals like liberty
and equality.
The range of values that mattered to his
own inner personality might have seemed to be primarily
aesthetic, not social.
Nothing gave him greater pleasure
than the enjoyment of fine style, be it in a masterpiece
of fine arts from his exquisite collection, a literary
gem, or in personal conduct, . . . The length to which he
went in his sensitivity to style was indeed, in the nature
of an obsession; . . . But R a n t z a u 's arrogance was not
simply the narrow ancestor-pride of the aristocrat who
has nothing but noble forebears to boast of; his was the
nervous, finicky arrogance of the aesthete who has ab
sorbed the highest standards of his culture and abhors
those unable to reach the same heights. . . .
He advocated democratic reforms from the firm con
viction that Germany could no more be governed in the
old ways without inviting the most serious internal dif
ficulties*
Thus his vigorous espousal of social and
democratic reforms stemmed from the desire to aid Ger
many's war effort by preventing internal convulsions.
Moreover, sensing the coming defeat long before the m a 
jority of generals and politicians were ready to admit
the possibility, Rantzau wanted to deprive the demo
cratic enemies of Germany of the argument that Germany
was a bastion of reaction*24
Relations with the Court
As a former Imperial diplomat, his standing with the
Kaiser is of interest and importance in regard to his later al
legiance to the Republic.

"Not being of old Prussian origin,"

said Professor Bonn of the Count,

"he was not encumbered by the

traditional loyalty that bound the Junker to the House of Hohen=
23B o n n , pp. 228,

229-30*

24Hilger,

pp. 85-86,

87
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zollern,

and he had not found it hard to throw in his lot with
25
the Republic*"
Brockdorff-Rantzau was well acquainted at

Court and he had known the Kaiser since 1891.

According to

Stern-Rubarth,
The Kaiser was always friendly and benevolent toward
Brockdorff-Rantzau, and had his eye on his capabilities
ever since asking^ Professor Schottmuller for the exam
ination papers /Prufungsarbeiten 7 of the extraordinary
young officer upon his joining the f^irst Guard Regi
ment, the first Doctor of Jurisprudence and junior
barrister who had entered the Prussian Army . .0
Apparently,

the

young Count never

tablishing a genial relationship;
mien was always professional,

took the K a i s e r ’s lead in es
before the All-Highest his

intellectual,

and dignified.

It is appropriate to relate here that Count Ernst was
Chamberlain at the Imperial German Court for many years,
tually becoming Privy Councillor*
cation on November 9, 1918,
man Kaiser,

even

The Kaiser's partial abdi

when he gave up the throne as Ger

but refused to abdicate as King of Prussia, was a

monstrous political gaffe c

It was Graf Ernst,

from the Council of People's Representatives,

who,

obtained W i l h e l m “s

signature on the instrument of complete abdication,
vember 28, 1918, which began,

Crown of Prussia,

Crown connected

therewith.^
p. 229.,

dated No

"I herewith renounce for all time

my right to the

^Bonn,

as delegate

and to the German Imperial

Both brothers wished to see the
^Stern- Rub art h,

p p s 44_45o

Ibid*, p 0 63;
Joachim von Kurenberg, The Kaiser, A
Life of Wilhelm II, Last Emperor of Germany, tr. H 0T 0 Russell
and Herta Hagen (New York? Simon and Schuster, 1955), p„ 380*
After the war Graf Ernst acted as administrator for the exKaiser's estates in Germany*
He submitted his resignation from
this position in November, 1926*
Ernst zu Rantzau to ex-Kaiser
Wilhelm II, November 30, 1926, "Nachlass B-R, " 9101.H/3434/H228
212-13 *
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ex-Kaiser adequately provided for.
Representatives
Government)

When the Council of People's

(Majority Socialist forerunner of the Weimar

discussed what should be done with the former K a i 

ser 's property,
/Brockdorff-Rantzau "7 suggested that it should neither be
expropriated nor be~“lianded back to be disposed of freely„
Instead, the Kaiser's private property should be used by
the German state to pay him and his family a life-long
annuity that would enable them to live according to their
status.
Rantzau wanted to prevent the house of Hohenzollern from using their tremendous fortunes to the detriment
of the republic.28
Former Imperial Chancellor Prince Bernhard von Bulow
recorded in his Memoirs a conversation with Wilhelm II on June
27, 1909, when they discussed possible successors to Bulow as
Chancellor,

and wondered also who would be a good prospect for

Foreign Secretary:
Bulow?

Brockdorff-Rantzau is also talented.

Kaiser:
I don't care for him.
He's the nephew of Therese
Brockdorff, my wife's Mistress of the Robes, and I don't
like personal relationships between the Foreign Office and
my people at C o u r t . 29
The Kaiser remembered Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, however, when
three years later, he needed an exceptionally able diplomat and
a writer of lucid and detailed dispatches in the sensitive post
of German Minister in Copenhagen.
28

OQ

Hilger, pp. 87-88.

Prince Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs of Prince von
B u l o w , t r . Geoffrey Dunlop (4 v o l s . ; Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1932), II, 575.

CHAPTER II
THE VIEW FROM COPENHAGEN
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau was German Minister in Copen
hagen from 1912 until the end of the First World War.
very pleased with this assignment,

He was

for he considered the German-

Scandinavian relationship of great diplomatic i m p o r t a n c e . D e s 
cended from Danish and German nobility, he was uniquely quali
fied for this position.
Since the turn of the century,

several war scares had

ruffled the serenity of what was otherwise a golden age for
Europe,

and nationalist ambitions continually built up dangerous

pressures.

With the inception of the Triple Entente in 1907,

German and Austrian military chiefs became obsessed with the
fear of encirclement, or Einkreisung.
Budapest, where,

Glancing northward from

as German Consul-General he had been close to

the explosive Balkan situation,

the Count realized the potential

importance of Scandinavia to Germany's security.

As enemies,

the northern countries would force Germany to keep permanent
contingents of troops on the north coast, but as "friendly neu^Although seniority made him eligible for Sofia or Lis
bon, he declined these posts, preferring to remain in Budapest
until that in Copenhagen became available,: where he believed he
would "really be in a position to accomplish somethinq useful."
B M S , 16893/1012/396 7 26.
The post in Copenhagen was considered,
as "an old tradition of the Foreign Office," as preparatory to
the Ambassadorship in St. Petersburg.
Stern-Rubarth, p. 45.
19
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trals" their proximity to shipping lanes would be useful to Ger
many and they could be a source of food and raw materials. 2

fje

was especially interested in the Danish-German relationship.
Denmark's

"German Course"

The reign of King Christian X of Denmark had begun
shortly before Brockdorff-Rantzau assumed his ministerial duties
in Copenhagen.

Under the Radical-Socialist ministry of Prime

Minister Carl Zahle, Denmark continued the so-called "TyskerK u r s 11 (German course)
mighty German

Empire.

protective treaties,

aimed at friendly relations with the
^

They feared to do otherwise; despite

no one had come to Denmark's aid in 1864

when Prussia took Schleswig-Holstein.

Danish Conservatives

still hoped to rectify this injustice some day, perhaps by join
ing Germany's adversaries if a European war broke out.^

2BMS,

1689H/1012/396 730-31.

^Christian X also favoured this course.
B M S , 1689/1012/
396 731, 786.
According to a pre-World War II expose of DanishGerman relations, the policy of not antagonizing Germany began
in 1901, when a Liberal Government supplanted the Conservatives.
See Joachim Joesten, Rats in the Larder; The Story of Nazi Influ
ence in Denmark (New York; G.P. Putnam's Sons, pp. 223-26.
^Article V of the Treaty of Prague between Prussia and
Austria provided that a plebiscite should decide whether predomi
nantly Danish North Schleswig should be returned to Denmark.
By
a Danish-German Treaty of 1907, Denmark agreed to the post-1866
North Schleswig boundary without a plebiscite.
Danish resistance
continued, however, despite long-standing Prussian subjugation.
See Ralph H„ Lutz's extensive introduction to Hans Peter Hanssen,
Diary of a Dying E m p ir e, t r . Oscar Osburn Winther (Indiana Uni
versity Press, 1955), pp. xix-xx, xvi-xvii.
Thus evolved the paradox of Danish politics vis-a-vis Gerr
many.
In J o e s t e n 's words: "While the Conservative and RightWing Liberals, though ideologically more in sympathy with the
Kai ge rreich 's regime than with the Western democracies, refused
to capitulate to the mailed fist, Social-Democrats and Radicals
were all in favor of surrender.
Joesten p. 235.
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The Count,

therefore-, bent every effort to maintain the

Danish democratic elements in p o w e r „
many Cabinet Ministers,
Scavenius, and,

He was on good terms with

especially Foreign Minister Eric; von

as the scion of Danish and German noble families,

he was respected at the Danish Court,
self a Schleswiger,

Brockdorff-Rantz.au, him

urged that the German-Danish hostility

in

this northern part of Germany be played down in order to avoid
giving encouragement to the Danish conservatives *
again," wrote Erich Brandenburg,

"he stressed that, domestic poli

tics must not be allowed to dominate foreign
one of his cardinal precepts,

"Again and

p o l i c y .

This was

though it was often ignored in Berlin.

Outbreak of the First World War
War clouds gathered over Europe again in the summer of
1914, and this time they did not disperse.

Brockdorff-Rantzau

was attending the Kiel Regatta when news of the assassination
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was received.
matic representatives of Germany abroad,

Like the other diplo
the Count received only

scant information from the imperial Government regarding the
negotiations taking place between the governments involved.
During the tense period following the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia, he received no directions as to what he should do in
case war broke out,
seriousness of the

except "to see that Denmark realized the
s i t u a t i o n

He was not even apprised by

the Foreign Office of the German declaration of war against Rus-

5B M S / 1689H/1012/396 730-32.
^BMS# 1689H/1012/396 734; Luigi Albertini, The Origins
of the War of 1914, t r . and ed. by Isabella M. Massey, (3 v o l s .;
London: Oxford University Press, 1957), III, 673-76.
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sia.

Brandenburg relates that Brockdorff-Rantzau received in

structions to aid the homeward journey through Denmark of the
Russian Ambassador to Berlin when the special train crossed
over the Danish border,

and from this !,he had to conclude that

the diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia were broken
and that in all probability a state of war between the two
countries already existed,, "
Brockdorff-Rantzau's first duty,
sure Denmark's neutrality.

of course,

was to in

On his own initiative he indicated

that Germany had no wish to violate Danish neutrality,

and ob

tained a statement from the Danish Government on August 3 that
Q
Denmark would not join with Germany's enemies.
Two days later
he was directed by his Government to request that Denmark mine
certain of her territorial waters
Belt) herself,

(the Big Belt and the Little

if she did not wish Germany to do so.

This was

a hard decision for Denmark to make.

But once again,

German reprisal forced her to comply;

if the Danes refused to

mine the Belts themselves,

fear of

then Germany would do it and station

German troops on the various islands to guard the installations.
It took all Count Brockdorff-Rantzau1s skill and diplomatic

7 BMS,

1689H/1012/396 734.

8 BMS, 1689H/1012/396 734-35.
8A Danish Royal Proclamation of August 1 had declared
absolute neutrality; furthermore, according to a 191,2 neutrality
agreement between Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, the Belts and
Sound were to remain open to all vessels, merchantmen and w a r 
ships, in war and peace.
Joesten, p. 231.
King Christian X
wired his cousin, King George V of England, appealing for his
understanding of Denmark's position.
I b i d ., p. 236.
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adroitness to make the necessary demands upon Denmark regard”
ing sea defenses and to restrain Germany's military and naval
authorities from infringing on Danish neutrality during the
next four y e a r s .10

Danish-German EdDnomic Ties
From 1912 on, Brockdorff-Rantzau had strived for a
closer economic relationship between the two countries,
with much difficulty.H

often

He successfully fostered friendly re

lations, which, when war came,
rangement vital to both sides.

developed into an economic ar
For wartime deliveries of coal

to Denmark, Germany received essential foodstuffs.

This Kohlen-

politik was necessary even if it hurt Germany? otherwise,

Den

mark would be forced to look again to England if the German
coal supply failed,

and Germany might find the friendly larder

door closed.
Brockdorff-Rantzau appreciated every nuance of the
del icate relationship between Denmark and the two warring
powers, Germany and England.

He sometimes made recommendations

l ^ i n g Christian X respected Brockdorff-Rantzau, and is
reputed to have said after the war, "Denmark should really put
up a monument to him."
B M S , 1689H/1012/396 859.
^ H e vigorously advocated, for example, the building
of the Fehmarn Railroad line (Hamburg-Lubeck-Fehmarn Island-toCopenhagen) which, cutting hours off the old Kiel-Korsor-Copenhagen route, would have greatly benefited businessmen.
This earned him the ill will of German naval authorities who
resented the by-passing of the important naval headquarters of
Kiel.
Brockdorff-Rantzau complained that "it was incomprehen
sible „ o „ that they /are building railroads_7 in Asia to
strengthen German political influence, and, where a similar pos
sibility exists right at our doorstep thev reject it,"
BMS,
1689H/1012/396 732-33 .

180^43
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which Berlin found difficult to accept and to which the German
Admirals were especially opposed.

Through 1916 he insisted on

a realistic approach in view of B r i t a i n ’s naval superiority,
In order to retain Denmark as a "friendly neutral" Germany
simply had to tolerate some Danish shipments of grain to Eng
land, one of Denmark's essential markets,,
omy collapsed,
m

a

n

y

If the Danish econ

there would be no more food shipments to Ger-

reminded Berlin that Danish dependence on a com

mercial relationship with England ha$ developed as a result of
Germany's previous Schutzzollpolitik,13 and he now sought to
direct D e n m a r k ’s commercial orientation southward without up
setting her economyo

Constantly,

in conversations and reports,

he reiterated his conviction that the nation which first in
jured Danish neutrality would become Denmark's enemy.

Germany,

he said, would be wiser to refrain from provocative acts and
let England be the first to get tough with Denmark about neu
trality vi olations„

It was even better to offer to protect

■^Accjorciing to Dr „ Edvard Brandes, Finance Minister in
the Zahle Cabinet, as much as two-thirds of Denmark's exported
produce went to England and the other one-third to Germany,
See Brandes, p. 33.
In a memorandum of April, 1917, Brockdorff-Rantzau
noted; "if we deliver coal and iron to a greater extent, the
feeling of being forced into economic dependence on England
will disappear.
Herr von Scavenius has mentioned that, in this
case, in addition to other concessions, he would also be an a
position to increase significantly the quota of horses,," BMS,
1689H/1012/396 790.
l^BMS, 1689H./1012/396 792-33. Cf. Hanssen, p. xxv,
which describes the expansion of Danish” agricultural export
trade to England in the latter 19th century, since "the only
open market left was the British .
"
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Denmark from British coercion .A4
The ultimate goal of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s Danish policy
was twofold.

First, he wanted to avoid incurring the enmity

of Sweden and Norway, which he felt would be the result of
German military pressure on Denmark.

He wrote to Chancellor

Bethmann-Ko1lweg in April,

1917,

attack Denmark militarily,

Denmark will cease to exist politi

cally,

"If we,

for economic reasons,

and the hostility toward us of both the other Scandina

vian lands is

certain.

"1-5

His second objective was both shrewd and practical;
German military pressure,

he wrote in the same month,

ruin our whole Scandinavian policy.

"would

We need Denmark as a neu

tral broker after the conclusion of peace,

in order to rein

state relationships with the nations with whom we are now at
war,

and to rebuild our economic life."16

F0r this,

a long

standing economic partnership between the two countries was es
sential o

14BMS, 1689H/1012/396 766, 769, 784, 786, 836.
■*~~^BMS, 1689H/1012/396 799.
Other neutrals could be
easily antagonized,.
Richard von Kuhlmann had warned in Octo
ber, 1916, that Holland's 700,000 man militia would fight Ger
many if unrestricted U-boat warfare began.
Link, Campaigns,
1916-1917, p „ 185,
Hans Peter Hanssen, Reichstag member for
North Schleswig, also mentions Dutch hostility toward Germany.
Hanssen, p„ 55.

16BMS,

1689H/1012/396 826,

862-63,

792,93,99.
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U-Beats and the Americans
Six years in Copenhagen,

the "whispering gallery of

Europe, !l made Brockdorf f-Rantzau much more aware of events and
opinions in other countries than many German statesmen and mili
tary leaders at the t i m e «

He was among those Germans who

warned against intensifying the submarine warfare when the
military and naval commanders promised to subdue England within
months if Germany unleashed the U-boats.

The Count considered

this a foolhardy measure because he was one of the few German
diplomats in contact with representatives of neutral and Allied
states during the whole war.
In addition to keeping Denmark a friendly neutral,
Brockdorff-Rantzau considered it of greatest importance to
remain on friendly terms with the Americans who were in Copen
hagen.

Even worse than Danish alignment with the Allies was

the possibility of armed American intervention against G e r m a n y .
The Count was one of the first Germans to realize the enormity
--and then the probability of this.

He cultivated the friend

ship of the American Minister in Copenhagen,

and was consider

ate of American diplomats and travelers whenever requests were
made of h i.m- 7
One of the most interesting and prescient accounts of
diplomatic life in the Danish capital is Ten Years Near the
^ 7 •'He was always decent to Americans," wrote Maurice
Fo Egan, the American Minister to Denmark, of Brockdorff-Rant
zau, "and he was shocked when he found that his laissez passer,
which I obtained from him for the Hon, Do I„ Murphy and his
wife to pursue their journey to Holland, was treated as a
“scrap of p a p e r » !i:i Egan, Ten Years . , . , pp, 306-08,
Un
fortunately, German military authorities and border guards
usually paid no heed to these diplomatic niceties.

German Fron ti er , by Maurice Francis Egan, who was the American
Minister to Denmark from 1907 to 1918.

Respected at the

Danish Court, where he became Dean of the diplomatic corps in
Copenhagen about 1917 as the senior representative,

Egan was

well regarded by the other diplomats gathered in that enclave
of neutrality so close to the scene of war.

In this book he

refers many times to Brockdorff-Rantzau as "my colleague across
the street."

Although Egan became more and more mistrustful

of Germany's actions and intentions, he and the Count struck
up a close friendship over the years.

Propinquity undoubtedly

played some part in it., yet it was not surprising; both were
men of letters, good taste,

and elegant manners, who delighted

in refined conversation.
Despite the genuine friendship with the German Minis
ter, Dr. Egan never lost sight of the menace of German mili
tarism.

His whole book was a warning against Germany's aggres

sive intentionso

Well before the war broke out in 1914, Egan

realized the danger of German influence over Denmark, which
would lead,

in the case of German occupation of Denmark,

German ownership of the Danish West Indies I
sult of Egan's skillful handling,

to

Largely as a re

these outer Caribbean islands

with strategic deep water harbors were purchased by the United
States from Denmark "just in time"--December, 1916.

They were

renamed the Virgin Islands.
As late as 19.16, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau continued to
impress Americans in Copenhagen very favorably.

"Count Rantzau,

28
wrote Egan,
was desirous of keeping peace with the United States.,
I
think that he regarded war with us as so dangerous as to
be almost unthinkable,.
I found Count Rantzau a very
clever m a n ; he played his game fairly. It was a game, and
he was a colleague worth any man's respect.
He is one of
the most cynical, brilliant, forcible diplomatists in Eur
ope, with Liberal tendencies in politics.18
Several times in 1916,

James W. Gerard

(American Ambassador in

Berlin since the end of 1913) passed through Copenhagen on the
way to and from the United States.

At least twice, Egan ar

ranged luncheons for him and his wife,

to which Brockdorff-

Rantzau and others connected with the German Legation were
also invited.

Conversation was partly in French; although

Gerard told Egan that he spoke little French,

"he /perard _/7

got on immensely well with Count Rantzau, who spoke no Eng
lish. 1119

Gerard, not noted for friendliness toward Germans,

considered the Count "a most able diplomat" and set down his
impressions after further meetings with him in Copenhagen to
ward the end of 1916In Copenhagen, too, both on the way out and in, we
lunched with Count Rantzau-Brocksdorff /sie_J7 , then
German Minister there.
Count Rantzau is skillful, and
wily, and not at all military in his instincts; and, I
should say, far more inclined to arrive at a reasonable
compromise than the average German diplomat.
He is a
charming International with none of the rough points and
aggressive manners which characterise so many Prussian
officials 20

18I b i d ., p. 270.

19 I b i d ., p. 282.

^0jam.es W. Gerard, My Four years in. Germany (New Yorks
George H. Doran Co*. 1917), p. 425.
Regarding one of his
trips back into Germany Gerard relates; "I remained a day in
Copenhagen, in order to arrange for the transportation to Ger
many of the three tons of food which I had brought from New
York, and. also, in order to lunch with Count Rantzau, the
German. Minister, a most able diplomat."
I b i d », p. 352.
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Herbert Bayard Swope, correspondent for the New York
World who had spent several, months in Germany,
York with Gerard in August,

returned to New

1916, via Copenhagen.

Swope re

ported extensively on wartime conditions within Germany,

and

gave his opinion in the New York World that intensified sub
marine warfare was inevitable.

Gerard had said as much in a

somewhat indiscreet interview with Swope aboard ship.^!
his Pulitzer Prize winning book.

jn

Inside the German Empire, In

the Third Year of the W a r , published in 1917, Swope also re
corded that;

"Count Rantzau,

a few days after he had paid a

visit to the Kaiser and the great general staff,

told me frank

ly that he feared the plan /for all-out U-boat war_7 was rap
idly becoming unavoidable „58

Swope considered Brockdorf f-Rant

zau "unusually able" and identified him as "the very intelli
gent German Minister to Denmark,,"^
21on the Swope-Gerard interview, see E „ J 0 Kahn, Jr t,f
The World of Swope
(New York; Simon and Schuster, 1.965), pp.
Count Bernstorff mentions Swope,, along with William,
Bayard Hale, Karl von Wiegand, Cyril Brown, and Karl W„ Acker
man, as American journalists who had helped to provide accu
rate and favourable information on Germany for the American pub
lic through 1916.
Swope also pressed the theme of German hatred
of Americans., but Bernstorff viewed this as an "election man
o e u v r e , ” offset by Swope :s praise of German 'bff icienc^1" and or
ganization on the home front.
Count Johann Heinrich Bernstorff,
My Three Years in America (New York; Charles Scribner's Sons,
ig2o ) , P T ' 8 ..... ... ..
22fierbert Bayard Swope, Inside the German Empire, In
the Third Year of the War (New York; The Century Co.. 1.917),
pp. 8 8 , 5 5/ 7 7-78.
Before leaving Copenhagen, Swope wrote in a personal
letter; "My dear Excellency;- My wife and I feel we can not
leave Copenhagen without expressing to you the real pleasure
we felt in meeting you.
I congratulate Germany in being so
ably represented at this important, post, and I shall take plea
sure in expressing this sentiment in Berlin and Washington.
I
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Dr., Egan's position of official neutrality had become
more and more difficult after the Lusitania tragedy in May,
1915.

He tells how,

advertisement

after hearing of Bernstorff's infamous

(Count Bernstorff,

the German Ambassador in

Washington, was a cousin of Brockdorff-Rantzau) warning Ameri
cans not to sail in British or Allied ships,
I had said
"The day after an American is killed
witho ut
warning at, sea, we will declare war I" It was
undiplomatic, but. I had said it to Count Rantzau, to Prince
Wittgenstein, to Count Raben-Levetzau, to Prince Vaidemar,
to the Princes, to other persons, and, I think, at the
Foreign O f f i c e .23
,

o

o

„

As already mentioned,

.

„

Brockdorff-Rantzau did regard unrestric

ted U-boat warfare as a reckless move,

to be avoided.

A year

before the February, 1917, decision making it official German
policy, he had given his opinion,
patch from, the Chancellor,

in answer to a secret dis

that America would enter the war im

mediately if the U-boat war was intensifiedo24
German official, circles believed that England,

the most

powerful and determined Allied nation in 1916, would only ac
cept the idea of negotiations leading to a status quo peace if
convinced that America would not join the Allies in the w a r „
regret that our stay in Copenhagen should have been so brief as
I should have Iiked our acquaintance to have ripened into
friendship.,
Perhaps that opportunity will come, if not. before.,
when you are sent as Ambassador to America.
We would be for
tunate in having a man of such broad understanding, wide sympa
thies, and attractive personality as the German representative
--a worthy successor to Bernstorff who has done so well there .
. ."Swope, to Brockdorff-Rantzau, August ±5, 1916, "Nachlass
B “R,
9.105H/3438/231 37.1-82,■. By June, .1917, Swope was "sweepingly characterizing all the subjects inside the Empire as
'those damned Germans.""
Kahn, pp. 183-84«,
2^Egan,
24BMS

Ten Years

0 . ., pp. 290-91.

1689H/1012/396 752.
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President. Wilson seemed to want to keep out of the war, but his
fundamental pro-English feeling was becoming apparent,

and

would certainly be sparked by another incident like the Lusi
tania or the Arabic, as Bernstorff constantly warned from
W a s h i n g t o n

.25

yet the German High Command evidently ascribed

little importance to possible American intervention,
sed harder for the unrestricted use of submarines„

and presEgan des

cribes Brockdorff-Rantzau1s attitude at this times
We were still "neutral," and the election was eome
months off.
Count Rantzau saw the danger which the mili
tary party was courting.
He was too discreet to make
confidential remarks, which I would at once repeat to my
Government; he knew, of course, that. I would not repeat
them to my colleagues, who never, however, asked what he
said to meo
He was equally tactful, but we saw that he
was exceedingly nervous about the outcome of the U-boat
aggressiono
It was worthwhile to know his attitude, for
he represented much that was really important in Germany.
He began to be more nervous,, and many things he said, which
I can not repeat, indicated that the military party was
running a m u c k . 2 6
In Copenhagen,
German situation.

Egan held a magnifying glass upon the

He saw that,

despite the existence of oppo

sition views and those who would conclude a reasonable peace,
Germany was hopelessly dominated by the military.

He felt

^ Be rnstorff, My Three Years „ . , , p. 295.
In their
books on wartime Germany, Gerard, Egan, Swope, (and Bernstorff)
all refer to the persistent belief in Germany that ';er.ma.o -Am.eri cans, remaining loyal to Germany, would actually prevent an
American declaration of war against G e r m a n y „ Gerard and Egan
did what they could to refute this notion., and Swope notes that
Egan was aided by Brockdorff-Rantzau., "who finally came to this
view and helped eradicate the mistaken one that had been held
in B er lin." Swope, pp. 77-78.,
Some things contributed to the notion.
In a secret
meeting of the Finance Committee, March .10, 1915, Secretary of
State
Heifferich mentioned that " < . . appreciable sums were
subscribed to the second /German war_7 loan in Scandinavia,
Switzerland, and A m e r i c a , especially by the Germans in the lastnamed country."
Hanssen, p„ 101.
^Egan,

Ten Years

„ . . , p., 306,
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events would inevitably drag America into the conflict,
cially if Russia collapsed.

espe

By the end of 1916 Egan realized

that "we must enter the war eventually,

yet the depth and

breadth of German preparedness was horrifying;

and we are so

unready; we must gain time ! 2 7
Egan's frequent contact with the Count did not go un
observed and uncriticizedo
worried;

The British were increasingly

Egan relates thats

A messenger came to warn m e — a messenger from one of
my best English ,friends--that it would be well for me not
to see so much of Count Rantzau,
It was easy, my friend
said, for me to be attracted by mere cleverness and to
forget what England was fighting for.
It had been repor
ted that I had said that when Rantzau was Voltaire, he
was frightfully diabolical; when he was Heine, he was de
lightfully diabolical; but when he was just Rantzau, he
was the devil himself,!
This had reached the ears of some
of my English friends, and they thought such companion
ship might lead me to take the war issues too lightly .^8
For over two years Egan walked the tightrope of neutrality and
worked toward the one contribution he could make toward his
country's preparednesss

the timely purchase of the Danish

West Indies.
If they feared that Maurice Egan might be charmed over
to the wrong side of the fence,

the British representatives in

Copenhagen recognized "Brock," as they called him,
was:

for what he

the most influential and best supported diplomat in the
27

I b i d ,, p. 300.
At the beginning of the war, Sir
Henry Lowther (at that time British Minister in Copenhagen)
had astonished Egan with the prophecys
"Our great weakness is
Russia; if you do not come in and offset it, I fear greatly."
Ibid., p o 311.
^ Ibid. , pp„ 299-300.

Danish capital as long as the radical government remained in
p o w e r .29

Peace Feelers through Denmark
Politically and geographically,

Denmark was in a u-

nique position to offer mediation for peace.

Married to P r i n 

cess Alexandrine of Mecklinburg-Schwerin, King Christian X was
also related to both the British and Russian ruling families.
In the first two years of the war,

the Danish King had offered

Germany a tenuous means of contact with Russia or England. Two
approaches to Russia in this manner

f a i l e d .

20

The English diplomats in Copenhagen were a good baro
meter of Britain's reactions toward peace feelers,

and Brock

dor ff-Rantzau left no stone unturned in gathering such infor
mation.

On December 12, 1916, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had

made a speech in the Reichstag in favor of peace negotiations.
Because this move seemed to flaunt the strong German military
position, Lloyd George spoke out against the idea until G er 
many would guarantee reparation and restitution of invaded
On January 17, 1917, an article called "Denmark’s
Uncrowned King" appeared in The Bystander, an English language
newspaper circulated among dTpTomatic circles in Copenhagen.
Picked up in the British press also, it described "Brock's" in
ordinate influence over Danish affairs, which was credited to
the existence of a strong German element in Denmark and the
well-staffed and funded German Legation and spy system over
which "Brock" ruled with an iron hand.
BMS, 1689H/1012/396
874-76, "Nachlass B - R , " 9101H/3439/H232 804-12.
-^According to Birnbaum, p. 104, King Christian " .
o offered to make confidential approaches through Hans Niels
Andersen, a Danish ship-owner with international contacts, in
order to sound the feelings towards peace in official circles
in Britain and Russia."
Nothing came of either attempt, in
1914 and 1916.
Rudolf Stadelmann, "Friedensversuche im ersten
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t e r r i t o r y .

offer,

England was officially unreceptive to the German

yet Brockdorff-Rantzau reported that peace feelers

would not be altogether ignored by England at the end of 1916.32
The year 1917 was the turning point for England as
well as America.

G e r m a n y 's decision for all-out U-boat war

fare plus the intensified raids on England by bombers and Zep
pelins launched England on a "crusade" against G e r m a n y .33

As

Prime Minister of the coalition government formed at the very
end of 1916, David Lloyd George was the leader of Britain's
determined war effort.

Three months previously he had said

Jahre des W eltkrieges," Historische Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937),
516-18, gives h more detailed account of the 1914 approach to
Russia through Copenhagen and describes Brockdorff-Rantzau fs
part in promoting it.
^B ro ck do r f f - R a n t z a u reported, after December 12, that
he had heard that the British Minister in Copenhagen /sir RajLph
PagetJ7 had said that any English government accepting the
peace offer of the Central Powers would be hanged.
BMS, 1689H/
1012/396 915.
Perhaps this was merely an English idiom!
See Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wikseil, 1958) , p"! 25O n , which mentions
a dispatch from Brockdorff-Rantzau to the Foreign Office on
December 18, 1916, "suggesting a desire for peace on the part
of the Entente."
A report written by the Count in 1922 for a
committee investigating various peace attetnpts mentions Eng
land's readiness to discuss peace at the very beginning of
1917.
BMS, 1689H/1012/396 898-903.
See also Link, pp. 17784, 230-31.
^ F o r a good account of the air raids, see Dr. Douglas
H. Robinson, "Zeppelins in the German Navy, 1914-1918," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXII (July, 1956), pp.
742-61.
“
“
In his 1922 report on peace attempts, Brockdorff-Rant
zau said that in February, 1917, "It was revealed to me through
an intermediary that the English negotiator who had arrived in
/copenhagen__7 refused to meet with me because he had nothing
Turther to say to me."
BMS, 1689.H/1012/396 901.
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that England would settle for nothing less than complete de
feat of German militarism and the ruling classes in Germany—
the

impassioned declaration that became known as the "knock

out b l o w , "34
In January of 1918, King Christian considered the
time ripe to approach England about ending the war before a
new spring offensive began,

and Danish Foreign Minister

Scavenius informed Brockdorff-Rantzau that the King was wil 
ling to attempt mediation again.
Kaiser,

Chancellor Hertling,

the

and Field Marshal von Hindenburg discussed this offer

and decided that Germany's position was too unfavorable for
an acceptable settlement.

Brockdorff-Rantzau urged modifi

cation of German demands in vain; London, however,
ready declined the Danish King's confidential

had al

i n q u i r y .
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Plans to "Revolutionize" Russia
From the beginning of the war,

the object of German

diplomacy was to break up the Entente by concluding a sepa
rate peace with Russia or France.

Germany expected to gain

more in that, way than from the results of a general peace
conference.

This policy in all its variations is examined

by Karl E. Birnbaum in Peace Moves and U-Boat W a r f a r e . Ever
since the summer of 1915, Brockdorff-Rantzau had been inter
ested in the project of provoking revolution in Russia,

in

3*^See Link, Campaigns, 1916-1917, p. 176, for Lloyd
George's "knock-out" interview with the American reporter
Roy W. Howard, September 28, 1916.
For a very good German
study of Lloyd George's position of wartime leadership in
Britain, see Erwin Holzle, "Lloyd George im Weltkri eg ," Historische Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937), 40-70.
33;b m S, 1689H/1012/396 902; S tern-Rubar t h , pp.

54-57.
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order to weaken the Entente.
During his years in Copenhagen,

the Kohlenpolitik kept

the Count in constant touch with Danish and German Social Democrats including Philipp Scheidemann and Friedrich Ebert, who
became leaders of the early Weimar Repu bl ic ,
had met a certain Dr. Helphand
tionaries),

In this w^y he

(known as Parvus among revolu

an ex-Russian belongihg to the German Social Demo

cratic Party.

Helphand had many ideas and contacts that might

exploit the revolutionary movement in Russia to Germany's advan
tage.

Brockdorff-Rantzau advised the Chancellor to use any

means available,

including Helphand's scheme of shipping known

revolutionaries to Russia— above all Lenin, who was then biding
his time in Switzerland.

m

an extensive report to the

Fo r

eign Office on December 6 , 1915, Brockdorff-Rantzau had warned
that Germany's
even more.

"existence as a great power is at stake— perhaps

. . . Victory,

world is ours, however,

and as reward the first place in the

if we succeed in revolutionizing Russia

at the expedient moment,

thereby destroying the Co al i t i o n ."37

At first Bethmann—Hoilweg and the Foreign Office had hesitated.
A recent study of Lenin's

"shipment" through Germany refers to

memoranda and secret dispatches from the Count to the Foreign
Office in the first week of April,

.1917, urging that Lenin be

36see dispatches in Z.A.B. Zeman (e d .), Germany and the
Revolution in Russia 1915-1918 (Londons Oxford University Press,
1958) " pp. 8 , 9', 30-3l, 32-33.
On Helphand and Lenin, see E d 
mund Taylor, The Fall of the Dynasties (New York: Doubleday,
1963), pp. 283-88.
37

-

Fritz Fischer, "Deutsche Kriegsziele, R e v o l u t i o m e r u n g
und Separatfrieden im Osten 1914-1918," Historische Zeitschrift,
CLXXXVIIX (1959), 259-60, 301, treats this report extensively,
noting that it does not appear in the Zeman collection of docu
ments relating to Germany's part in creating the November revo
lution in Russia.
See also Birnbaum, p. 18n.

sent to Russia without further delay.
approved theidea,
With America

the trip was

When General Ludendorff

accomplished early that m o n t h .38

on the side of the Allies,

the move

had become im

perative .
It remained for Germany to conclude peace with the
Soviets after the November Revolution in 1917.
eye on future German-Soviet relations,

Brockdorff-Rantzau recom

mended lenient terms and no annexations.
said on April 1,
Russian one.

"can be

Always with his

"The peace," he had

either a German-English

one or a German

I hold thelatter prospect for the

more probable."

But the harsh terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March,
1918, were a complete refutation of the Count's long-term Ru s
sian policy.
Peace and Reform Movements in Germany
The cordial working relationship with Social Democrats
of Denmark and Germany which developed during the war years p r o 
foundly influenced the C o u n t ’s diplomatic career.

Kaiser W i l 

helm II is said to have referred to Brockdorff-Rantzau at this
time as "the only sensible man among my diplomats--he has under
stood even how to deal with the Social Democrats I"40
of it later on,

writing

the Count described being well received at an

38 Werner Hahlweg, "Lenins Reise durch Deutschland imi
April,1 9 1 7 Vierteljahrheft fur Zeitgeschichte, IV (October
1957), 312-22T
“
-------- --

39BMS,

1689H/1012/396 920-28;

1690H/1013/396 941.

^ E d w a r d Hallett Carr, German-Soviet Relations between
the Two World Wars, 1919-1939 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
P r e s s , 1951), p . 67; Stern-Rubarth, p. 60.
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audience with the Kaiser in May,

1916.

Wilhelm, he said, had

evidenced the "liveliest interest" in the Danish negotiations.
After 1917,

the Kaiser's opinion changed abruptly.

Rantzau's memorandum continues,
Kaiser,

Brockdorff-

"Since I was suspected by the

after the opening of the unrestricted submarine warfare,

of being a defeatist, he received me very ungraciously in May,
1917

. . ."41
Exactly as predicted,

the resumption of unrestricted U-

boat war early in 1917 had brought the United States into the war
against Germany.

The divergence of German military and civilian

viewpoints was thrown into sharp relief with the passage of the
Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917, masterminded by the
impetuous Catholic Center Party member Matthias

Erzberger.4 ^

Although it realigned the political parties, bringing togther
the Social Democrats, Centrists,
dorff remained virtual dictator.

and Progressives, General LudenThree Chancellors and three

Foreign Secretaries were to fall in thirteen months, while the
Supreme Command dangled the prospect of military success.
Before the Peace Resolution,
Georg Michaelis,

the inexperienced Chancellor

Bethmann-Hollweg's successor,

had cast about for

a suitable man to replace Arthur Zimmermann who had resigned as
Foreign Secretary.

The choice narrowed to Baron Richard von

4 ^-The Kaiser explained that after America's declaration
of war he could have no further consideration for small neutral
states.
See Stern-Rubarth, p. 58, and BMS, 1689H/1012/396 803.
42

On Erzberger and the Peace Resolution, see Klaus Ep
stein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democrapy
(Princeton University Press, 1959), p p . 182-213.
Erzberger
was a rash opportunist who, however, always had the best inter
ests of his country at heart.
He was to have profound influ
ence on Germany's Versailles decision.
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Kuhlmann and Count Brockdorf f-Rantzau „

On July 18,, 19.17* the

Count penned a memorandum in Copenhagen regarding the conditions
under which he would accept the appointment 0
The action was characteristic of the man;

Brockdorff-

R a n t z a u 's suspicious nature and legal-trained mind never allowed
him to accept any position of responsibility without first met ic 
ulously setting forth his concept of the job and the conditions
under which he would undertake it„

He wrote:

If I take over the office of Foreign Secretary, it will
be my duty to work toward a peace which will be commensurate
with the sacrifice which the German nation has made, and
which will guarantee the future of the nation and her right
ful place in the w o r l d c 4 3
He then demanded to know the truth from the Supreme Command and
the Navy about the military situation 0

A second memorandum

(Au

gust 1 ) is very critical of the ascendancy of the military over
the political leadership,,

Ludendorff 1s promises of victory were

simply not materializing and the submarine campaign had failed
so far to break England down,,

Facing a bleak fourth winter of

war, he recommended a Wilson-like peace without v i c t o r y s
If we are led on further by the military authorities,
it only remains for us to perish in grandeur, in my opinion„
As things now stand, it is the duty of the politicians to
ask if the people would not, instead of this, prefer to
live o
We must therefore strive for a peace of understanding„
The present military situation offers a suitable basis
to reach this goal „ Nicht besiegt werden, heisst doch
nicht s i e g e n 0 4 4
43bME,

1690H/1013/396 9 3 4 0

44jbidQ, 1690H/1013/396 939-40ff„
On May 4, 1917,
Brockdorff-Rantzau had expressed his opinion to General Luden
dorf f that Germany's allies,, especially Austria-Hungary, were
"at the end of their s tr en gt h1" and that the military situation
was very unfavorable for Germany,, B M S , 1690H/1QI3/396 948„
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Nothing,

he said,

representatives,

should be done without consulting the people's
"who now have a strong voice,"

Not only that,

but the Kaiser must take the initiative in setting up a parlia
mentary government.
To Michaelis, who paid little attention to the Peace
Resolution,
cal.

Brockdorff-Rantzau's views must have been too radi

He chose Richard von Kuhlmann.
After almost a year in office Kuhlmann,

too, concluded

that diplomatic action would be needed to end the

w a r

*45

Gener

al Ludendorff insisted that the Kaiser replace Kuhlmann with
Admiral von Hintze,

then German Minister in Norway,

Supreme Command could control.
loomed ahead,

whom the

A fifth grim winter of war

and Germany's allies were deserting one by one.

Count Hertling (Chancellor for a year after Michaelis's four
months)
1918,

resigned when the Ilindenburg line broke on September 29,

and the high office devolved upon the reluctant Prince

Maximilian von Badeno

A man of integrity,

respected for his

work toward the humane treatment of prisoners of war, Baden's
task was to work with the Reichstag, majority in putting through
constitutional reforms..

General Ludendorff,

however, had even

more urgent plans for Prince M a x a
His first day in office Prince Max was astounded by
Ludendorff S,s sudden demand for an armistice through the good of
fices of President Wilson.
the situation was desperate:
curred,

The new Chancellor hesitated, but
Field Marshal von Hindenburg con

and Austria had already asked for peace.

By October

3,

^^Harry R. R u d i n , Armistice 1918 (New York:, Yale Univers
ity Press, 1944), p„ 6 ^ B er ns to r T T T M i r T h r e e Years . . . , p., 415 =
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the first German note,

accepting Wilson's Fourteen Points as the

basis of an armistice and future peace negotiations,

was on its

way to the President046
The following day,
forming his new government.

the Chancellor was occupied with
He intended to break with the past

by appointing men who were not associated with the policies
which had pursued the war,.

'“We must form a Government of men in

whose case there is documentary proof that they strove for this
peace of justice even at the moment of our greatest victories
„ . ."47
choice.

He hoped to save Germany's colonies with one important
"The post of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

had fortunately not been demanded for the parties.

I hesitated

between Solf and Count Brockdorff-Rantzaua our Minister in Copen
hagen.

...

I then decided finally for Solf."

D r 0 "Wilhelm Solf

had spoken out for "a peace of understanding, tL and as former
Govenor of Samoa and Colonial Secretary,

Baden considered his

appointment to be "a pointed assertion of our just claim to
colonies 0
46RU(3in :s book Armistice 1918 explores in minute detail
the reasons for L ud e n d o r f f 1s loss of nerve and his demand that
Prince Max ask for an armistice immediately.
Rudin effectively
blasts the military's later ,3stab-in-the-back" charge against
the Government.
See Rudin, pp. 1-137.
47Prince Max of Baden, Memoi r s , tr„ W.M. Calder and
C„WoH. Sutton (2 vols„; New Yorks Charles Scribner's Sons, .192 8 ),
I, 370.
^^Baden, II, 28.
Prince Max noted happily that '"The
___
phrase CA colony is a mission field, ’ had been coined by ^/Solf__/
and was in his case no mere form of speech." I bid.
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It is doubtful if Prince Max could have prevailed upon
Brockdorff-Rantzau to take the post at that m o m e n t „
of September,

At the end

Ebert and Scheidemann had made a second appeal to

him to come in as Foreign Secretary.

The message,

relayed to

Copenhagen through his twin brother, Count Ernst zu Rantzau, was
answered with a memorandum dated October 3 ,

Aware of the m ili

tary and naval animosity towards him as well as the "malicious
opposition of the Pan-Germans and heavy industry,

and the m i s 

trust of the Conservatives" he considered the post of Foreign
Secretary too devoid of authority to accomplish anything.

Even

as Chancellor he would not have the backing of the Supreme Co m
mand and the Monarch.^9
Prince Max chose Dr., Solf for the Foreign Office, but
he had other plans to utilize the talents of Brockdorff-Rantzau„
He intended to name the Count as his own successor,
resign as Chancellor.
source of advice,
son's notes,

Meanwhile,

should he

the Count remained a valuable

especially in formulating the answers to W i l 

and his location in a neutral capital was a diplo

matic advantage.
Requisites for an Armistice
The drafting of Germany's reply to President Wilson's
second note caused a last debate over submarine warfare.

On

October 19, Prince Max met with several German Ambassadors,

in—

^^Brandenburg notes that Brockdorff™Rantzau was unwill
ing to serve under Hertling, who was unacceptable to the Social
Democrats.
At the time he wrote this memorandum, the Count did
not know that Prince Max would be Chancellor and institute con
stitutional reforms.
The distance from Copenhagen to Berlin
made prompt, communications difficult.
See BMS, 1690H/1013/396
946, 949ff, and Stern-Rubarth, pp^ 53-54.
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eluding Brockdorff-Rantzau, who all concurred that U-boat w ar 
fare must be dropped or there could be no hope of an armistice.
The sinking of the Leins ter on October 11 had caused great reper
cussions in England.

"Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, !! relates Prince

Max,
spoke impressively of the fix in which we found ourselves
today.
He described the devastating effect it had had upon
the German representatives abroad when Gne day they woke up
and read that Germany had asked Wilson for an armistice.
The first was the decisive step; now there was no alterna
tive but to follow out the path we had once set foot u p o n , ^
All thus, according to Baden,

convinced the Cabinet,

Naval oppo

sition was squelched and a third German note was off to Wilson
on October 21.
The next bastion to tumble was the authority of the Su
preme Command.

When the third American note refused to treat

with the "military masters and monarchical autocrats" of Germany,
Baden insisted upon the dismissal of General Ludendorff as proof
of the new Government's authority.

The very next day a fourth

German note asked for an armistice.
Constitutional and authoritative changes notwithstanding,
Prince Max's regime was viewed with suspicion by the Allies from
the very beginning.

It was all too sudden— a "camouflage democ

racy, " a “peace tra p. "

President Wilson felt a moral obligation

to end the slaughter as soon as possible.

Although he moved

SOBaden, II, 150.
The other Ambassadors declaring
against U-boat warfare were Count Wolff-Metternich (formerly in
London), Dr, Rosen (Minister in the Netherlands), and Count Bernstorff, who telephoned his anti-submarine views from Constanti
nople.
Just before the Leinster incident, Herr von Romberg, the
German Minister in Switzerland, had warned that U-boats "might
aggravate the situation,
Philipp Scheidemann, The Making of New
Germany; The Memoirs of Philipp Scheidemann, t r 0 J.E„ Mitchell
(2 vols. ; New York; D. Appleton and Co.,, 1929), II, 185.
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cautiously regarding an armistice,

Wilson had many critics at

home and abroad.,

and many Americans wanted

France, Britain,

nothing less than the complete surrender of Imperial Germany.
On October 7, the New York Times had trumpeted "No peace with
the HohenzollernSc"51
The Monarchy represented,
block in the road to an armistice.

therefore,

a last stumbling

Scheidemann and the Social

Democrats were now demanding the Kaiser's abdication lest the
war continue until Germany disintegrated.
agitation was apparent in Berlin,

Already Bolshevist

and in Bavaria "there was

serious talk about seceding from the E mp ire."52
Still hoping for a constitutional Monarchy,

Prince Max

sought more information on how important the act of abdication
would appear abroad.

He sent a trusted adviser,

Dr. Kurt Hahn

(Head of the English Section of the Foreign News Service), to
Copenhagen to meet with two American diplomats and with Count
B r o c k d o r f f - R a n t z a u o H a h n returned with his anxiously awaited
report on October 30, revealing that the Americans had stressed
that Wilson needed grounds to defend his "peace of justice"
against the "chauvinists of the Entente who are now at the helm
in England and France, "

L u d en do rf f’s dismissal, would help,

-^Rudin, pp, 106-08.

^

they

197-216,,

B a d e n , II, 233-35.
One of the Americans was Li.thgow
Osborne, Second Secretary of the American Legation in Copenh a g e n . See Rudin, pp. 226, 232«
Osborne later went to Germany
as a member, of the Dresel Commission * See Chapter III, infra ,
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had intimated,

but since

'in the eyes of hundreds of thousands

the Kaiser and Crown Prince are the embodiment of all that Is
hateful and * „ „ dangerous in G e r m a n y ’ only the elimination of
the Hohenzolierns would furnish drama tic proof of change,,

One

American had concluded the conversation with an outburst of emo Lion^

"For G o d ’s sake,, do something to make Wilson strong

against the Entente militarists

0

0 51

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau

agreed that the German people would be in no position to resist
dishonorable armistice conditions if the Kaiser remained,, 54
In his Erinnerungen, the late D r 0 Theodor Heuss recalled
a visit at the German Legation in Copenhagen in mid-1918o

He

told of a long conversation with Brockdorff-Rantzau.s
He knew the war was lost and said it right out.,, He con
sidered his essential task fulfilled; he told of Danish
trade unions and the German coal agreement, which helped
overcome the p e o p l e ’s historic resentment,,
I recalled
his complete lack of bias toward the workers" movements,
not exactly in keeping with his noble status, when Ebert
appointed him. Foreign Minister 0 0 0'-55
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau did not hesitate to advocate
the changes he considered inevitableD

,JHe became more and more

convinced that an attempt must be made, while there was still
time,

to conclude an acceptable peace,

and that it was likewise

necessary to revive the tottering situation in Germany with
54saden, II, 2 3 3-34; Rudin, p„ 2 3 2 0 Reluctant to take
the step himself, Baden tried to get. Brockdorff-Rantzau, among
others, to take on the onerous duty of suggesting abdication to
the Kaiser,
The Count declined because of
the lack of_constitutionality /for_such a step_/ implicit in his office
g Mini
ster to D e n m a r k " Stern-Rubarth, p„ 5 4 0
55Theodor Heuss, Erinner ungen 1.90 5-1933
Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1963), pp„ 223-24„

lTubingen;:
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inner r e f o r m s . " ^

Here was an experienced diplomat of inde

pendent convictions and high standing who would cooperate even
with a working man's republic for the sake of Germany's future.
It did not take long for the Social Democrats to turn to him
for help and support.

56BMS,

1689H/1012/396 928.

CHAPTER III
3R0CKD0RFF-RANTZAU BECOMES FOREIGN MINISTER
Abdication and Armistice
In Germany,

a bewildering race of events followed m il i

tary defeat in the field and the appeal for an armist ice„

Sig

nificantly, Matthias E r zberger( a prominent Catholic Center
Party leader and a civilian,

was chosen as chief German repre

sentative to the coming armistice talks.

Prince Maximilian von

Baden, Chancellor during these last anxious days of October,
1918,

informed Erzberger that. Germany's desperate situation made

an armistice imperative.

The Chancellor also wanted Brockdorff-

Rantzau to accompany Erzberger as Foreign Office representative
at the armistice proceedings, but the distance from Copenhagen
made this impossible.
The first full week of November witnessed the spread of
revolution and the downfall of the Hohenzollern Monarchy.
tria,

the only other remnant of the Central Powers,

on November 3,

capitulated

Disorder convulsed Germany; riots and sailors'

mutinies spread from northern seaports to Berlin,
south

Aus

and in the

the Independent Socialist leader Kurt Eisner deposed the

old Wittelsbach Dynasty in Bavaria and declared a Bavarian Re■j
Upon Solf :s advice, Count Alfred Oberndorff, the war
time Ambassador to Bulgaria, went instead.
Epstein, p. 2 71.
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publico

By the sixth of November, with Erzberger on the way to

armistice talks.

Prince Max realized that the immediate abdica

tion of Wilhelm II was the only means of preventing a violent
revolution in Germany as well as proving to the Allies that Ger
many was no longer dominated by the war regime.

The Social

Democratic leaders Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann,

un

der pressure from their party, were demanding the abdication of
the Kaiser and Crown Prince by November 8.

Unable to obtain

any word from Wilhelm IX or his military entounage at their head
quarters in Spa, Baden declined at first to declare the abdica
tion himself.

In his eyes it would have been "nothing less than

a coup d 1e t a t .112

Yet he had failed to secure the Kaiser's volun

tary abdication before the deadline set by the Social Democrats,
and they resigned from the government as they had w a r n e d „
der the circumstances,

Un

Baden wished to resign as Chancellor,

and at first he intended "to recall Rantzau to Berlin by tele
gram and send in his name to Spa as my

successor.

"3

There was no time for Baden to carry out any such plan.
On November 9, the Kaiser fled to Holland,
that the army would no longer support him.

convinced at last
Prince Max had fi

nally announced the abdication on the strength of a military
communique from S p a „

Very soon after that, Philipp Scheidemann

^Baden, II, 347„
Until the last moment Baden hoped to
retain the monarchy by the device of an abdication coupled with
the Kaiser's naming of a Chancellor to carry on,* under these
conditions he even thought a regency could be arranged,, Ibid.,
pp. 351-57 o
3Xbido , II,

335,,
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proclaimed the German Republic from a Reichstag balcony,
the milling crowds in

lest

the streets desert Ebert and the Majority

Socialists for Soviet-inspired Karl Liebknecht and the Spartacists0

Prince Max then relinquished the Chancellorship to Fried

rich Ebert.^

with Ebert and Scheidemann as leaders,

a Council

of People's Representatives, which included three Independent
Socialists in a total of six members, hopefully retained authorlty on November l h

5

The war ended that day,

after Matthias

Erzberger had signed an armistice designed by the French to pre
vent any German renewal of hostilities.
Brockdorff-Rantzau Replaces Solf
Dr. Solf, who

had signed the last three of the German

notes to Wilson,^ was

not to remain Inng ih office as Foreign

Secretary after the CPR assumed its precarious political author
ity.

Although a "good democrat," he believed that the Independent

Socialists were incompatible with the Majority Socialists and on
December 9, 1918,

in a CPR meeting,

he went so far as to accuse

the prominent Independent Socialist Hugo Haase
A

(one of the six
11

Ludwig ziramermann, Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Ara der
Weimarer Republik (Gottingen; Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1958), p. 42.
Dr. Simons, legal expert in the Foreign Office greatly respected
by Prince Max, "already regarded Ebert as the man for the post of
Chancellor" on November 8th.
Baden, II, 335.
^At Compiegne, Marshal Foch (and Erzberger himself) won
dered what government the German armistice delegates actually
represented.
Rudin, pp. 370-73; Epstein, pp. 279-80.
^Because of the possibility of a Chancellor crisis, Erz
berger advised that subsequent notes (after the first) be signed
by Foreign Secretary Dr. Solf instead of Prince Max.
Matthias
Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1920), p
325 =
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CPR members)

of collaboration with Russian Bolshevists, 7

Solf's

past utterances on colonies were also something of a liability.
If the CPR was to hold out until the election of a National Co n
stituent Assembly,

it would be necessary to replace Dr. Solf

with a man acceptable to Majority Socialists and Independents
a l i k e «,
Although fatal in S o l f ’s case, previous connection with
the Imperial regime did not absolutely prevent a man from serving
under the CPR.

Erich Eyck,

in A History of the Weimar Repub l i c ,

explains that while the two Socialist parties retained political
aut hor lty ,
they quickly realized that they would have to look outside
their parties for men to direct those offices which required
professional competence. . . , They sought to solve this
problem by excluding "bourgeois" ministers formally from
the true cabinet, and making them instead responsible to
the Council of People's Representatives.
Furthermore, these
ministers were given Social Democratic undersecretaries or
assis tan ts.®
Prior to Baden's appointment of Dr. Solf, Ebert and
Scheidemann had unsuccessfully offered Brockdorff-Rantzau the
post of Foreign Secretary.

If he was prepared to accept the bid

-j
Zimmermann, p. 34.
According to Zimmermann, Solf and
General Groener both wanted immediate elections in order to end
the revolution and the provisional CPR of Ebert and Scheidemann.
On the other hand, the Independent Socialists wanted to get rid
of Solf.
Kurt Eisner (of the Bavarian Republic) and others a c 
cused him "of having burnt the documents of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs relating to the responsibility of the Imperial
regime for the outbreak of the war."
See W„M„ Kn igh t-Patterson,
Germany from Defeat to Conquest 1913-1933 (London; George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1945), p. 231.
Erzberger had called Solf "to
tally ignorant of political affairs." Epstein, p. 262.
Q
Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Rep ublic, t r . Harlan
P. Hanson and Robert G.Lo Waite (2 v o l s .; Harvard University
Press, 1962), I , 53-54.
Eyck notes here that the Foreign Office
received Dr. David, a Social Democrat, and Karl Kautsky an Inde
pendent Socialist leader.
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now,

in view of the drastically altered political situation and

the fact of civilian leadership,

the new Republic would benefit

from his professional experience and known liberal outlook.
Count Brockdor£f-Rantzau had previously declared himself ready
9
to work toward rebuilding things if a collapse occurred0
Clear
ly,

the time had come.
The Count had already prepared the way with characteris

tic thoroughness,

since Ebert and Scheidemann had been in con

tact with him before Solf's break with the I n d e p e n d e n t s , ^

In a

letter to Scheidemann on December 9, Brockdorff-Rantzau set
forth his main condition for accepting the post of Foreign Sec
retary ;

he must also participate in the solving of Germany's

internal pr ob lems0

The foremost problem,

preserving the po

litical unity of the R eich , made necessary the creation of a
republican army to combat further inroads of Bolshevism.

1.1

Toward the end of the letter is a paragraph of great interest,
in view of the events which followedt
In regard to the duty which would ultimately rest with
me, the concluding of peace, I should like here to touch
upon a point which must not be overlooked. __If the peace
terms, which the enemy will dictate to us /.are such that_7
they do not allow our people an existence compatible with
human dignity, I must know if I would be empowered to re
fuse my signature, or if it would be the intention /of the
Government^/ only to ratify the treaty under p r o t e s t / ^
9BMS, 1690H/10X.3/396 949.
At that time (October 2,
1918) he had spoken in terms of the Chancellorship, since he
considered the post of Foreign Secretary completely ineffective0
-*-9BMS, 1690H/1013/396 959; Hajo Holborn, "Diplomats and
Diplomacy in the Early Weimar Republic, 11 in The Diplomats 19191 9 3 9 , ed. Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton Univer
sity Press, 1953), p„ 133.
Hereafter, Holborn, "Diplomats."
■^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 4-5.
^-^I b i d . , pp.

5~6o
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Br ockdorff-Rantzau1s inevitable Promemoria followed the
letter,
matters.

dealing for the most part with political and economic
First and foremost,

the world must be convinced of the

stability of the new German Government if Germany hoped to pur
sue any sort of foreign policy.

To this end the National Assem

bly must be called before February 16, and the authority of the
Republic firmly established within Germany.

!"3

Of greatest importance was the restoration of G e r m a n y 's
economy and her credit abroad,
industries.

and the encouragement of her own

Loans from abroad would be indispensable to the re

covery of the German economy,

and he considered America the best

prospect for such credit if Germany took sensible steps to re
vive her economy.
A people that evidences no propensity for governing it
self, which yesterday possessed the most authoritative govern
ment and today is no longer capable of erecting a new and
modern national government, would be refused American or any
other foreign credit. . . . I think that the question of
foreign credit must be thoroughly and carefully examined by
the best financial and economic authorities in the country,
* * *
inquiries made through neutral channels
He ended his letter to Scheidemann with one last consideration.
He would serve as Foreign Secretary if his health would permit.
During the last few months in Copenhagen he had found it necessary to consult a doctor about heart trouble.
Hugo Haase at first balked at the idea of an aristocrat
and former Imperial diplomat replacing Solf.

Apparently,

it was

•^The Congress of Workers and Soldiers which had just met
in Berlin (December 16-19, 1918) throwing its support to the M a j 
ority Socialists, had set a deadline of January 19 for elections
to a National Assembly.
See Evck,, I, 51, and B M S , 1690H/1013/396
964.
By February 16, a third renewal of the Armistice would be
necessary.
l-^Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Dokumente , p. 9.

-*-5I b i d .., p 0 6»

documentary proof of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s early condemnation of
unrestricted submarine warfare which,

in addition to Ebert and

Scheidemann's obvious confidence in the Count,
*i

agree.

induced Haase to

sr

The Count presented the CPR with a brief five point

version of his essential conditions,

demanding full authority

in selecting p e r s o n n e l . ^

as Erich Brandenburg points

out,

Although,

the CPR did not like being presented with conditions,

they

agreed to Brockdor f f-Rantzau 's demands.-*-®
Brockdorff-Rantzau was duly appointed Foreign Secretary
on December 20,

1918.

Accepting both the physical and mental

burdens of office, he declared from Copenhagen on the 24th;
I have no illusions about the tremendous difficulties
which await me in my new office.
What gives me strength
and confidence however, is my unshakeable faith in the G e r 
man people and their future.
My first and most important
duty . . . is the conclusion of a just p e a c e . ^
The "just peace," of course,

rested upon President W o o d 

row Wilson's Fourteen Points and subsequent Wilsonian utterances
on settling European affairs equitably.

Germany had accepted th

Fourteen Points in the first October note to Wilson;

the final

American note of November 5, said Brockdorff-Rantzau, indicated
also the acceptance by the Allies of this basis for peace, with
16
Victor Schiff, The Germans at Versailles 1919 , t r . Geo
frey Dunlop (London? Williams and Norgate Ltd., 1930), pp. 35-38
17
Not only Solf had objected to Haase.
Brockdorff-Rantzau mentioned in a secret memorandum "die Frage H a a s e . 11 He
feared Haase's alleged Soviet connections would jeopardize futur
German relations with the United States and the Entente.
BMS,
169OH/1013/396 963.
•*-®BMS, 1690H/1013/396 962-66.
Ebert and Haase signed th
letter informing him he had been appointed and the conditions
a ccept ed„
19Br ockdorff-Rantzau, Do kum ent e, p. 13.
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reservations about freedom of the seas and re par ations.20

Since

self-determination was mutually agreed to be "a fundamental
right of all peoples" Brockdorff-Rantzau demanded it for Germany
also.

When he took office on January 2, 1919, he concluded a

statement to the Wolff Telegraph Bureau with the words,
principle of

"If the

"The Balkans to the Balkan peoples' holds true,

then it must also mean
fuse, he said,

'Germany to the G e r m a n s . '"

"a peace of oppression,

He would re

of annihilation and en 

slavement. "21
The change-over in the Foreign Office was very sudden
and without much formality.

According to Stern-Rubarth, Dr. Solf

knew little of this decision of the CPR.
came down to Berlin and called on Solf,

When Brockdorff-Rantzau
the latter thought it was

his twin brother on an errand connected with the Kaiser in H o l 
land.

"The explanation," concludes Stern-Rubarth, "must there

fore have been somewhat of a surprise.
Upon taking office officially in January,

the Count

echoed the words of Prince Max at the outset of his unhappy Ch an
cellorship:
Karl Kautsky,

"Ich will versuchen zu retten, was zu retten i s t ,
the Socialist Foreign Office expert,

that, of all the Ambassadors'
90

pp.

declared

reports he had examined, Brockdcrff•

■

I b r d ., p. 13.
See Preliminary History of the A r m i s t i c e :
143-44" For the text of the November 5th note.
—— — —
91

Brockdorff-Rantzau,

Do kum ent e, pp. 17-18.

22

Stern-Rubar t h , p. 73.
Accepting Solf's res igiid lion on
December 13, Ebert had requested Solf to carry on until a succes
sor could be named.
Ebert to Solf, December 13, 1918, "Nachiass
B - R , " 9105H/3440/H233 353.
^ B l u c h e r , p. 42; cf. B a d e n , II,

2 5.

55
R a n t z a u 0s were the best.

Ebert said simply,

MWir haben den

besten von den alten Diplomaten zu unserm Aussenminister gem a c h t .1124

However., by December 27,

the three Independent So

cialists had left the CPR, objecting to the use of N o s k e 's
troops to quell the Berlin r i o t s o n
troops,

the need for using such

Solf and Brockdorff-Rantzau had both been of the same

opinion„
Foreign Policy Outlook
It is enlightening to sthdy Bro ckd orff-Rantzau's assess
ment of the major

vestern powers and the enigma of Soviet Russia

after the war 8s end.

For Ebert and the Cabinet on January 21,

he outlined briefly the possibilities for German foreign policy.
Since the former enemies would doubtless give little considera
tion to international law and the moral claims of Germany,

she

must build her case iipon the twin threats of imminent economic and
political collapse.

England and France insisted upon maintaining

the blockade and forcing Germany to demobilize completely,

and

this left only one course open:
We must therefore seek to convince the enemies that,
the economic collapse and political weakness of Germany
would be contrary t.o their own interests and that in truth
we have common interests..
The means for this is reference
to the danger of Bolshevism.
"All our enemies," he continued,
against Germany for war d a m a g e s ."

“"have placed heavy claims
They must,

then, be made to

realize their own very literal stake in the prompt economic re24Blucher, p. 43.
2^Eyck, I, 51.
The Independents H a a s e , Dittman, and
Barth were replaced by Social Democrats Gustav Noske and R u 
dolf Wissell.
BMS, 1 6 9 O H / I Q 13/396 970.

habilitation of the German Republic-

In the same vein., it

would be expedient for Germany and the western nations to come
to an understanding on three points:
1 - A common defensive effort to keep Bolshevism from
encroaching on Germany's eastern border.
2. The granting of a reasonable and just peace leaving
Germany economically and political healthy (lebensfahig) .
3..
Agreement on the common /desinability 7 of the
economic restoration of R u s s i a . ^
Only the improvement of economic conditions in Russia could al
leviate the dangers of terrorism and revolution?

until then,

Germany had to convince the western nations of the need for a
middle European power strong enough to keep Bolshevism at bay.
Meanwhile,

after the strategic mistake of Brest-Litovsk, Brock

dor ff-Rantzau was determined that Germany should do nothing fur
ther to jeopardize future relations with Russia,

in case the A l 

lies proved intractable.
From the outset of his tenure as Foreign Office Chief,
Brockdorff-Rantzau placed all hope for Germany in her relation
ship with the United S t a t e s .

England he believed to be given

over entirely to a policy of annihilation

(Vernic htun g) of Ger

many, while Wilson's peace program held out a hope of justice.
Moreover,

signs pointed to the dominance of American economic

might in the post-war world.

If Germany offered American

capital attractive possibilities,

such economic ties would have

26B M S , 1690H/1013/396 987-92,
See also Herbert Helbig,
Die Trager der Rapallo-Politik
(Gobt:ingen: Vandenhoek und
Rupprecht, 1958), p. 13.
”
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the further nuance of hindering future British domination of
Europe.

indispensable though American capital might be,

the

Foreign Secretary hoped also that "the working classes of the
enemy nations,

recognizing in the new Germany a worthy partner

in the struggle for the achievement of their aims, would a dvo
cate justice in their b e h a l f „"
ganda,

The effectiveness of war propa

however, made this extremely doubtful in the immediate

futu r e .
It was clear that the Allies disagreed among themselves
on the handling of major problems connected with the peace.
This situation could well be advantageous for Germany, but
Brockdorff-Rantzau realized the danger of any overt German at
tempts to exploit it as the Peace Conference in Paris embarked
^ G e n e r a l Groener had argued in the same Cabinet meeting
for a stronger army to defend the eastern front against Poland.
This would also make Germany "bundnis fah ig11 if, in the future,
any one of the Allies needed a counterweight against the others.
Brockdorff-Rantzau, from the beginning, refused to press for
military requirements above what was absolutely necessary to
quell the Bolshevist uprisings.
In a secret memorandum to Groe
ner on the same day he warned against the word "bfindnisfMhlg11 as
"unbedingt zu v e rmeiden." A better word would be leistensfah ig:"
since Germany must cultivate America as an economic partner.
The Count recognized Wilson's political weakness revealed by
the recent elections to the Senate and feared that the Entente,
no longer needing America in the war effort, might conduct an
economic war against Germany after peace was signed.
B M S s 1690H/
1013/396 991, 397
040-050.
Groener also urged the Foreign Minister not to stress
the right of self-determination so much, because it would en
courage the German separatist move m e n t s , BMS, 1690H/1013/397 040.
28BMS,

169OH/1013/396 995.
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upon heated and secret discussions destined to last well over
four monthso

pQ

Conflict with Erzberger
By the time the elections for the National Assembly
took place on January 19, the Spartacists had succumbed for the
time being to Noske's a r m y . ^

The Armistice,

renewed for the

first time on January 17, provided a thirty day political breath
ing spell during which the Assembly met in Weimar,

a city rich

in German cultural tradition and safely removed from, sporadic
Bolshevist violence in Berlin.

Out of 421 seats,

rested with the Majority Socialists,

strength

the Catholic Center and the

unexpectedly large number of members of the new Democratic
Party.
Respected by all factions, Friedrich Ebert was elected
President on the 11th of February.

Philipp Scheidemann became

Chancellor and selected his coalition Cabinet of seven Social
ists,

three Center members,

and three Democrats plus Brockdorff-

Rantzau as Foreign Minister without political affiliation,

and

the Center's Matthias Erzberger as Staatssekretar in charge of
293rockdorff-Rantzau declined to follow up the possi
bility of establishing contact between President Wilson and
Prince Max von Baden through the Geneva Red Cross, to arrange
for the exchange of German prisoners of w a r „ Baden outlined
his plan for a rather high-handed approach to Wilson in a letter
to the Count on January 2 C 1919,
Brockdorff-Rantzau feared that
such an attempt would arouse Wilson's and the Entente's mistrust
B M S , 1690H/1013/396 990^397 002.
^ T h e i r most effective leaders, Rosa
Liebknecht, had been murdered on January 16,
the Spartacist riots in Berlin, including an
Reichskanzle.i, had been beaten down by Noske

Luxemburg and Karl
almost a week after
attack on the
's Freikor ps
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Armistice affairs.^1
It was the successive Armistice renewal negotiations
that confirmed certain impressions about the coming Allied
tude toward Germany at the peace table.

atti

What happened when Erz

berger met the implacable Foch at Trier in mid-January, mid-Feb
ruary,

and mid-March did much to crystallize Brockdortt-Rantzau's

attitude and determine his strategy in dealing with the Allies.
The Compiegne-Trier meetings were indicative in many
ways of what was to come at Versailles,,

In his book Armistice

19.18, Harry Rudin shows how France feared that the exchange of
notes between Germany and President Wilson would prevent the
military defeat of a Germany which now hid behind a "camouflage
democracy"

to plead for an armistice. ^2

French Premier Clemen-

ceau had asked Marshal Foch to draft armistice conditions guar
anteed to keep Germany from renewing the war later.

No Ameri

cans were present at the initial armistice meetings of November
7-11,

and Foch !s terms were severe, his manner gruff.
Erzberger submitted countersuggestions and actually suc

ceeded in getting some significant,

though minor,

changes made.

He signed the still onerous terms of November 11, and tendered
a statement that Germany would honestly try to fulfill the con
ditions although some of them might prove impossible.

"The

German Delegates," his declaration continued,
. . . also wish to reemphasize their view that the consum
mation of this armistice must throw the German people into
3lEpstein, p. 288.
The Foreign Office chief became For
eign Minister (Aussenminister) instead of Foreign Secretary.
The
old term, Staatssekret&r, now designated permanent undersecre
taries in each M2.ni.st«ry; See Kurt Rosenbaum Community of F a t e ;
German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928 (Syracuse University
Press, T&&4) , p. if
3

pp. 89-90.
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anarchy and famine.
They had a right to expect conditions
which, while guaranteeing the full military security of
our enemies, would at least end the suffering of non-com
batant women and children.
The German people, who stood steadfast
of enemies for fifty months, will preserve
and unity no matter how great the external
tion of seventy millions can suffer but it

against a world
their freedom
pressure.
A na 
cannot d i e . 3 3

At each Trier meeting Foch complained of Germany's
failure to meet various deadlines and tightened up the terms.
Erzberger was able to defend Germany's claim on Danzig, but Foch
held all the trumps and always forced Erzberger to sign or see
Germany invaded.

At Compibgne the German Armistice Delegates

had been confined to a large fenced area around the railroad
spur,

doubtless for their own safety; at Trier,

prisoned"

in a hot.elc.35

they were "im

Klaus Epstein describes Erzberger's

valiant efforts in Germany's behalf.

Ignorant of the oppressive

circumstances, many rightist Germans denounced his w e a k n e s s . ^
Brockdorff-Rantzau had also objected to Erzberger's
management of armistice affairs,

and their great feud was precip

itated by the first renewal of the armistice.

The Count had

instructed Erzberger to ask for the return of German war pris
33

Epstein, p. 281.
Note similarity of phraseology to
Brockdorff-Rantzau“s May 7th speech at Versailles.
See Chapter
V , in fra„
34RUCjin, p.

37 3.

35Epstein,

pp.

291-92,.

^ A f t e r signing the Armistice extension in February,
Erzberger lashed back at one of his critics; "He forgot the in
convenient fact that, we have unfortunately lost the war."
See
Epstein, p. 298.
Erzberger was also aware that the Allies, if
Germany refused to sign, would march into Germany and consider
themselves free of further obligations under Wilson's note of
November 5th.
I b i d ,, p. 299.

oners since Germany had returned Allied prisoners,
relaxation of the blockade.

and for a

If exorbitant demands were pressed

by the Allies, Erzberger was to return home to consult his Go v 
ernment o

Erzberger not only failed to alleviate the prisoner

and blockade issues, but advocated handing over to the Entente
the Soviet revolutionary Karl. Radek, who had been imprisoned 'in
~4—}

Berlin."The

new Foreign Minister," says Epstein,

was horrified by such unorthodox diplomacy, which would de
grade Germany in the eyes of the world, threaten future re
lations with Russia, and cause a domestic explosion on the
part of the Independent Socialists.
He also thought the
matter should be handled by the Foreign Office rather than
the Armistice Com mis sion.38
A more serious crisis developed when Erzberger accepted
F o c h 's armistice extension terms on February 19th.
b e f o r e , at Weimar,

Five days

Brockdorff-Rantzau had delivered his p r inc i

pal address on foreign policy.

The Foreign Minister now claimed

that the concessions made by Erzberger,

especially regarding

Poland, were very much at odds with the tenets of his speech., 39u
As Foreign Minister he needed solid support to contest
excessive Allied demands.

He had sent a note to the Armistice

Commission at Trier a month before,

saying Germany would fulfill

the armistice requirements to the best of her ability,

and re-

37Epstein, p, 290; Helbig, pp., 15-18=
On Brock.dor.ffRantzau's instructions to Erzberger, see B M S , 1689H/1012/397 010
3®Epstein, p. 2 9 0 o
^Epsteirx, p. 295, says;
"Foch demanded - . . that Lhe
German
Fre.lk.orps / forces in the East stop operations against,
the Poles on a demarcation line set by himself.
Erzberger. as
always confronted by the threat, of an Allied invasion of Germany
was forced tc accept Foch 1s terms."
For a synopsis of Brockdorf
R.antzauhs February 14 speech, see Chapter IV, infra 0
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commending a committee of experts to study the problem.

When

the Cabinet approved Erzberger s signature to the February terms
in spite of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s disapproval,

he asked to resign.

In a letter to Ebert he pointed out that the Allies were not in
agreement about resuming the w a r .

He demanded to take over the

German Armistice Commi ssion, ending the letter with a forceful
p a ragraph:
. . , I see the impossibility of further positive work; I
foresee further that the last bit of our prestige in foreign
eyes will, be lost after we give ourselves up, and that this
confession will afford our enemies the opportunity of tight
ening the screw of extortion without limit (die Erpresserschraube ohne Ende anzuziehen) . Our present concessions, in
my opinion, mean only a postponement and no solution.^0
Both Ebert and Scheidemann urged him to stay in office,
and he did.

What induced him to remain is uncertain,

methods were already challenged; perhaps,

since his

as Erich Brandenburg

says, he realized that someone had to assume the duty of stand
ing up for Germany's rights in the face of anything.
obvious that the masses on both sides wanted

peace.

And it was

^1

First Days in Weimar
Erich Brandenburg reveals that just before the Armistice
renewal crisis, Brockdorff-Rantzau briefly considered joining a
political party.

Hitherto intentionally unaffiliated,

considered in sympathy with the Social Democrats.^2

he was

Had he

40B M S , 169 O H / 1013/397 026-30,
41B M S , 1 6 9 0 H / 1 0 1 3 / 3 9 7 030-33.
Brockdorff-Rantzau asked
that Scheidemann sign the note authorizing Erzberger to sign the
armistice terms, so that he, the Count, would not be responsible.
42scheidemann, II, 304, says;
"We counted him as a So
cial Democrat, though he was not a member of the Social Demo<cratic P a r t y „"

joined a party, however,
Party.

it would have be6n the new Democratic

Brockdorff-Rantzau had always felt that in order for

foreign policy to be consistent and effective,

its leader should

not be identified with a particular domestic political program,
thereby risking his own downfall when his party no longer com
manded a majority.

Brandenburg includes the text of a letter

to Democratic leaders,
Count,

dated February 7, 1919,

contemplating party membership,

in which the

discussed a Foreign M i n i 

ster 's need to be independent of party struggles,

and then added

On the other hand, I realize that in such decisive
times as these it is important for everyone to be artic
ulate in supporting a cause.
Therefore I shall join the
German Democratic Party /Deutsche Demokratische Partei ~7
whose entire program is closest to my own political convi c t i o n s .
He absolved the party from collective responsibility for his
leadership of foreign policy and likewise requested that he not
be obliged to leave office if the party did not remain in the
m a j o r i t y .43
This letter, Erich Brandenburg has concluded, was never
sent,

for the signed original as well as the draft copy remains

in the files of Brockdorff-Rantzau1s correspondence.

But Fritz

Max Cahen, who assisted Brockdorff-Rantzau at Versailles,

and

Erich Eyck, both assert that the Count did belong to the Party.'44
His letter of February 7 proves Br ock dor ff-Rantzau6s
party inclination beyond any doubt, but it can be inferred that
he did not formally join their ranks.
43BMS,

In August of 1.919, he

1690H/1013/397 034-35.

44Fritz Max Cahen, Der Weg nach Versailles (Boppard/
Rhain: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1963), p. 348,* Eyck, I, 90.
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wrote in a personal letter to his good friend and colleague at
Versailles,

Dr. Walter Simons 3

Meanwhile I see that the possibility is net far off,
when I can take a discreet part in affairs; X wi 11
not encumber myself with party politics . „ „,r~Xpa~rteipolitisch will ich mich nicht b elasten)45
The following year,

the Democrats unsuccessfully sought

Brockdorff-Rantzau as their candidate for Reichsprasident if an
election was to be held, but Ebert retained the post.

Composed

Largely of republican theoreticians— Hugo Preuss, who wrote *the
Weimar Constitution was a member— the Democratic Party was an
important part of the original Weimar coalition, but its influ
ence declined steadily after the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s ,46
On February 10, four days before his major1
, foreign
policy address, Brockdorff-Rantzau made a brief statement in
the National Assembly,

saying that he supported the provisional

Constitution and Dr. Preuss's efforts in framing a more perm
anent document.
he added,

in accord with President Wilson's philosophy,

"I am determined not to conclude any secret treaties."4 ^

45 BMS, 1691H/1013/397 259.
"^Founded in December, 1918, the Democrats combined old
Progessives and National Liberals with intellectuals devoted to
the establishment of a republic,.
Although it hoped to unite
all liberals, Gustav Stcesemann attracted many of its potential
adherents by forming his German Peoples Party (Deutsche VoI kspa r t e i ) . Eyck, I, 60-61.
Many prominent intellectuals among
the Democrats were Jews; the rightists, as early as January,
1919, "attempted to discredit /the Democratic Party_J7 as a redtainted, unpatriotic viewish creation."
Lewis Herzman, D N V P
Right Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1924 (Lin
coln , N e b r .: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), p. 4b.
The
racist slur against: tne Democrats is a major factor in Herzman's
study.
47pie Deutsche NatIona.1versammlung im Jahre 1919, X, 6 6 .
Fourth Sitting, February 10, 1919.

CHAPTER IV
PEACE RECONNAISSANCE
Interviews and Press Conferences
From the beginning of 1919 the Allies and Germany each
prepared for an eventual confrontation at the peace table,
using whatever information they could obtain regarding each
other's intentions and often building upon sheer conjecture,
Colonel Arthur Conger,

an intelligence officer on General Per-

shing's staff, went into Germany as a military observer and met
with General Groener, Er zberger; and Brockdorff-Rantzau early
in the y e a r „

As a link between German officials and President

Wilson, Conger was to have some decisive effects on the German
attitude at Versailles.^

Other Americans were members of fact

finding deputations?

through the Gherardi and the Dresel Field

Missions

the United States Commission to Negotiate

to Germany,

Peace learned of Germany's internal and political situation
from, on-the-spot, observers,.

The British and French undertook

similar missions.,
About twenty prominent, men of the new German Government
were interviewed by members of the Dresel Mission early in Jan
uary.

Brockdorff ^Ra ntz au's interview took place on the third,

the day after he formally came into office as Foreign Minister.,
In this colloquy,

pp.

the Count stated his policy and outlook

■^On C o n g e r ’s good educational background,
305-06o
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see Epstein,
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clearly.

For the purpose of this thesis it is worth quoting

the American version in full-2
Count Rantzau began the conversation by stating his
a i m s . He said that his policy would be to sign any peace
on the basis of the fourteen points of President Wilson,
but that he would not accept conditions which made Germany
the slave of the Entente.
He said that he had accepted
his office with reluctance.
The German people could not
be destroyed, nor would he sign any peace whatever but a
peace which would grant Germany the possibility of continu
ing a decent existence..
He stated that he had always stood for President Wilson,
and that at the time the offer for an armistice went to the
President it was he who had particularly urged it„ and he
had thus taken upon himself a great responsibility before
the people.
He said that he had great faith in the Presi
dent's honesty, and had great admiration for him.
He said
he appreciated the difficulties under which the President
worked in Paris, and that he could understand the French
and Belgian attitude.
He said that he would not whine or
beg, but that the /coal and food situation_J7 was exceed
ingly serious, so serious indeed that it mTght result in
Bolshevismo .. . . Germany and America, he believed, /had. J
similar interests and were akin to one another, and could
for the future of the world cooperate profitably.
In discussing the Peace Conference, he mentioned the
question of Bernstorff being sent there, and expressed his
doubts whether he would be acceptable.
Count Rantzau stated that he was optimistic for Germ,any,
because he had not lost his faith in the German people,
which had been deceived and misled, and which had followed
a phantom to the edge of an abyss.
Optimism, he believed,
was the only possible basis for a constructive program, and
he intended to draw a sharp line at the foot of the happen
ings of the wpr and to proceed to reconstruct,.
Count. Rantzau stated emphatically that, a /^nonarchical^/
reaction was out of the question.
Berlin, January 3, 1919.
In the first, three months of 1919 the Foreign Minister
was also in touch with various British officers and investigate
2

UoSo, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919
(13 v o 1s „;"WasKington, D 0C „ ; 1942-1947), II, 162-63.
Hereafter
cited as F.RUS.
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ing commissions.

In the opening chapter of his study of Ge r

many's Ostpolitik leading to the Rapallo agreement, Herbert
Helbig discusses the fear of the Entente that the new German
Government was really double-dealing in 1919.

While supposedly

in league with Soviet Russia, Germany was suspected of exag
gerating the dangers of Bolshevism in order to win easier peace
terms»

In February and March Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke at dif

ferent times with the British Generals Sir Richard Haking and
Spencer Ewart regarding the Bolshevist m e n a c e »

Quite forth

rightly, General Haking said that the purpose of the British
Commission, sent to investigate the activities of Karl Radek,
was also to determine the authenticity of the German Government's
fight, against Bolshevism.3
Other British investigators were finding the situation
in Germany critical; Prime Minister Lloyd George wrote:
I was receiving constant messages from our representa
tives in Germany as to the urgency of supplies reaching
the hungry civilians if disaster were to be averted, and
Mr. Hoover, who was in charge of food supplies, had reported
difficulties and d e l a y s „ In March I felt bound to call the
attention of the Allied representatives once more to what
was going on„
Brockdorff-Rantzau held several press conferences with
representatives of foreign papers and granted interviews to
British and American newspaper correspondents.

He discussed

G e r m a n y ’s right to her colonies, his approval of the idea of a
^Helbig, pp.

17-20.

^David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference
(2 vols.; New Haven; Yale University Press, 1939), I, 190.
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League of Nations,
rights,

the international negotiation of workers'

the Fourteen Points as the basis of a just peace,,

the

injustice of the proposed occupation of the Saar valley and the
left, bank of the R h i n e , and the unreality of declaring Germany
solely guilty of causing the war,.

In each interview he stressed

that economic cooperation was the only road to post-war recon
struction,:.

Germany recognized certain weighty financial obli

gations that were the legacy of the war, but she must possess
the means to carry their, out.

The Fourteen Points, he declared,

must apply to Germany as well as the other nations,
territorial que stio ns«.

This of course left the matter of A n 

schluss open for the Germans in Austria to
ary 24,

including

d

e

c

i

d

e

on Janu

the Foreign Minister spoke to foreign newspaper corres

pondents in the same vein,

saying;

The statesmen of today and tomorrow must have the inten
tion of changing the /spirit of 1914 which led to the death
of millions
As long as thoughts of revenge live, there
will be wars,
As long as a n a t i o n ’s territory is taken by
force, people will take up arms in defense of freedom..
As
long as there are irredenta, stateBmen will only be able
to discuss things hesTtanuly and s e c r e t l y /
^Brockdorff-Rantzau met with Austrian Secretary of State
Bauer in February to discuss terms under which Anschluss could
take place at a later date if German Austria desired it.
He did
not want to antagonize the Allies with a fait accompli or. this
point,
B M S , 1690H/1013/397 051-54; Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente . p p „ 77™7 9 0
^Brockdorf f-Rantzau, D o kume nte, pp.. 29-30.
See also
similar interviews, I b i d , p a s s i m . Helbig, p. 20, mentions Ger
many's hope that intervie ws”*with foreign press representatives
would help to convince the .Entente countries that G e r m a n y 2s
very existence was at stake in the fight against. Bolshevism..
In December, 1918, a report, from the Dresel Mission
noted; '’Persistent endeavors will be made to convert observers
to the German view. , „ . In this connection, attention is
called to the great undesirability of allowing the entry into
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The Speech of February 14,

19.19

Brockdorff-Rantzau was probably more successful in m a k 
ing his views known abroad through the newspaper interviews
than in his "Count and Democrat" speech to the National A s e m bly on February 14,

1919,

in which he stated his entire program

and outlook for Germany in the post-war world.
all but ignored outside of Germany.
stated at the outset,

had two goals;

The speech was

German foreign policy,

he

the ending of the war and

the restoration of normal relations among nations.

No longer a

military power, Germany agreed with the Allies on the Fourteen
Points, which should apply to her own situation as well as to
other nations.

Germany and Allied nations faced a moral obli

gation to disarm.

The question of war guilt could only be

decided by an impartial commission in which all nations had con
fidence o
That the peace should be concluded on an economic as
well as a political basis was the underlying theme of his whole
policyo

In the interest of economic recovery, Germany should

not be required to give up all her colonies and her merchant
fleet.,

Germany recognized her duty to rebuild Belgium, and

northern France and was resigned to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine,
if a plebiscite so decreed, but other territorial questions
must be decided by the peoples involved.

Poland's access to

Germany at present of American newspaper reporters, some of whom
have already in several cases obtained interviews with German
public men."
F R U S , II, 12-13.
On February 11, a Gherardi C om
mission report, referring to Bernstorff, said; "I am told he has
been pressing 'inspired inte rviews’; that is, prepared and type
written answers to supposed questions by the United Press cor
respondent."
FRUS, II, 1.3 o
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the sea could be guaranteed by internationalizing the Vistula
River„
The speech fully endorsed the League of Nations idea,
with the requisite that neutral nations should be members and
that Germany be admitted after the peace was signed.

Other

than the Fourteenth

Point, plans for such a League

been unveiled,

Foreign Minister anticipated the League's

The

need for a supra-national administrative authority,

had not yet

a general

assembly {3 undesparlament) , and some means of enforcing decisions,
"Germany," he said,
/will 7 cooperate in every respect in establishing the
League, even though the other nations would only admit us
with deep misgivings and the League is primarily founded
to stop Germany from, continuing her warlike policy, which
is now the farthest thing from our desires.
We must over
come this distrust, with proof of a sincere love for peace.
Brockdorff-Rantzau repudiated Germany 8s former
rattling"

to get her way;

"sword

the course was now "to convince the

opponent that it is in his own interest to examine our v i e w s ."
Led by the working class,, the new German Government also
included socialists

and the middle class,and could

now speak

for the nation.

Foreign Minister he needed and

valued the

As

National A s s e m b l y ’s support, which his predecessors had lacked,
and he hoped "to prove that a man. could be a Count and at the
same time a convinced Democrat,"
from, the best talent available,

Having selected their leaders
the people could also correct

their mistakes; he knew he would remain in his post only as
long as the Assembly agreed with his p o l i c i e s .
feated,

but not dishonored,"

he concluded,

"We are de

and he swore to

defend the honor and dignity of the German people.7
This speech,
Dresel report.

in English translation,

duly appears in the

It was aimed at the peacemakers in Paris as well

as the Weimar National Assembly,

but Wilson, Lloyd George,

and

Clemenceau were unattentive— they were either indisposed or not
present in the French c a p i t a l ,
German Preparation for Peace Negotiations
Although they had little official knowledge of what was
to come as a result of the deliberations of the Paris Peace C o n 
ference which had convened in January of 1919,

the German G o v 

ernment made extensive preparations for its part in concluding
peace.

Dr. Alma Luckau,

German Peace Delegation,

chronicler of the activities of the
describes the organization and work of

the Paxkonferenz, which assembled expert opinion and documentary
evidence on all anticipated questions of peace.

Count Bernstorff,

former German Ambassador in Washington and the only German
statesman who knew President Wilson,
prominent Americans personally,

Colonel. House,

directed its work.

and other
By March,

7The entire speech is in Brockdorff-Rantzau, Do kumente,
pp. 37-63.
For an English translation, see F R U S , II, 16-26.
A
Gherardi Mission report, noted: "The press comments on Brock
dorf f-Rantzau Es speech indicate that it is thought, to be very
broadminded,
Germany expects that her delegates will come to
the Peace Conference, not as representatives of a defeated coun
try, but as statesmen who expect to assist in the reconstruction
of Europe.
Wilson's 14 points are regarded as Germany's great
est safeguard." F R U S , XII, 15.
The American Minister at the
Hague (Garrett) reported he had heard "that Count BrockdorffRantzau in framing future policy considers it to be of first im
portance that, he learn American opinion regarding his speech . .
F R U S . XII, 26-2 7.
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however,

the hopes for a negotiated peace began to fade .,8
As the Paxkonferenz prepared Germany's case,- the prob

lem of who would lead the peace delegation had to be decided.
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau at first did not want this duty him
self.

He considered it better strategy if he,

Minister,

remained in Berlin.

with excessive demands,

Then,

the Foreign

in case of a dictated peace

as the Armistice negotiations portended,

the Delegation could delay its decision by having to communicate
with Berlin for instructions.
desired,

He would,

if President Ebert

be present in Paris at the opening and conclusion of

the pr oce edings.^
Toward the end of March, however,

Brockdorff-Rantzau was

convinced that Germany must, try for negotiations with the Allies
While the Paris Peace Conference continued throughout the first
quarter of 1919,

the critical food situation in Germany pro

duced two significant results.

On the one hand Spartacist vio

lence broke out again in Berlin, where a general strike began in
March,

and Soviet, republics cropped up in various parts of the

countryo

The other event in March involved successful negotia

tions with the Allies over provisioning Germany through the
^Later on, at Versailles, the pressure of time did not
permit extensive use of the tremendous amount of material assem
bled by Paxkonferenz experts for the German Delegation.
Of the
work of the Paxkonferenz Dr. Luckau observes; "The thoroughness
of this preparatory work was as extraordinary as its futility
was pitiful,"
Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris
Peace Conference (New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1941),
p . '31 o
9.BM3, 1690H/1013/397 038-43.
Bernstorff was felt to be
unacceptable to the Allies.
Although Brockdorff-Rantzau appeared
in Weimar when necessary, he apparently stayed in Berlin most of
the time, where the Foreign Office conducted its affairs.

summer.

Talks in Spa had foundered early in the month when Ger

many asked such an assurance before handing over her entire m e r 
chant fleet to the Allies.

On March 13th, however, Allied-Ger

man discussions resumed in Brussels, where agreement was reached
on these points as well as the technical matters involved.
resulted in a partial lifting of the blockade,

This

allowing the

delivery of "200,000 tons of food into Germany in ten days."
But there was no basic change of attitude.

Herbert Hoover,

in

charge of food shipments, met with continued Allied objections
to further relaxation of the blockade,

which was considered by

France and Britain as a potent weapon to force German acceptance
of the peace terms .
While encouraging,

this was by no means an indication

that the coming peace negotiations would follow the same pattern.
Time appeared to be running out for Germany,

however,

and nego

tiation/ over technical matters was the only possibility of ad
justing a dictated peace.
March,

At a Cabinet meeting on the 21st of

Brockdorff-Rantzau presented a protocol on handling the

problem of a peace which obviously would not conform to Wilson's
principles.
1..
2.
3,

As he saw it., Germany had three alternatives;
Refuse such a treaty.
present the Allies immediately with Germany's own
treaty draft.
Study the Allied treaty, then offer counterproposals.

^ H e r b e r t Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York;
McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 170-78, 229-36.
"Despite all our efforts,
wrote Hoover, "the blockade was not removed until the ratifica
tion of the Peace Treaty of Germany on July 7, 1919." Ibid., p.
178 .
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The third possibility, he said, would be the best;

the delegates

should be so well prepared that they could give their decisions
on the spot

This the Paxkonf erenz had already seen to.

It. took the Cabinet two days to discuss fully the ap
proach to the expected terms of peace.

Having accepted the

Fourteen Points and the Wilson-Lansing Note of November 5th,
which left certain territorial questions untouched, Germany
could argue convincingly for justice.

In the Count's words,

"Not

covered in Wilson's Points are several important questions of
peace for which we must propose solutions in the spirit of the
Wilsonian program.
Regarding the reparations payments,

he observed that

other peace considerations affected Germany's future size and
strength, but only this question involved her very existence.
The Lansing Note and certain of Wilson's Fourteen Points could
be interpreted as setting limits on what could be demanded.
Closely bound up with this was the question of war guilt,

for

the Allies based their exorbitant reparations demands on the pre
supposition of Germany's sole guilt as aggressor.
1918, Dr. Solf had sent a note to the Allies

In November,

"proposing to turn

over the examination of the causes of the world war to a neutral
commission whose members should be given free access to the ar
chives of all the Powers.

X 1BMS,

The proposal

169OH/1013/397 059.

12B M S , 169OH/1013/397 059-60.

/was rejected_J7 by the

75
Allied Governments,

who found that it was unnecessary to explore

13
what was self-evident,, Jl
Brockdorff-Rantzau revealed that England had very re
cently rejected a similar request from him,

saying,

'According

to the opinion of the Allied Governments Germany's guilt for the
war had long been indisputably established ."44

Ebert and the

Cabinet decided to refute the English assertion with another
note and to request a neutral investigation once again,,

The

German Delegates were not to give up the idea that the question
of war guilt could only be decided in this manner„
At last the Cabinet meeting adjourned,
full support to the Count's proposals.

having given its

They considered it "im

possible to accept a peace going beyond the limits which he had
characterized."

Brandenburg points out here that the unity of

the Cabinet behind Brockdorff-Rantzau1s program was not unchal
lenged.

General Groener,

among his other criticisms,

called for

a much sharper opposition to the war guilt question, and

Staats-

sekretar Erzberger had no scruples about approaching the peace
question behind the Foreign Minister's back in any way he saw
l^BMS,

1690H/101.3/397 066-74;

Holborn,

"Diplomats,"

p. 140„

14 BMS, 1690H/1013/397 074; "Nachlass B - R , " 9105H/3443/
H234 910.
Brandenburg notes that President Ebert, who agreed
that the Lansing note of November 5 was acceptable as a basis
for peace negotiations, stated that if the Allies dictated a
peace which went beyond Wilsonian principles, then Germany
should submit a counterclaim to them.
15 BMS,

1690H/1013/397 076.

76
fit.They had

already clashed over the Armistice renewal.

E r zberger, one of

the Catholic Center Party's most prom

inent and knowledgeable members, was looked upon by Ebtert,
Scheidemann,

and the Count as an intriguer.

biographer, Klaus Epstein,

E r z b e r g e r 's recent

describes the antipathy between the

aristocratic Brockdorff-Rantzau and the jovial Swabian--two men
who were poles apart in every respect.
"resented Erzberger's restless,
ity;

"Rantzau," says E p s t e i n ,

incautious,

and meddling activ

Erzberger resented Rantzau's noblesse oblige attitude

towards parliamentarians and his ill-concealed disdain for ama
teurs in di plo macy „"16
Toward the end of
or not

March the Cabinet also debated whether

to make public the Kautsky Documents dealing with the

Empire's diplomacy before the outbreak of the war.
knowing the content of this collection fully,
were divided in their opinion.

Some,

Not yet

the Ministers

like Democrat Eugen Schif-

f e r , feared they would actually help to prove Germany's war
guilt.

Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to withhold them for possi

ble later use,

since what awaited the Germans at the Peace Con

ference was yet unknown.

On April 8, the Cabinet agreed that

-*-^Epstein, p. 302.
Erzberber complained to Scheidemann
on April 26 that the German Peace Delegation had no diplomat
with personal experience in France, England, Italy, Belgium or
Japan.
The Count naturally considered this an insult.
He
asked Erzberger, however, to accompany the Delegation to V e r 
sailles , hoping in this way to prevent Erzberger from under
mining the Delegation's position in Weimar.
Erzberger refused
to go as a member; he would have preferred to lead the Delega
tion himself.
See B M S , 1690H/1013/397 094, 100,
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they should be held in reserve.

Two days later,

the Foreign

Minister delivered his second majcr address in Weimar,

touching

on foreign policy and his program of reform at the Foreign
O f f i c e ,17
"Invitation 88 to Versailles
A week later came Clemenceau°s note summoning qualified
German representatives to Versailles on April 25 to receive the
terms of p e a c e .

The word "receive 88 implied only a dictated

peace; Brockdorff-Rantzau1s reply named three delegates

"fully

empowered to receive draft text of preliminary peace negotia
tions, " who would be accompanied by four minor officials 0

To

this the Council of Four replied that they "would treat only
with plenipotentiaries."18
l 70n war guilt and the Kautsky Documents, see B M S , 1690H/
1013/397 074, 76; and Fritz Dickmann, "Die Kriegsschuldfrage auf
der Friedenskonferenz von Paris 1919," Historische Zeitschrift,
CXCVII (1963), 64, 72-7 4.
This recent German study of the war
guilt question criticizes Brockdorff-Fantzau for not publicizing
and utilizing the Kautsky Documents before and during the Peace
Conferenceo
By revealing the actions of the Imperial regime,
Kautsky wanted rto avoid the identification of the new Germany
and its^ government, which had no conduct the peace negot.ian.ions,
with /those who had caused the war/ even if it had only been
through their helpless incapability that the last diplomatic
threads had been cut in 1914„"
For the April 1.0th speech, see Brockdorf f-Rantzau, Dokum e n t e , pp. 83-94.
l^Luckau, pp. 58-59, 210; Schiff, pp. 27-29.
Lord Rid
dell, p p 0 54-55, records some interesting words of Lloyd George
regarding this exchange of notes.
'M 0G 0 said the result of the
message to the Germans might bring about the fall of the German
Government, and that we were at a critical period of the negotia
tions.
He thought the G e r m a n s 0 reply would show their disposi
tion.
If they agreed to send representatives, that would show
they were anxious for peace.
If they_decl.ined to do so, it
would show they were indifferent/'
/On the next day, Apr’il 21,,
Lloyd George revealed at d i n n e r / that “The Germans have replied
saying thtey will send great personages.
That, is a regular climbdown and very signifi can t."

78
On April 20, Dresel reported an interview with Brockdorff-Rantzau.

The Count,

according to Dresel,

averred that

the formal invitation to Versailles had astonished him, and
that he should only go if he were specifically directed by
the government to start.
As far as he could see, an ulti
matum was intended /and 7 it was not clear why he should go
to Paris to receive” this1. Passing to discussions of terms
he said that conditions apparently proposed would reduce
Germans to abject slavery. . „ . He would never sign any
peace nor would the Ministry in his opinion agree to one
which deprived Germany even temporarily of /the Saar and
upper Silesia_7 and he was convinced that the German people
would back this up.

His attitude was of great depression and he showed a
remarkable irritation towards the French.
He gave the im
pression of sincerity although I /am_7 not convinced he
will not ultimately recede from his position.
From the
papers, a proclamation just issued by Ebert, and interviews
with several well-informed persons, I have guarantees that
the views of Rantzau meet with much support.-*-^
Brockdorff-Rantzau replied to Clemenceau that Germany
would send plenipotentiaries.

He himself would lead the dele

gation, with the understanding that the draft treaty to be
presented would be negotiated.
Delegation have

He asked also that the German

"complete freedom of movement and full tele

phonic facilities for the purposes of communicating with their
Govern men t."20

19F R U S , XII, 83.
The Count's memorandum of this inter
view is very detailed and bears out most of Dresel's observations.
Several times he told Dresel emphatically that he would not sign
a treaty ruinous or dishonorable to Germany, and that all infor
mation from Paris indicated that just such a treaty awaited Ger
many.
"Nachlass B-R, " 9.105H/3441/H234 180-93.
2^Schi.ff, p. 30; Luckau, p. 210.
When asked to comment
on the leader of the German Peace Delegation in May, 1919, M a u 
rice Egan, now returned to America,
said:
"Rantzau is intel
lect personified, and it will require not mere idealism but the
most scrupulous knowledge of diplomatic tactics on the part of
the Allies to deal with him."
New York Times, May 4, 1919, IV, 1.
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At the end of April, members of the Dresel Mission sent
back conflicting reports together with some perspicacious advice.
Ellis Loring Dresel and Lit'hgow Osborne disagreed on the nature
of the new German Government.
on April 30,

Osborne concluded in his report

1919,

Personally I am inclined to believe that . . . . a coali
tion Socialist government here is best for all concerned.
The present Government, under the circumstances, is a
thoroughly dishonest one.
(Ellis disagrees here, and I
probably have overstated the case.
He agrees that the Gov
ernment is weak, opportunistic, time-serving and employs
idiotic measures.
I suppose that there are sincere demo
crats in it, but no "feel" for democratic methods has been
acquired, and c o u l d n ’t be made use of if it had been.)
It
consists of tame pseudo-Socialists, still tamer pseudo-Democrats and of persons who pretend to base their democracy on
Catholicism.
(Imagine politics based on revealed religion
in this day and age).
The G o v e r n m e n t ’s instruments are the
old "Beamtentum", and as regards democracy, no more need be
said about them.
The g o v e r n m e n t ’s methods undoubtedly smack strangely of
the old regime; it depends on military forces; there is
still the attempt tQ "imponieren 11. "imponieren" is the
basis of foreign policy-^see Rantzau's answer to the first
"invitation" to Versailles.
And that whole incident is re
garded here as a "diplomatic victory" for Germany! !
On May 3rd, a report from Dresel himself opined thats
It . . „ seems probable that the somewhat uncompromising
utterances of government officials and publicists need
not be taken too seriously, and that, the Government will
sign in the end,, especially if it can save its 1face ' by
being able to point to actual 'negotiations at V e r s a i l l e s . ^
Dresel likened the German appearance at Versailles to a "pilgrimmage to Canossa" and included observations which might
well have been useful-,
I venture to suggest that whatever definite statements
can be made indicating that at least a limited amount of
discussion of terms will be permitted might have reassuring
influ enc e„

21FRUS, XII,

101.

22F R U S , XII. 89.

Italics mine
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I emphasized /Tn his April 19 interview with Brockdorff
Rantzau_J7 throughout the talk the belief that German econo
mic rehabilitation will be in the interests of the whole
world and that on the conclusion of peace our attitude will
be only cooperation to this end.
I also pointed out the
ruinous consequences of summary rejection of peace.
The whole Dresel Mission,

continued the report, was re

garded in German official circles as "an advance courrier to
mitigate the shock of the coming Treaty."24
In view of the conditions which were to prevail at V e r 
sailles in May,

the concluding information in Dresel's report

fell on deaf ears;
I venture to draw attention to the sensitiveness of
the government and of the delegates as to their probable
treatment at Versailles.
They evidently fear that they
were likely looked on as Pariahs.
In view of their ex
cited and almost abnormal frame of mind I am convinced
that as concilliatory an attitude as can be_ adopted to
wards them in non-essential matters may have important
bearing on final result.
Even insignificant concessions
and the form in which distasteful demands are phrased
will mean much to some of delegates.
I believe therefore
that latitude in such matters as material comforts, the
widest liberty that can properly be afforded the dele
gates, occasions for informal intercourse, and ample op- p o f t u n i t y to prepare and state their case, cannot fail
to have a favorable effect,
My personal opinion, gathered from a large series of
interviews, is that the present government will refuse to
sign peace if the conditions are such as are stated in
the press. 2^

23FRUS f XII, 83,85. Dresel ended this report with a
rather pathetic pleas "I shall endeavor to impress this as strong
ly as possible in future conversations and shall be grateful for
any suggestions as to anything that can be said further along
these l i nes ."
24FR.U5, XII, 84.
This is exactly how Brockdorf f-Rantzau
described T t In his own report covering the April 19th Dresel
interview: "I have the impression that /Dresel
as well as Os 
borne are here on an official mission T o work with all means to
prepare the people and government for the acceptance of the
peace."
"Nachlass B ~ R , " 9105H/3441/H234 190.
25F R U S , XII, 85-86.
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Although he no longer believed that "Wilson would
strain every nerve /to prevent_7 Germany's position among the
peoples of this world from being reduced to n o t h i n g , .
Dresel 's assurance of American realization of the importance of
the economic rehabilitation of Germany in the post-war world
fitted in with Brockdorff-Rantzau's concept of a just peace
acceptable to both sides.

The future rested upon the prompt

restoration of commercial and economic ties and the participa
tion of all western nations in the League of Nations.
On the way to Versailles,

however,

the Foreign Minister

received news from the American Army Colonel Arthur Conger that
confirmed every suspicion that the harshest of peace terms awaited Germany.

There was little left of President Wilson's

Fourteen Points after four months of the Paris Peace Conference.
^ B r o c k d o r f f - R a n t z a u , D ok umente, p. 10.

CHAPTER V
CONFRONTATION AT VERSAILLES
A Last Interview with Conger
Two special trains carrying the leading members of the
German Peace Delegation to Versailles left Berlin on the after
noon of April 28, 1919.

During this journey the American Colo

nel Arthur Conger had a final interview with the German Foreign
Minister.

Conger,

who had his headquarters at Trier, had sent

a telegram requesting a meeting with Brockdorff-Rantzau en
route,

to which the Count agreed.

The Colonel boarded the

train at 2;15 A.M* on April 29, and the twenty minute discussion
lasting from Essen to Duisburg, was of great significance.

It

was here that Brockdorff-Rantzau learned in some detail how far
the Treaty terms fell short of the Fourteen Points and that.
President Wilson was allegedly unwilling and unable to make any
changes in view of the French thirst for revanche and the de
mands of other nations at the Paris Peace Conference.

Germany,

now safely hors de c o m b a t , was simply to be shown the "dotted
line o11
According to the secret memorandum, written that day by
Brockdorff-Rantzau,
disclosures to make.

Conger had three important and confidential
Since the traveling time between Essen

and Duisburg would be short, he launched into a speech "almost
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memorized verbatim, "-®-

He began by revealing that direct tele

phone contact between Paris and Trier now existed,

and added

that arrangements could even be made whereby communications from.
Berlin could be transmitted to the American Delegates in Paris.
Secondly,

said the Colonel,

it might be possible for the Ameri

can military officer included among the French officers to be
assigned as custodians,

or guards, of the German Delegation in

Versailles to establish contact with its

leader.

^

But the most important revelations concerned the im
placable position of the Allies regarding the peace terms.

Con

ger implied that unity would prevail despite the trouble with
the Italians, who had left the Conference.
Brockdorff -Ra ntz au's memorandum,

Then,

according to

Conger remarked that all the

Treaty conditions were still not determined and that it was p o s 
sible that the Germans would only receive a part of it to start
with.

Although President Wilson had done all in his power,

it

now appeared certain that no more modifications in the Treaty
could be attained.
Saar Basin,
cussion.

The fifteen year French occupation of the

for example, was not even subject to further dis

Put simply:

President Wilson wished that the Germans

would sign whatever terms were placed before them,

LBMS,

By so doing,

16 9 lE/.l 013 /3 9 7 108-12.

2I b i d . Brockdorff-Rantzau gives this officer's name as
R.oyl /si.c"~7r~Tyler . Major Royal1 Tyler was the American liaison
officer with the Germans, according to Charles Seymour, Letters
from the Paris Peace Conference, ed. Harold B. Whiteman, Jr.
(Yale UnlVersity-PressT 1965), p. 221.
A Major Gibson served
in this capacity for the English.
"Nachlass B - R , " 9105H/3443/
H235 655 o
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the Germans

"would assure themselves of the sympathy of Wilson

and the American people and possibly after ten or fifteen years
modifications could be secured.
The Foreign Minister was not interested in possible
changes a decade or more in the future.
occupation a "poorly veiled annexation."

He considered the Saar
Germany was willing

to make reparations to France and to supply her with coal as
long as necessary,

both of which would be impossible in the

face of economic distress augmented by the loss of the vital
Saar region,,
ger,

Brockdorff-Rantzau, who never really trusted Con

stressed the imminent danger to the new-fledged Republic:
No government would be able to risk signing such a
treaty.
If the Entente wishes to render the present
German government, which it has itself designated as
qualified to negotiate, incapable /of existing_7, that
is their concern, and they will also be responsible if
it leads to unavoidable chaos in Germany.^

When Colonel Conger reminded him of Germany's totally defense
less condition, which Marshal Foch was eager to exploit,

Brock

dor f f-Rantzau countered with the Bolshevist threat:
We are indeed no longer capable of military resistance,
but a nation of 70 million cannot be annihilated.
If
the Entente really enforces the plans that have just
been revealed to me, then Bolshevism in Germany will be
inevitable.
It should be clear to our enemies that /Bolshevism_J7 would not stop at the French border.
By no
means do I wish to use Bolshevism, as a threat--! merely
state the fact s. 5
BMS , 169lfl/1013/397 111.
Epstein,

^BMS , 1691E/1013/397 112.
p. 306.

5BMS,

169 111/1013/397 112.

On mistrust of Conger,

see
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At Duisburg Conger had to leave.,

He said that he roust

report the course of the conversation immediately to President
Wilson,

to which Brockdorff-Rantzau emphatically agreed,

repeat

ing again that he could not sign a treaty that was not based
upon the Fourteen Points.

C o n g e r "s interview seemed an obvious

attempt to sound out the German Delegation leader, who now sus
pected the worst.

Colonel Conger had said in effect that G e r 

many would be expected to sign the draft treaty without demur;
the forthcoming meeting of ex=belligerents in Versailles was to
be a mere formality and any intransigence on Germany's part
would only arouse Allied and Associated wrath.

What sort of

reception awaited the Delegation at Versailles?
The ''Spirit of Versailles"
The journey took on an ominous character soon after
crossing the border of the as yet unbombarded V a t e r l a n d .
French auspices,,

Under

the Germans were subjected to an intentionally

slow and bitterly enlightening trip through the war-devastated
regions of Belgium and northern France.
into Vaucresson,
29,

near Versailles,

The trains chugged

on the rainy evening of April

1919.
Colonel Henry of the French Army, who acted as liaison

officer during the seven weeks that the Germans actually spent
at Versailles, met the leader of the German Delegation on behalf
of the French Government.

It was an icily formal greeting,

Mo-

^Eest described by Victor Schi.ff, pp. 45-57.
Actually,
their journey was planned by the Frehch so that they would ar
rive in the evening ,, Luc k a u y p. 211 .
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tor vehicles then conveyed the entire group to the three hotels
7
allotted to them in Versailles.
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and
the most prominent Delegates occupied part of the HStel des
Reservoirs,

the secretarial staff was housed at the HStel

Suisse,

and members of the press were assigned to the Hotel

Vatel.

A contingent having arrived two days previously,

German deputation now numbered about 180 persons,

the

including

communications technicians and printers.
French soldiers,

although willing to do so, were for

bidden to assist the Germans in carrying their luggage into
their quarters^ and members of the Delegation soon found them
selves completely isolated from any contact with the outside
world,

although they had access to newspapers and were in touch

with their Government in Weimar.

A part of the park at V e r 

sailles was reserved for them to walk about in, but after an
"incident" or two,
bounds..

the town of Versailles was placed out of

Only traffic among the three hotels,

located near each

other on both sides of the Rue des Reservoirs, was permitted.
The French wished to preclude all contact between the Germans
and the inhabitants of Versailles,* French journalists faced the
7

Noting that the cars had "little yellow pennants," Professor Bonn of the Delegation wrote:
"The French had very
tactfully chosen yellow for the German delegation; it denotes
pestilence on board.,"
Bonn, p. 226.
Perhaps Brockdorff-Rant
zau indulged in similar macabre humor at the Treaty presentation
ceremony on May 7s his overcoat, bowler, suit, and gloves were
all in funereal black.
^General Seeckt. himself helped with this task.
Fried
rich von Rabenau, Seeckt, Aus seinera. Leben 1918-1936 (Leipzig:
Hase u ., Koehler, 1940), p. 163.
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threat of court martial if caught conversing with members of
the German party.

9

Victor Schiff,

a Socialist member of the German press

corps, who knew France and the French language well, made a
strong contention regarding the German quarantine:
above all,

"There was,

the desixe Lo keep Lhose German Social Democrats who

were known to be on our Delegation from meeting their socialist
comrades in F r a n c e ."10

The Allied fear that German Socialists

would try to unite organized labor behind objections to an im
posed,

imperialistic peace was very real.
"Only phot o g r a p h s ," observed General Hans von Seeckt in

a letter to his wife on April 30,

"seem to be freely allo w e d ."11

Pho to graphers' flashes had dazzled the arriving delegates the
previous evening,
local newspapers.

and the results of these now appeared in the
The world learned of the Germans mainly

through the pictures and comments of the French newspapers,
which sneered at "the very pale Count Brockdorff-Rantzau" only
as "the ex-ambassador of Wilhelm II," and misrepresented other
Germans,

*

Unable to make any reply to the French press,

9 X b i d . ; Schiff, p p . 55-56.
eating with the enemy "

the

The charges would be "communi

in

Schiff, p. 54.
George Bernard Noble, Policies and
Opinions at Paris, .1919 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), p.
j 8'5. quotes from Veritjf and Humanite regarding the desires of
French Socialists to make the treaty more acceptable to Germany.
11

12

Rabenau,

p. 163.

Ibid,, Schiff, p. 58.
Brockdorff-Rantzau was particu
larly angr’y~abbut. the hate campaign which the Paris Temps car
ried on against him.
See Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente und
Gedanken urn. Versailles (Berlin: Verlag fur K u lturpoliti k, 1925),
p, 135.
This is borne out in Noble, Chapter X.
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Germans could only wait for word iron the leaders of the Peace
Conference,,

On May 1.„ the quarantine was intensified by the

construction of wooden palisades around the German compound,
ostensibly to protect them from the Boche-hating
That day also,

F r e n c h .

^3

the diplomatic exchange of credentials

took place in the Trianon Palace H otely which had been Allied
Headquarters during the w a r 0
Government,

As plenipotentiary of the German

Brockdorff-Rantzau did not wish to attend this

brief meeting himself;

Clemenceau would not be present and the

Count felt that lesser persons could well attend to this chore,
M. Jules Cambon,

Head of the Allied Credentials Committee, made

it known that Brockdorff-Rantzau was expected to be there,
since all those to be present
for the United States,

(Cambon for France,

Henry White

Lord Hardinge for Great Britain,

and

Keishiro Matsui for Japan) were themselves plenipotentiaries.
The Count relented.

At the meeting he exchanged greetings with

Cambon, who had been French Ambassador in Berlin for seven
years before the war.

Brockdorff-Rantzau, however,

delegated

the actual job of examining the credentials to his fellow delegate,

Reichs jus tizminis ter Lands ber g 0

Both nervous tension and

excessive regard for punctilio can account for t h i s „ ^

The

Allies worried that Germany would ask for the Italian creden33L u ckau, p 0 5 9 0 Literary Digest History of the World
W a r , ed„ Francis W 0 Halsey (10 v o l s .• New York. Funk and Wagnails
C o « , 1920), X, 307, describes this stockade in detail and in
cludes a photograph of a part of it,
This
big c a g e ” enclosed
an area of about 100 by 300 yards,,
l^Henry White „ according to his biographer,,
was shocked
by the agitation of Brockdorff-Rantzau„ who seemed on the point
of collapse.
His face was chalky, his knees shook uncontroll
ably , and his hands trembled 0 A few curt and formal sentences
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t.ials (Orlando had left the Conference after: the disagreement
over F i u m e ) , but the Germans accepted the Allied credentials
after pointing out certain facts and discrepancies
Except for the diplomatic exchange of credentials,

the

Germans received no instructions or communications from the Al
lies for seven days following their arrival.

The lowering

"spirit of Versailles" was palpably a p p a r e n t , ^
summoned to appear quickly in Versailles,

Having been

the German Delegates

were now treated as persons under house arrest and simply ig
nored while the Paris Conference still struggled over main
points of the treaty.

During these days of waiting while the

Council of Three deliberated behind closed doors,

the German

Foreign Minister held discussions with his colleagues .

He

were exchanged, documents passed from hand to hand/ the two
groups bowed stiffly to one another, and the Germans retired.
' /white thought^/7 there was pathos in the humiliation of a
once-great Empire, but Cambon said, coldly, that 'he was glad
to report the Germans seemed to be in just such a frame of mind
as they should b e . '
Allan N e v i n s , Henry White; Thirty Years
of American Diplomacy (New York; Harper and Bros., 1930), p.
443.
See a 1sc B M S , '16 9 1H/1013/397 117; Novak, pp. 209-11; Lord
Hankey, pp., 138-39.
Cambon was the only French dignitary whom BrockdorffRantzau singled out later for courteous bearing.
Dokurnente und
G e d a n k e n , p „ 2 03.
13
lord Hankey, p. 138°
Luckau
p. 62.
The French wanted
to split up Germany by demanding credentials from Bavaria.
Paul
Birds a.1,1 . Versailles Twenty Years After (New York; Har court.
Brace and Co.,, Inc.,, 1941), pp. 218-2 3.
^ M a n y writers have described this hostile atmosphere
vividly, one of the best being Victor Schiff, who makes a great
effort tc be impartial and notes many small incidents whose
cumulative effect was to have tremendous influence on the G e r 
mans,
The aispirit of Versailles" is admirably captured by Her
mann Lutz, who uses the phrase often in his book German-French
Unity- B asis for European Peace (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
1957), p p Q 30-88
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sought the g r o u p 5s backing of his policy and assured them indi
vidually of his 'ow. support, and confidence.
All,

that is, but one group-

who were among t h e m 0

the few military officers

The Count ostentatiously ignored General

von Seeckt and Commodore Heinrich when greeting Delegates soon
after the arrival, in V e r sailles«
but not one of the Dele gat es»
resentative,

Seeckt was a peace commissioner

He and Heinrich,

the Naval rep

feared correctly that they would not be asked to

participate in any of the top level discussions among the
Delegates

Seeckt and Brockdorf f-Rantzau did hold amicable

discussions together while awaiting the pleasure of the Allies
to be made known, but the C o u n t 3s flat refusal to stress Ger
man military requirements quickly alienated S e e c k t o ^
17

See Bro ckdorff-Rantzau's speech of welcome to the
Delegates at the H^tel des Reservoirs, April 30, 1919, B M S ,
1691H/1013/397 115-16.
At first, during conferences, everyone
feared that the rooms were "bugged" with hidden m i c rophones.
Schiff, pp. 31-33, 79-80.
"Nachlass B~R, 91 9105H/3443/H335 258.,
Cahen, pp. 227, 312, savs that, the Germans "listened in r on the
Soviets at Brest-Litovsk
18 Rabenau,

pp. 158, 165.
The cool relationship between
Brockdorff-Rantzau and General von Seeckt, which apparently b e 
gan at this time, developed into a feud which lasted into the
1 9 2 0 Es. when Seeckt objected to the Count as Ambassador to So
viet Russia in 1922.
At Versailles, Seeckt at first wanted to
press for a German Army of 300,000 men (Rabenau, p. 159.)
He
later settled on 200,000, but Brockdorff-Rantzau refused to ask
for an increase over the 100,000 allowed by the Treaty,
In 1918
Seeckt had insisted "Deutschland muss bundnisfahig sein.
Man
ist aber nicht bundni'sTaHIg^l~wenn man waffenlos i s t .S! Frockd orf f-R an tzau 1s program called for Germany to lead the way in
universal disarmament? he also spoke out against the re-forming
of pre-war type coalitions.
Seeckt accused him. of offering up
Germany's national honor by refusing to negotiate from a position
of military strength.
See Rabenau, p p «, 17 5-80* Brockdorff-Rantz a u , Dokume nte , pp. 81-82,■ Walter Goerlitz, History of the G e r 
man General 5taff 1657-1945, tr . Brian Bat teFsTiaw' i N ew Yor k7%"
P raeger , l9b~3~) , p.
„19Fpr exami
. S e e c k t wrote in a lettf r to his wife on
at a long time with Broc> dorff-Rantzau and
May 4, "Yesterday
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Presentation of the Treaty
Since no further communications from the Allies were
forthcoming,

the Count wrote a letter to Clemenceau on May 4,

saying that certain Ministers,

needed by their government in

Weimar, would be obliged to leave late on May 5 unless the A l 
lies had definite plans.

This ploy got results.

the French liaison officer,

Colonel Henry,

informed Brockdorff-Rantzau that

the peace conditions would be handed to the Germans at a cere
mony m

the Trianon Palace Hotel on Wednesday afternoon, May 7,

at three o'clock.
session,

After perusing the agenda for the approaching

the Germans realized that they would have no part in

oral negotiations and that only fifteen days were to be allotted
to them for the preparation of their written comments in French
and E n g l i s h .20
sage,
tions.

This,

together with the tone of Conger's mes

appeared to leave Germany without any voice in negotia
Great attention,

therefore, was given to a speech

drafted for the Foreign Minister if he were permitted to have
the floor.

In fact,

there were two alternative speeches? one

was a short statement,

and the other, very long and detailed.

Premier C l e m e n c e a u !s attitude as presiding official was to
found him quite determined and competent in many questions.
Nous v e r r o n s ." Rabenau, p. 165.
Dr. Walter Simons, legal advisor to the Delegation, also mentioned in a letter describing
"internal frictions" hampering the work of the Delegation "the
fact that the Count has to fight a silent battle against our
representatives of the war departments here . . . "
Luckau, p.
126 ,

20Luckau, pp. 61-63; Novak, pp. 211-12. May 7 was
also the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the L u s i t a n i a ,
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determine the nature of the German reply.21
Descriptions of the fateful meeting on May 7 are plenti
ful, but Lord Riddell's is one of the best.

Riddell,

acting as

"an official link between the /paris Conference_7 and the Brit99
ish P r e s s , s t r i v e s for accuracy by paying careful attention
to the smallest details,

and he evokes the mood of the hour-

long proceedings very well.
The large,

elegant room was arranged very carefully,

with long tables forming a re cta ng le 0

Chairs on one side for

the six German delegates plenipotentiary

(Bjcocrkdorf f-Rantzau ,

Landsberg,

and Giesberts)

Leinert, Melchior,

Schucking,

faced

those at. the head table across the void, where Premier Clemen
ceau,

sitting with President Wilson and Mr. Lansing on one side

of him. and Prime Minister Lloyd George and Mr. Bonar Law on the
other, would preside.

Premier Orlando was not present.
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Dr. Luckau says that at least ten drafts of Brockdorff-Rantzau 1s speech were made.
She includes three of them,
in addition to the one actually delivered, in her documentary
volume, noting that it is impossible to tell who wrote them.
The text of the shorter speech, to be given if C l e m e n c e a u 1s atti
tude toward a defenseless Germany was "reasonable," appears in
Luckau and Novak as follows:
"The fortune of war has gone against us, and we are ready to accept the conditions for which
the preliminary negotiations have furnished the basis.
We are
prepared to go to the very limit of what is possible, but that
limit is set by the dignity and the vital needs of the German
people,.
We shall examine the document handed to us with good
will and in the hope that the result of our interview may be
subscribed to by all of u s „" Luckau, p. 65; Novak, pp. 7. 217-18;
Schiff, pp. 69-70.
^R i d d e l l , p. ix.
Without an official pass, the New
York W o r I d 1s Herbert Bayard Swope, who had met and liked Brockdorff-Rantzau in 1916 (see Chapter II supra) , blustered his way
into the building and obtained a good seat in the room, where
the ceremony was held,
Kahn, pp. 226-28.
Apparently he had
long forgotten Copenhagen, and the Count was just another "damned
German."
See Chapter II, s u p r a , p. 29n„
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Gradually the room filled as those entitled to be there
began to take their places.

Photographers had a field day as

the participants arrived at the building.^3

colonel Henry indi

cated that the Germans were present, whereupon a French official
announced;

"Messieurs les delegues allemands I11 and the six men

filed into the room with their two interpreters
moment's hesitation," noted Lord Riddell,
In acknowledgement,

"After a

"everyone stood up."

Brockdorff-Rantzau bowed ceremoniously to

the head table before the Germans took their seats. 2 5
Clemenceau opened the session promptly at three o'clock,,
and his terse speech set the stage all too well for the drama
that followed.

The powerful personality of the French Premier

had all along been the driving force of the Paris Peace Confer
ence.

President Wilson had won his point on the League Covenant

as an integral part of the Treaty, but the raison d'etre of the
draft treaty,

to strip Germany of the means to regenerate mil i

tary power for all time to come, was the result of Clemenceau's
^ L o r d Riddell commented that outside "the whir of the
cinema cameras was almost equal to that of a small aeroplane."
Riddell, p. 70.
Inside the building, the curious stood on tables
and chairs placed along the walls, and the Germans were continu
ously photographed as they walked by.
BMS, 1691H/1013/397 118.
^ L u c k a u , p. 65, notes that the five members of the
Foreign Office were also present:
Dr. Simons, von Haniel, von
Stockhammern, von Lersner, and R<3diger „
^ R i d d e l l , p. 71, Literary Digest H i s t o r y , X, 308.
Erich Brandenburg notes that Brockdorff-Rantzau bowed to Clemen
ceau (BMS, 1691H/1013/397 118), as does Lord Hankey (p. 152).
Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (3 v o l s .?
Doubleday, Page and C o ., 1922), II, 501, s a y s : "The leader, Count
Brockdorff-Rantzau, tall, thin, black-clad, aristocratic appear
ing, seemed to everyone who saw him under great strain.
His face
was pale, and his bow to the head of the table where stood
Clemenceau, was awkwardly formal."
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relentless chairmanship,

Twice now in his seventy-eight years

he had seen Germany invade France — in 1.871 they had taken
Alsace-Lorraine and demanded a large indemnity.

Throughout his

career in politics Clemenceau regarded German militarism with
horror and a p p r e h e n s i o n . ^

Germany had been defeated this time,

but only after four dreary years of warfare such as civilized
man had never endured,

A trail of utter devastation in Eelgium

and northern France remained in mute testimony to the horrors
that had been;

the drain of national treasure and the stagger

ing casualty rate portended a long period of recovery,

if in 

deed recovery from such carnage was ever possible.
There were those who would reduce Germany to a mere
shadow of her former self by making the Rhineland regions inde
pendent of her.

Groups pressing for the most debilitating de

mands included Marshal F o c h ( Aristide Briand, Louis Barthou,
and President Poincare.

"The Tiger" was influenced sufficiently

by Wilson and Lloyd George to keep such agitation at bay, but
he insisted on the uttermost demands for reparations,

was ada

mantly opposed to G e r m a n y 1s immediate admittance to the League,
and compromised on a fifteen year occupation of the left bank
of the Rhine although his original recommendation had been
thirty years.

^ T h o m a s A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace
(Kew Yorks The Macmillan Co., 1944), pp. 152-56, gives a good
picture of Clemenceau, his germanophobia, and his masterminding
of the Peace Conference.
Another good portrait and psycholog
ical study is found in David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David
Lloyd G e o r g e , vol., V, 1917-1918 (6 vols
Boston; Little, Brown
and Co., 1936), pp. 194-205.
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The key to C l e m e n c e a u 's idea of dealing with the Germans
lay in his attitude,,

Lloyd George tells how,

during discussions

of the disarmament provisions of the Treaty, Clemenceau had ex
pounded on hew to negotiate from a position of strengths
- . o The Germans must, of course, be spoken to with
moderation and equity, but also with firmness and decision.
. o . The degree of pressure to be exerted would be made
to fit each case as it arose.
But the Germans must not be
tolds 'Go on, do as you like.
Perhaps we shall someday
threaten to break off relations, but just now we will not
be f i r m . !
» *
If a German thought that the one having the
mastery showed any signs of hesitation, or failed to look
him straight in the eye, he would concede n o t h i n g ,^7
On May 7„ the time to exhibit the proper attitude had come.

The

entire gathering knew what a stupendous moment of triumph and
revenge this was for the French Premier,

He felt himself the

personal avenger of Bismarck at Versailles in 1871.

"Gentlemen,

Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire," he began
This is neither the time nor the place for superfluous
wordso
You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries
of the great and lesser Powers, both Allied and Associated,
that for four years have carried on without respite the
merciless war which has been imposed upon them..
The time
has now come for a heavy reckoning of accounts u You have
asked for p e a c e . We are prepared to offer you peace.
To make known to you something else that is in my mind,
I must of necessity add that this second Peace of Versailles
which is now to be the subject of our discussions has been
too dearly bought by the nations who are represented here
for us not to be unanimously resolved to use all the means
in our power to obtain every satisfaction that is due us.
There will be no verbal discussion, and observations
must be subm.itted in writing.
The plenipotentiaries of
^ D a v i d Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties
(2 v o l S o ; London? Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1938), I , 586.
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Germany will be given fifteen days in which to put into
French and English their written observations on the en
tire treaty „ „ .,28
While Clemenceau's speech was being interpreted first
into English and then into G e r m a n . M 0 Dutasta,
of the Peace Conference,

Chief Secretary

entered the quadrangle and placed a

thick copy of the Treaty before

Lhe Count,

who arose slightly

to make a "stiff little b o w , " and placed the large document to
one side with his black gloves on top of it.
after the translation,

Clemenceau asked,

if anyone wished to speak,

and Brock

dor ff-Rantzau raised his hand "after the manner of a schoolb o y . "29

The whole German Delegation realized that this might

be the only time the Allies would consent to hear a German rep30
rese nta tiv ef

Clemenceau might be unassailable, but Wilson

and Lloyd George would perhaps take certain facts to heart.
Perceptibly nervous,
scene,

according to most witnesses of the

the Count donned his horn-rimmed reading glasses.

lecting the lengthy and carefully prepared German reply,
dorff-Rantzau proceeded to read it aloud without
his c h a i r „

This action,

Se
Brock-

ri sing from

construed by nearly everyone as inten

tional. disrespect., became notorious as the typical insolence of
the Hun.

it was also the culmination of the psychological ef-

Luckau, pp. 223-24.
Novak, in an emotional descrip
tion of this tableau, asserts that Clemenceau seemed to depart
from his previously determined words, as the significance of the
occasion overwhelmed him, and that he returned to his text after
a few sentences rasped out in an unmistakable passion of hate.
See Novak, pp. 216-17 .

29RiddelI, p> 32; Literary Digest H i s t o r y , X, 309
Luckau,

p, 6 3 o
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fects of the "spirit of Versailles" upon the German Delegation
and its leader .
Reading the speech,

the Foreign Minister acknowledged

Germany's military defeat and affirmed the sincere intentions
of his Government

to rebuild and make good the damages to Pel-

gium and northern

France,

guilt for the war

rested upon G e r m a n y I n

the most rankling

phrases was the following;

but

repudiated the idea
Allied ears,

that the sole
one of

The hundreds of thousands of non-combatants who have
perished since the eleventh of November by reason of
the blockade were killed with cold deliberation after
our adversaries had conquered and victory had been as
sured to them.
Think of that when you speak of guilt
and punishment.
Germany,

said the Count,

could not sign a treaty which would

condemn her to economic ruin and thereby prevent the payment of
substantial reparations, which she felt bound to undertake.

He

made a rational appeal for committees of experts from both sides
to study the problem of reparations required from Germany and
how she might best meet a substantial amount without going
bankrupt.
The League of Nations now represented the world's hope
in place of power politics and coalitions which had always led
to war in the past.

He ended with a plea for international

good-will, within the framework, of the League;
Gentlemen;
The sublime thought to be derived from,
the most, terrible disaster in the history of the world
is the League of Nations,
The greatest progress in the
development of mankind has been pronounced, and will
make its way,,
Only if the gates of the League of Nations
are thrown open to all who are of good will can the aim.
be attained, and only then the dead of this war will not
have died in vain.
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The German nation is sincerely prepared to reconcile
itself with its severe lot if the agreed-upon basis of
the peace is not undermined«, A peace which cannot be
defended before the world in the name of justice would
always generate new resistance to it.
No one would be
in a position to sign it with a clear conscience, since
it would be unfulfillable. No one could assume the
risks which would be contingent upon signing.
We shall examine the document presented with good
will and with the hope that the final result of our
meeting can be signed by all of us.^l
The "Big Three" fidgeted uncomfortably and whispered to
one another.

Clemenceau was angered? Lloyd George and Wilson

were visibly uneasy at the references to the blockade,
phistry implicit in the German war-guilt theory,
ment of the Fourteen Points,
League of Nations.
speak,

the so

the abandon

and the need for an all-inclusive

Clemenceau asked if anyone else wished to

and then abruptly adjourned the session.

The Germans

left the room first.^2
Going down the steps outside,

Brockdorff-Rantzau

lighted a cigarette and stood silently, waiting for his staff
and their transportation.

The cigarette

as an arrogant gesture; actually,

"caused a sensation"

the Count was a super-sensi-

31

The complete speech can be found xn Brockdorff-Rant?au,
Dokum ent e, pp. 113-18, and, in English translation, in Luckau,
p p . 220-23.
Lord Riddell, p. 73, noted that "The length and tone
of the Count's speech were obviously a surprise to the Allied
delegates."
Lord Hankey, pp. 154-55, says that "the intrinsic
merits of the speech were spoiled
. «. by his failure to stand
up . . . and by his harsh and almost menacing intonation, /and /
by the loss of coherence due to the delivery and interpretation
in sections . . . "
^ A c c o r d i n g
to the Literary Digest. H i s tory, "After the
meeting the German delegates were the first to leave the Trianon.
Before they appeared at the outer door, the military guard of
the palace had been withdrawn so as to avoid any semblance of
military honors."
X, 316.
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tive, high-strung individual,

now very much overwrought,

and he

was a heavy smoker
Analysis of the Speech of May 7, 1919
Overlooking the discourtesy of not rising,

the speech

has subsequently been characterized as "a powerful and digni
fied expression of Germany's i n t e n t i o n s , W r i t i n g

in 1927,

British historian George P . Gooch put forth the following opinion;
The Foreign Minister's declaration and the tone in which
it was delivered appeared to certain members of his
audience tc breathe a spirit of lowering defiance.
But
it merely reiterated the principles of his first address
to the National Assembly /at Weimar, February 14, 1919 /
and if re-read to-day it will appear to most judges skil
fully adapted to avoid the pitfalls of truculent selfrighteousness and insincere contr iti on.35
In 1940,

Professor Gooch referred to Brockdorff-Rantzau as "an

able and liberal-minded man" and continued that "no German dip
lomat could have presented the demand of the new Germany for
fair play with greater argumentative skill,
the behavior of the "Big Three" during the speech,
see Riddell, p. 73, and Dr. Simon's letter on May 10, in Luckau,
p. 119, which also describes the Germans leaving the a s s e m b l y =
Novak, p. 225, describes the scene on the steps.

14

1925

Ro B o M o w a t , A History of European Diplomacy 19.14(Mew York; Longmans, Green and Co.., 1927), p. 151.

^ G e o r g e P, Gooch, Germany (New York: Charles Scribners
Sons, 1927), p p „ 215— 16.
Professor Gooch also notes that "No
attention, h o w e v e r , was paid to the /weimar, February 14_7 speech
at Paris, where the victors were conTident of their power to en
force whatever terms they cared to impose."
I b i d ., p. 213.
Actually, Wilson and Lloyd George were both absent from Paris at
that time, and Clemenceau was shot on February 19.
See above,
Chapter jyf,
^ G e o r g e P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplo
macy , 4th edc, (London; Longmans, Green and Co., 1940) p. 59.
In 1938 even Lloyd George conceded "This appearance of arrogance
was not reflected in the speech itself, which, although it con-
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Why,

then, did the Foreign Minister deliver a well-framed

speech in such a discourteous manner?

Several circumstances,

most of them generally unrecognized at the time, help to explain
this indisputable breach of etiquette.
the Count's

"exceedingly broken,

Those who saw him noted

nervous physical c o n d i t i o n 37

Lord Riddell describes him upon entering the great hall:
Brockdorff-Rantzau looked ill, drawn and nervous.
He
walks with a slight limp.
His complexion is yellowish,
and there are black rings under his eyes which are sunk
deep in his head.
When he was taking off his coat, x
noticed that his face was covered with beads of perspi
ration „38
Two Americans, General Tasker H. Bliss,
Britain, Henry White,

and the Ambassador to

considered the Foreign Minister too over

come with nerves to stand up in front of the assembly,
Englishman Harold Nicolson records a like view. 39
with Wilson and Clemenceau, Lloyd George fumed:
Germans made me very angry yesterday.

and the

jn accord

"Those insolent

I don't know when I have

tained a protest, was characterized rather by dignity
fiance o" Lloyd George, The
Truth „. .," I, 67 7.

than de

^Lutz, p o 41 „
38Ri(3Hell, p 0 7 1 . Lord Hankey had hastily observed in
his diary on May 7 that "Brockdorff-Rantfcau was a sinisterlooking rascal, a typical junker,,
His speech was a strange mi x
ture of cringing and i n s o l e n c e Q u o t i n g this diary passage in
his book, he continues the story: "But when my private secre
tary Sylvester, who had typed the translations of the speeches,
showed me an advance copy X
was not sure that my judgement was
not too hasty, . . ." Lord
Hankey, p. 1.55» Hankey"s opinion in
1963 was that the speech "was in fact by no means a bad one, when
read in its entirety later." I b i d „, p
154.

39Lutz, p. 41; Nevins, p. 444? Harold Nicolson, Peace
making 1919 (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939), p. 329.
Nicolson also gives A.J„ Balfour's reaction; "Didn't, he stand
up?
I failed to notice.
X make it a rule never to stare at
people when they are in obvious distress."
I b i d ., pp. 329-30.
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been so a n g r y „
still there*

Their conduct showed that the old German is

Your Brockdorff-Rantzaus will ruin Germany's

chances of reconstruction„

40

Nineteen years later,

however,

he devoted the better part of two pages in The Truth About the
Peace Treaties to offering an elaborate excuse for BrockdorffRantzau's

"boorishness, 11 attributing it to nervousness and
AT

stage fright*

±

There is no doubt that the previous six months had under
mined the Foreign Minister's health*

Photographs taken before

42
and after .1919 show this clearly *

The war years in Copenhagen

had been a continual nervous strain*

Aware of heart trouble in

the latter half of 1918, he had made his acceptance of the
Foreign Office contingent upon health considerations as well as
his political and diplomatic program* 43

The heart condition was

apparently a minor problem immediately after the war*

But in

the latter 1920's Brockdorff-Rantzau was plagued with attacks
of angina pectoris*

40 Riddell., p* 76*
4^Lloyd George, The Truth * * * , I, 676-77*
Still other
opinions were subsequently aired*
Stephen Bonsai, French diplo
mat and linguist, saids
‘I lean to the opinion that BrockdorffRantzau * * * was both ill and drunk*
For weeks we have heard
of the enormous quantities of cognac he consumes daily and but a
glance at his deadly white face, his sunken chest, his hollow
shoulders reveals what must have been his physical condition for
a long time past* * * * 55 Stephen Bonsai, Suitors and Suppliants g
The Little Nations at Versailles (New Yorks Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1945), pp* 270-71*
Bonsai also quotes Balfour as saying* "Beasts
they were and beasts they are*
How rn the world can we contrive
to live in the same world with them?
Ibid*
4?

43
140*

Compare photographs in Novak and Stern-Rubarth*
Brockdorff-Rantzau,

Do kumente, p* 6 *

Cf* FRUS,

II,
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The first, months of the Republi.c had been a time of
terroro

Brockdorff-Rantzau had withstood gunfire and bombard

ment with Ebert and Scheidemann w h e n ’ the Reichschancellery was
besieged by Spartacists,

and Government officials in Berlin were

never safe from Bolshevist brigands.44

prom January,

1919,

office hours in the Wilhelmstrasse began at 8 or 10 A 0.M„ and
the Foreign Minister often stayed on until five or even seven
o ’clock the next

m o r n i n g .

of correspondence,

45

He jea]_t personally with mountains

attended lengthy Cabinet, meetings,

met with

the Paxkonferenz, worked out plans for Foreign Office reforms,
gave interviews and press conferences,

and endlessly speculated

upon the Allied demands awaiting Germany at the peace table and
what the German response should b e «,
divergent political viewpoints,

He strove to reconcile the

for he believed that a German

Government, without solid backing would stand no chance against
exorbitant Allied t e r m s »

The week at Versailles preceding May

7 had been full of frantic preparations for the coming ordeal
foreshadowed by the last meeting with Colonel C o n g e r „

The long

conferences, perusal of the anti-German French newspapers to
which reply was impossible,

and waiting under the most psycho

logically frustrating circumstances had taken its toll of every
one .
Gustav
44 Stern-Rubarth, pp. 70-95; Blucher, pp. 42-45.
N o s k e , Von Kiel bis Kapp (Berlin: Verlag fur Politik und Wirtschaft, 1920), although he makes no mention of Brockdorff-Rantzau, gives a vivid description of these days.
45 Stern-Rubarth,

p.

74.
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Brockdorff-Rantzau was not a good orator.

He always

read his meticulously prepared speeches and was naturally reti
cent in front of a large heterogeneous group.46

jn small

gatherings his acquaintances marvelled at the brilliance and
often pedantic literacy of his conversation and his acumen in
personal debate.

But he was no rabble rouser,

and his aristo

cratic bearing and forbidding reserve could never evoke much
feeling of rapport with an audience.
a scholar,

He was a lawyer,

a diplomat in the old tradition,

a writer,

and a man of lib

eral political opinions,

yet he lacked completely the means tc

communicate and inspire.

Although he believed that Germany's

future would best be served by the Republic,

the Allies could

see him only as the stereotyped Junker--the unrepentant and un
changed face of the old regime.
The speech he read on May 7 was much longer than Clemenceau's and contained points that he felt must be mentioned
openly.

His later excuse that it was easier to read this long

document, sitting down was probably true.4 ^
also enters the picture.

C l e m e n c e a u 's comparatively short

speech had been translated in its entirety,
and then into German,

Another factor

first into English

after the Premier had finished speaking.

Those accounts long enough to give such details all note that

4 ^Ibid c, p 0 129; Schiff, pp. 40-41, 63; Bonn, pp. 230-31 ?
Epstein, p
302 ? Bern sto rff , M e m o i r s , p. 2 54.
Eyck, I, 90,
refers to the C o u n t ’s " . . . keen mind and sense of style,
thanks to which his communications were penetrating and emphatic,
On the other hand he lacked, as do so many diplomats, the gift
of extemporaneous speaking.
Faced with any large audience, he
could only cling nervously to his prepared manuscript and plunge
a h e a d „"
4 ^Gooch . Recent Revelations , . . , p. 99; Schiff , p., 69,
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Brockdorff -Ra ntz au1s speech, given in German, was translated
sentence by sentence, first into French and then into English.
The Count himself chose this singular method of delivery.
Wot only did it render standing to speak impractical;

it pro-

longed the time needed to deliver the speech and destroyed its
continuity„
The main reason, however,

for the studied discourtesy

is given by D r . Simons and the Count himself.

Simons tells

that the Count asked him, on the way to the Trianon Palace
Hotel, whether or not he should rise to speak; Simons recom
mended that he should.
otherwise,

because,

As a lawyer, Brockdorff-Rantzau felt

as Simons related in a letter to his wife

on May 10,
In a diagram of the hall of the session which appeared
in the French newspapers, the German table had already
been designated as "banc des accuses."
The Count there
fore had heard, in spirit, the words, "the prisoner will
stand up," and it was for that reason he kept his seat.49
In 1925,

an embittered Brockdorff-Rantzau vehemently denied any

attack of nerves and wrote his own explanation, which corrobo
rated that of Dr. Simons;
R i d dell, p. 72; FR.US, III, 417.
Writing in 1963, Lord
Hankey recalls these detaiTs^clearly, and relates that there
was only one copy of the speech, which had to be passed from
the speaker to both interpreters and back again.
Lord Hankey
also includes the information that the Allies, knowing that
Brockdorff-Rantzau spoke fluent French, had discussed "whether,
when the Treaty was handed over to the Germans, he should be
permitted to speak in German or should have to speak in French
or English."
See Lord Hankey, pp. 153-55, 139.
The Count did
not know English.

49Luckau, p. 119 o In an interview for the Deutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung on May 10, the Count had only a cryptic reference to this act,ion; "If I remained seated, while Clemenceau
stood, it had its well considered r e a s o n s „" Brockdorff-Rantzau,
D oku mente, p. 120 .
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They certainly hoped to gloat over our downfall*
If many
were disappointed 3 0 . I regret that I must point out
that my duty demanded that I disappoint them this time,,
Even today I can see the French newspapers before me with
the plan of
the great meeting hall, in which the place
assigned to
us was designated with large letters as
the
"bench of the accused* a"
. . . I felt myself to be a peace negotiator,, as the
representative of a power, defeated after dreadful strug
gles and tremendous efforts, but still great, and I did
not consider myself as an accused man who must rise be
fore his judges*50
Although he always denied it, a state of nerves cannot
be ruled out; indeed,

as Professor Bonn has written,

Brockdorff-

Rantzau "did not want the Allied statesmen to see ^/him_J tremble
before them."51
prisoner in the

And he would not for one moment appear
dock.

the Count likened Wilson,
Minos, Aeacus,

In a press conference at the end
Lloyd George,

and Rhadamanthus,

asthe
ofMay,

and Clemenceau to

the mythological three judges

of the dead in Hades.52
50Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente und Gedan ken , p„ 202.
5lBonn, p. 230.
Eyck, I, 93-94, holds that a combina
tion of all these factors, physical and emotional, is respon
sible for the Count's remaining seated, and that BrockdorffRantzau, knowing he "would suffer a violent attack of stagefright," used the "Defendant a r i s e “" explanation as "an excuse
which concealed his real rea son* "
^ B r o c k d o r f f - R a n t z a u , Dokume nte , p. 151; Stern-Rubarth,
p. 15.

CHAPTER VI
"JUMMER DE KOPP B A B E N 11
Reactions of the "Big T h r e e "
The morning after the presentation of the Treaty to the
Germans found Clemenceau,
serious discussion.

Lloyd George,

and Wilson deep in

The fear that Germany's signature to the

Treaty would not be easily obtained permeated the session.
Angered over his indiscretion and bitter tone of voice,

they

nevertheless remembered Bro ckdorff-Rantzau's plea for committees
of experts to study the questions of war guilt, European resto
ration,

and,

above all,

rations program.

to prepare a financially workable repa

They called for a translation of the Count's

speech on that very point,

then discussed it a bit f u r ther:

Lloyd George suggested that this did not constitute
a definite proposal which need be replied to.
Clemenceau agreed that it would be better to take
no notice.
President Wilson agreed and suggested that one p o s 
sible interpretation of the phrase was that if the G e r 
mans signed the Treaty they would want the assistance of
the Allied and Associated Powers in carrying it out.
(It was agreeds —that no reply should be made to this statement in
Br ockd orff-Rantzau1s speech.)!
At another meeting on the following afternoon,
cil of Three remained convinced that the Junkers,

1F R U S , V, 510-12.
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the C o u n 

personified

107
by Brockdorff-Rantzau,

still dominated Germany.

although he regretted the blockade,
lin if the Germans refused to sign.

Lloyd George,

urged the occupation of Ber
As he put it,

It would be the outward and visible sign of smashing the
Junkers.
They would never be convinced otherwise.
President Wilson said the hope rested on the remain
der of Germany ridding themselves of the Junkers.
Apart from Brockdorff-Rantzau, the other German dele
gates had looked reasonable men.
Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that none the less
they had allowed the Junker to take the lead.
They
could not free themselves from the sense of servitude
to the Junkers.
President Wilson thought that Mr. Lloyd George's
theory was correct that the insolent parts of Brock
dor ff-R antzau1s speech had been his own and the rea
sonable parts supplied by the other d e l e g a t e s . 2
They then summoned Marshal Foch to ascertain whether or
not sufficient military units were still available to impress
Germany and invade her if necessary.
Mr.
tage to
Germans
thought
march.

Lloyd George suggested that it might be an advan
have some demonstration at an early stage.
The
were now making up their minds.
Possibly they
that the Allied and Associated Powers would not

M. Clemenceau said that that was exactly what the
Germans were saying.
They believed the French Army inca
pable of marching and that the United States Army was
going home.
Mr. Lloyd George said that it might be too late ten
days hence and he thought some action ought to be taken
to show that the Allied and Associated Powers had made
their minds up.
He would like a demonstration made
within a day or two.
The most impressive form of demon
stration would be to bring the cavalry to the front.
Marshal Foch said that his cavalry were too few for
a great demonstration, but he proposed himself to make

2F R U S , V, 527-28.
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an immediate visit to the Commander-in-Chief of the
various armies in such a way that while apparently
secret, it would be known to everyone and all Germany
would be puzzling to know what he was up t o .
President Wilson suggested a secret journey with
careful leakage„
Marshal. Focn said that this was what he intendeds

3

Impact of the Treaty
Meanwhile,

the German Delegation worked feverishly,

making the most of their two weeks to learn the contents of the
voluminous Treaty and prepare their written comments in the
prescribed manner.^

The first job was to translate from French

into German the very few copies of the 80,000 word document
3F R U S , V,

539; Riddell,

pp.

77-78.

^Brockdorff-Rantzau commented on the initial German
reaction in an interview for the Hamburger Fremdenblatt on May
21s "On May 7, the Delegation considered whether there would be
any kind of negotiation over this Peace, or whether the quick
and unqualified refusal of it would not be preferable in spite
of all the hazards that might arise from that.
We did not choose
this path, . e . which might have corresponded most of all to the
state of mind in Germanv, but we made use of the right granted
us to formulate our objections and bring them to the attention
of the Allied and Associated Powers within the length of time
provided." ^fijnable to complete their commentary in 14 days, the
Germans asked for an additional week, which was g r a n t e d .Jy
"We
could n o t , " continued the Count, "go away remaining silent on
certain aspects, as intolerable as they might seem, to us, in the
hope that there would be an opportunity to discuss them after
the conclusion of the Peace; or hoping that, in practice, their
actual carrying out would not be interpreted go severely as the
text of the Peace Treaty indicated. . . . We wish to sign only a
peace which we can actually observe.
We abhor any double-deal
ing, any deception, any mental reservation.
As honorable peo
ple we wish to fulfil those obligations accepted by us.," Brock
dor f f-Rantzau Do kum ente, pp. 129— 30.
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that were available to t h e m .5

Translation posed many serious

problems due to the vagueness of the French text in some places.
Of great significance was the interpretation of Article 231,
"war-guilt. clause,"

the

for the Treaty's reparations and punitive

clauses rested upon it,^

The previous notes from Dr« Solf and

Brockdorff-Rantzau requesting neutral investigation of the
causes of the war had been curtly rejected by the Allies with
the observation that German guilt was already accepted as fact.
Outside the innermost councils,

others at the Peace C on

ference knew as little of the details of the Treaty as the Ger
mans.

The document in its entirety was unknown to nations small

and large on the Allied

s i d e . 7

the entire Peace Conference,

utmost secrecy had characterized

and a summary of the Treaty terms

^Victor Schiff tells how they were obliged
May 7 copy and a few others into sections in order
the all-night labors of the translators before the
mittees were able to study the treaty as a whole.
Novak, p. 2 26.

to tear the
to expedite
various com
Schiff, p. 74;

^The ambiguity of Article 231 resulted in the war guilt
issue.
Did Germany's "responsibility" for "aggression" involve
only legal liability or moral guilt for the whole war?
The
genesis of Article 231 and the resulting interpretations are
carefully examined in R 0C. Binkley, "The 'Guilt' Clause in the
Versailles Treaty," Current H i s t o r y , XXX, (May 1929), pp. 294-300
^Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations; A Personal
Narrative (Bostons H o u g h b o n “Mifflin Co., 1921), pp. 239-40Colonel House said* "The Germans are giving us an example of open
diplomacyo
They print the Treaty as soon as it is given them,
and we are getting in Paris the German edition.
It is being
sold in Germany and Holland and nearby countries at a ridicu
lously low price, something like fifty cents a copy.
Neverthe
less, be it remembered, the United States Senate has never seen
the Treaty as a whole."
Edward M. House, The Intimate Papers
of Colonel House, Arranged as a Narrative by Charles Seymour (4
vols o; Bostons Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1926-1928), IV, 472,
Her e
after cited as House Papers.
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had been distributed only hours before the meeting of May 7.
contrast to the Wilsonian principle of "open covenants,

In

openly

arrived a t , " secrecy had served as a smoke screen for the disa
greements and old-time diplomacy of the framers of the Treaty.®
Victor Schiff, who was also one of the Secretaries of
the Delegation,
"war of notes,,

refers to the next episode at Versailles as the
When the translators had finished,

the commit

tees of German experts went to work on their written commentary.
On May 9, their opening volley in the note-war pointed out the
incongruity of the Treaty with the Fourteen Points and concluded
inauspiciously:

"The draft of the treaty contains demands which

no nation could endure; moreover,

our experts hold that many of

them could not possibly be carried o u t . "10

The next note encom

passed a German plan for a League of Nations Covenant,

observ

ing,
At this time the German delegation desires to point out
the contradiction which lies in the fact that Germany

80n April 5, Lord Riddell asked: "Will the peace terms be
published before they are discussed with the Germans?"
Replied
Lloyd Georges
"No, certainly noti
They will be handed to the
Germans when they come to Versailles.
If the terms were pub
lished beforehand, the position of the German Government would be
made impossible.
The terms might lead to revolution.
We shall
be very strict about any infraction of this arrangement, and
shall punish any paper that publishes the terms before we make
them p u b l i c ..15
Clemenceau did not even allow Marshal Foch to see the
terms before the Germans were summoned late in April.
See Rid
dell, pp. 46, 61.
^Schiff, p. 84.
General Seeckt, ready to leave on the
8 th of May, referred sarcastically to the forthcoming "Papierkr i e g .11 Rabenau, p. 172.
■^Luckau, p. 2 25 .
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is asked to sign the covenant of the League of Nations
as an integral part of the treaty, although she is not
among the governments which have been invited to join
the League.
The German delegation wishes to know under
what conditions an invitation to become a member of the
League would be e x t e n d e d . ^
The bid for entry into the League comprised the first written
German observation, because,

explained Brockdorff-Rantzau to the

Deutsche Allgameine Zeitung , the League came first in the Treaty
and everything else was contingent upon it.

To the Europa Press

Bureau he gave a complete statement;
We ourselves know that the new Germany has broken with
the principles and practices which are the cause of
the distrust of our enemies.
Blit it must be made clear
that until now we have had no opportunity to offer
proof of this on the level of international negotiations.
Therefore we cannot ask at the outset that our assur
ances of the inward and outward revolutions /in Germany_J7
be blindly accepted by our adversaries.
We can and must
demand that the Entente grant us the opportunity to
demonstrate, through our actions a compelling proof of
the new political convictions of the new Germany.
Not
through words alone, but above all through deeds, must
we offer something . . . better in place of the politique
that was formerly followed by the representatives of the
previous Germany at the Hague peace conferences and also
during the w a r / ^
A complete discussion of the Treaty provisions and the
German counterproposals is beyond the scope of this thesis.
her comprehensive book,

In

The German Delegation at the Paris Peace

C o n ference, Dr. Alma Luckau has admirably covered this subject.
Denied oral communication with the Allies, Germany's Delegation
was determined to place her views before the world arbiters.
The criticisms leveled at the Treaty by the Foreign Minister

11Tbid.

^ B r o c k d o r f f - R a n t z a u , Dokumente, pp. 120, 122-23.
The
German stand on the League was No. 10 of eleven subjects covered
in the "Instructions Given to the German Plenipotentiaries of
Peace" formulated in April, 1919.
See Luckau, pp. 199-209.
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and his experts came under several general headings.

In addi

tion to Germany's exclusion from the League of Nations,

other

areas of the Treaty considered vulnerable by the German experts
involved labor legislation,
peoples in disputed areas,
strictures,

reparations,

disarmament,

self-determination of

repatriation of prisoners,

and the "points of honor."

economic
This last

category included extradition of the Kaiser and other "war crim
inals" for trial,

and the infamous Article 231.

Brockdorff-Rantzau considered the war guilt assertion a
legal device whereby the Allies could stave off a peace settleto Germany's material disadvantage. 13

ment indefinitely,

May 13 he requested, by note,

On

the report of the Allied Commis

sion on the Responsibility for the War, which Clemenceau re
fused to divulge.

The "Tiger's" note to Brockdorff-Rantzau

said that such reports were

"documents of an internal character

which cannot be transmitted to you."

German guilt,

added

Clemenceau, went back to the Lansing Note of November 5, 1918,
according to which Germany, by accepting it, admitted responsi
bility for all "aggression.
Brockdorff-Rantzau countered with a blast at the
methods of the Peace Conference.
wrote that Germany had never

In a note to Clemenceau he

"assumed the responsibility for the

origin of the war," and therefore Germany could not:
l^Dickmann,
14Luckau,

p. 83.

pp. 242,

254; Binkley,

p. 300n.
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consent to be put off with the remark that the data on
the question of responsibility collected by the Allied
and Associated Governments through a special Commission
are documents of an internal nature of these Govern
ments.
This, a question of life and death for the Ger
man nation, must be discussed in all publicity;
methods
of secret diplomacy are here out of place.
The economic sphere was equally important,

for it was

here that the Count and his highly competent team continually
affirmed Germany's intentions of meeting reparations obliga
tions to the greatest feasible extent, provided the economic
capacity to do so was not denied h e r .
of colonies,

territory,

While stripping Germany

and natural resources,

the Treaty de

manded Germany's unconditional assent to as yet unspecified
reparations payments:

a "blank check."

German experts held

that the result would be internal chaos and economic collapse
endangering all Europe.

Brockdorff-Rantzau expressed his feel

ings to his fellow Delegates in a bitter precis of the French
text of the Treaty, wherein countless clauses began with "Ger
many renounces

. . ."

ganz dber fIhssig.

Snarled the Count;

"Das dicke Buch war

Es ware einfacher gewesen, man hatte erklart;

L'Allemagne renonce k son existence. L a t e r ,
interview,
side worlds

in a press

he expressed his opinion for the benefit of the outThe economic conditions of the Treaty represented

a "new kind of Einkreisungspolitik" on the part of the Allies,
which would only generate new and dangerous pressures in Ge r
many,

comparable to the pre-war m i l i t a r i s m . ^
^Luckau,

pp.

271-72.

l®Novak, p. 228; Rabenau, p. 169.

1^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dok ume nte , pp.

146-49.
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Efforts toward German Unity
To present his case to the Allies,

Brockdorff-Rantzau

needed the confidence and support of his Government at home.
Judging from the plenary session of the National Assembly in
Berlin on May 12,
backing.

the Delegation in Versailles retained strong

The Treaty was immediately denounced by every group

in the National Assembly,

led by Ebert and Scheidemann.

Demon-

strations of mourning and defiance were seen all over Germany. 18
But even as the Foreign Minister conferred with the
Cabinet at Spa on May 18, regarding the financial and economic
proposals to be made by the German Delegation,
resistance was weakening.

the fabric of

That very weekend Matthias Erzberger,

who still considered Colonel Conger the best link with Wilson,
met with Conger and a Major Henrotin whom he had asked to come
to Berlin.

Count Bernstorff was also present at this meeting

and held fast to the official stand that the Treaty could not
be signed as it stood.

Erzberger met the two Americans alone

the following morning; without Bernstorff,

who had irritated

them, he indicated that Germany could not postpone the peace
and that he could be instrumental in bringing about an agree
ment based on three face-saving proposals.

The Americans con

vinced Erzberger that the Allies were ready to march in and
occupy G e r m a n y . ^
l®Luekau, pp. 94-100.
Opposition to the Treaty, however,
was based upon diverse reasons, as Dr. Luckau points out.
■^Epstein, pp.

305-07; Zimmermann, p. 63.
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A second meeting between the Foreign Minister and govern
ment representatives at Spa occurred on May 22,
and Erzberger were there.
promise

before the

It was

Both Scheidemann

the last attempt to reach a com

German counterproposals were submitted.

Brock-

dorff-Ra ntz au5s personal antipathy toward Erzberger is well known,
but the group managed to come to an understanding.

Erzberger's

ideas had some influence on the final form of the counterpro
posals,

and the Delegation agreed to refer the decision for or

against

signing to the C a b i n e t .20
Although other disruptive forces were at work, Erzberger

more than anyone revealed the disintegration of solidarity in the
German stand.

Brockdorff-Rantzau had thought it an advantage to

have the Delegation called to Versailles,

since this might enable

them to present an appearance of greater unity,

and the home

front would be less demoralized without the victors in Berlin,2^
But the Allies and neutrals were soon well aware that Erzberger
or someone else could be found to sign.
The Counterproposals Fail
On May 29, which was also Bro ckdo rff-Rantzau's fiftieth
birthday,
Allies,

the Germans submitted their counterproposals to the

who had granted a week's extension to the original fif

teen days.

An accompanying cover letter

(Mantelnote) expressed

good faith and presented an outline of a specific German repara-

2 (^Luckau, p. 103.
9I
Richard Grunfcerger, Germany 1918-1945
Batsford Ltd., 1964), p„ 53.

(London; B,T»
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tions plan going 51to the extreme limits of what is possible."

o9

Again, pleas were entered for a neutral investigation of warguilt and for the inclusion of Germany in the League.
cluding paragraph faced facts,

The con

yet appealed to reason:

Germany must sign the treaty that has been presented
to her and must carry out its conditions.
Even in her
misfortune, right is too sacred to her for her to stoop
to accept conditions that she can not promise to fu lfill.
/previous treaties based on "the right of might" caused
and prolonged the world war ._7 The lofty aims which our
enemies have been the first to give to their way of con
ducting a war, require a treaty in a different spirit.
Only the collaboration of all nations . . . can create a
durable peace.
We are under no illusions as to the depth
of the hatred and bitterness which are the fruits of this
war; and nevertheless the forces working for harmony in
humanity are to-day stronger than ever.
The historic
task of the Peace Conference at Versailles is to bring
about this h a r m o n y . 2 3
The letter bore Brockdorff-Rantzau's signature, but had been pre
pared by Dr. Guttmann of the Frankfurter Zeitungo ^
The German counterproposals were voluminous and time did
not permit their translation from German into French and English,
although the Mantelnote was correctly submitted in those lan^Luckau,
23

p. 304 „

I b i d . , pp.

305-06; Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp.

144-45.

9A
"The suggestion that this responsible task should be
entrusted to a newspaperman, and not to a delegate or an expert,
originated with Commissioner General Simons, who believed that
G u t t m a n n 1s style might be more adapted to appeal to public
opinion than a concise and legal formulation."
Luckau, pp. 85,
126.
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They consisted of

Genera], Remarks"

followed by

eleven sections enumerating Germany s acceptance of obligations
and her requests

for revisions of the Treaty.

Most noteworthy among the Counterproposals were Section
I (on the League) ,
7 proposing immediate and complete disarmament
of Germany in return tor League memberships

and Section IV (on

Reparations), which defined financial commitments to be unde r
taken by Germany.
Germany is ready, within four weeks after the ratification of peace, to issue government bonds for 20,000,000,000 gold marks, payable not later than May 1, 192 6,
in instalments to be stipulated by the Allied and A s s o 
ciated Powers, and for the remainder of the total indem
nity to draw up the required deeds in the same manner
and to pay them in yearly instalments without interest,
beginning May 1, 1927, with the understanding that the
total compensation shall on no account exceed the sum of
1 0 0 ,000,000,000 gold marks 0
726
Their labors concluded for a while,

the German Delegates

wondered whether the Allies would break off negotiations.

The

Count and Dr. Simons discussed every contingency of signing or
not signing,

should the Allies refuse to consider changes;

both

also realized that their policy of reasoned protest, could now
easily be overruled in Weimar.,

The ultimate goal, of the Dele

gation had always been oral negotiations leading to an agreement
2 5 D r c Simons began a letter on May 30, "Yesterday and
the day before we gave the enemy more than 300 pages, folio size,
to swallow; and if they do not throw it; back at once, it will,
take them some time to digest it..." Luckau, p. 122.
Harold Nicolson noted in his diary on -Tune 1st: "A foul day,, owing chiefly
to my having to spend the whole morning and afternoon translating
German Notes which descend upon us like leaves in V a l l o m b r o s a 0
„ o" Nicolson, p. .355.
2 6Luckau,7 pp_^ 353, 382.
Germany also asked to retain her
colonies and large merchant ships..
In this thesis the term "'mil
liard" will be used instead of the American term billion. ,B
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on economic clauses and the alleviation of conditions detrimental,

m

their opinion,

27
to the fulfillment of obligations 0

Brockdorff~Rantzau chided the German press for speaking
only in terms of accepting or rejecting the Treaty.

"Our task,"

he wrote in a memorandum,

He granted

"is not purely negative."

that Germany must sign peace terms meeting certain requirements
of the Allies,

but maintained also that a reasonable agreement

had to be reached whereby Germany would not be reduced to
nothingness or slavery.
tions, " he continued,

"It has not come to oral negotia

"but 1 have not given up the hope that

the other side will yet find itself ready for t h a t , T o

a

German reporter on June 6 , he said:
Oral negotiations are not taking place, neither openly
nor secretly.
The fence, behind which they are protecting
us, is not only a courtesy, but a symbol.
I can almos t
believe that they fear the power of my discourse / Beredsamkeit /„
We must therefore wait until it pleases the
enemy to allow us to receive their written answer.2^
Discussion of Treaty obligations,

where appropriate,

with the Germans was no longer without, strong advocates on the
Allied side.

On May 10,

the Germans had requested

’direct

conversations," regarding repatriation of prisoners of war,

but

the Allies at the time refused this until Germany signed the
2^In a letter home on June 10, Dr. Simons reveals how
eighteen days passed while the Delegation awaited the Allied
response to the counterproposals.
“We are deep in preparations
for the face-to-face negotiations with the Allies, which, how
ever, for the time being, are not going to take place. 0 . . ”E
Luckau, p. 131.
2 8 "Nachlass B - R , " 9105H/3443/H235 318-19.

2 ^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumen te, p. 168.

Treatyo28

Although the Germans had contacts who could provide

some indication of the state of mind of the Council cf Three,2!
they had always overrated Wilson's .influence on Clemenceau and
this misconception prevailed even after the submittal of Lhe
counterproposals.

The

discussions of Wilson,

Clemenceau from May 21 through
Hunter Miller,

Lloyd George,

and

une 9, as recorded by David

reveal the desire,

not shared by Clemenceau, to

meet with the German representatives,
"On May 21, 1 noted Hunter M i l l e r , “President Wilson
advocated that the economic and financial, experts of the Allied
and Associated Powers discuss questions of detail with the Ger
man experts."

Clemenceau disapproved,

but Lloyd George agreed

that "a few small concessions would give them excuse to sign. '22
Meetings of the “Big Three" were held during the first week of
June, while the German counterproposals were being studied.
The three heads of state disliked the

no i n t e r e s t 5 feature of

the German offer of 1.00 milliard gold marks.

However,

Lloyd

George and Wilson strongly advocated the naming of a definite
reparations suiru in Wilson s words:

The object of the figure

was to get the Germans to agree L 222

A meeting on June 9 was

30 L u c k a u , pp

2 40, 2 5 3-

2^ D r a Simons mentions news from such a source in a let
ter of June 1, 1919,
Luckau, p, 12 9„
Paris

David Hunter M i l l e r M y Diarv at the Conference of
(20 v o l s , ; Privately printed, 1928 , XIX 276-77*

22 Ibid ./ p 2 79.
Cf FRUS , v ; }
147- 60, where the Coun
cil of Three, on .'une .3, discussed the idea of giving Germany
three months to submit another financial proposal, a f ter signing
the Treaty*
At this meeting, '^resident Wilson pointed out that,
if the German proposal could be accepted, half the objections
would disappear. 15
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devoted to reparations schemes.
cial expert,

M 0 Loucheur,

the French finan

had said that “the Germans would not accept as

high a figure as would have to be fixed."

The discussion then

foundered on the number of months needed to name,
G e o r g e ’s words,

in Lloyd

"a figure which would satisfy public opinion

either in Allied or enemy countries."24
ibility of such a figure,

Considering the incred

Hunter M i l l e r ’s record of W i l s o n ’s

next remarks is highly interesting:
President Wilson said that personally he was satis
fied with the reparations arrangements of the Treaty,
provided it was properly explained to the Germans, but
the important thing was to induce the Germans to make
peace quickly and if the concession of naming a definite
sum, even arbitrarily, would reassure the Germans the
concession was worth making.
It was also important to
leave the Germans sufficient assets to start their trade
again and to bear the burden of reparations; "he could
not ask the United States bankers to give credit if Ger
many had no assets*
A glance at the minutes of a meeting of the Council of Three
two days previously shows how Clemenceau had squelched the idea
of oral negotiations on the financial clauses with the compel
ling argument that:

"The object of the Germans in asking for

conversations was to divide the Allies.
Mo Loucheur said one thing,

They would say that a

lord Cunliffe another,

and Mr.

Keynes a third.'*28
Contrary to Clemenceau,,. both Wilson and Lloyd George
favored G e r m a n y ’s early admission into the League; Wilson was
prepared to give a "general, assurance

of this to Germany as

3 4Mi 11 e r l
7 My_ Diary , XIX , 2 79, 280 ..
35ib i d ,,, pp. 280-81.

36FRITS, VI, 2 36

soon as the Allies were convinced that the changes in her govern
ment were " s i n c e r e * B r i t i s h

and American Delegates and eco

nomic experts deplored the harshness of the Treaty in strong
wordso

Colonel House voiced his disapproval,

distr ess ,

much to Wilson's

On June 5, Herbert Hoover sent President Wilson an

extensive memorandum , saying he was convinced that (a) the demands made are greater than the economic
surplus; (b) that the regime and controls are such as
endanger the stable democracy in Germany; and (c) that
the Germans will never sign the Treaty i.n its present
form.
The present Government in Germany is the only
alternative to either Reactionary or Communistic Govern
ment, and if it fails we have political debacle in any
event. . . .38
Harold Nicolson,

of the British contingent,

observed in a let

ter on June 8 , "the real crime is the reparation and indemnity
chapter, which is immoral and se nseless."39
Early in June Lloyd George

(in a "perfect funk" according

to Wilson4 8 ) feared the possibility of Germany's not signing
and the terrible implications of this.
2^i b i d ., pp.

On the third of June he

157-58o

^ H e r b e r t Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert H o o v e r , Vol. I,
Years of Adventure 1874-1920 (3 v o l s .; New Yorks The Macmillan
Co o , 1952) , pp. 464-6 5 o Hoover, humanitarian and realist/had
begun his memorandum with this sentences "In any discussion of
the draft treaty, I think it must be accepted as a premise that
real justice can never be meted out, for no adequate punishment
of German crimes is conceivable or even encompassed in the pres
ent draft treaty."
^Nicolson,

p. 359.

4 0 Bailey, p. 292.
According to Bailey, Wilson was an
gered because Lloyd George pressed for concessions on France's
part instead of giving up any advantages accruing to Britain
from the Treaty.
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had suddenly offered the startling thought that

if Brockdorff-

Rantzau would not sign, he would probably be replaced by some
one else, whose signature might be of little acco u n t ,*'!42
As the month of June began, Woodrow Wilson suffered
from the effects of his illnesses and the physical strain of
six months of arduous discussions.

Other business demanded the

attention of the Council of Three at the same time the German
case was considered;

committees agonized over an Austrian

treaty, while simultaneously the German counterproposals were
translated and replies framed,

bit by bit.,

Wilson declared

his disinclination to change the achievements represented by
the German Treaty,

finally

formulated after disagreements which

had persisted until the literal eve of presentation.

June

third was the day he had made his often-quoted statement"
that the time to consider all these questions was when
we were writing the treaty, and it. makes me a little
tired for people to come and say now that they are
afraid the Germans won't sign, and their fear is based
upon things that they insisted upon at the time of the
writing of the treaty; that makes me very sick. D 0 .
These people that overrode our judgment and wrote things
into the Treaty that are now the stumbling-blocks, are
falling all over themselves to remove these stumblingblocks. o o «,
Though we did not keep them from putting irrational
things in the Treaty, we got very serious modifications
out of them.
If we had written the Treaty the way they
wanted it, the Germans would have gone home the minute
they read it.42

41 F RUS , VI, p., 1.59.

Italics mine.

42Seth P. Till,man,
, Anglo-Arnerican Relations at the Paris
Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton University Press, 1961), p.
355; House Papers, IV, 47 5-76.
One of the best presentations
of what Wilson did achieve at Paris in the face of extreme Allied
demands is Paul B i r d s a l l 's Versailles Twenty Years A f t e r 0
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Years

later, Lloyd George attributed W i l s o n ’s adamant stand to an

earlier cause;
1J

"The effect /of Brockdorff-Rantzau;s speech on May

on President Wilson's mind was to close it with a

s n a p . " 4 8

A letter from Andre Tardieu to Colonel House on June
tenth finally put an impossible situation into words:
For more than five months the heads of Governments
and their experts have studied the terms of Peace to
be imposed on G e r m a n y » They have reached an agreement
and they have communicated to the Germans a text which,
if it does not yet bind Count Brockdorff-™in any case
unquestionably binds the A l l i e s „
Could the Allies suppose that, this text would be
satisfactory to Germany?
Of course not.
However,
they adopted it.
Germany protests, as it was certain
she would.
Immediately a modification of the text is
undertaken.
I say this is a confession of weakness
and a confession of lack of seriousness, for which all
the Allied Governments will pay dearly in terms of
public opinion!
Is it an impossible Treaty?
Is it an
unjust Treaty?
Count Brockdorff believes it is.
If
we change it, we admit that we think as he does.
What
a condemnation of the work we have done during the
past sixteen w e e k s !44
The Council of Three had found it impossible to agree
to accept any of the major German counterproposals.
had to inform the German Delegation of this,

Now they

and demand that

Germany accept the Treaty virtually as it was on May 7.
with work and argument,

the "Big Three" again checked with

Marshal Foch on the availability of an invasion force,
it be necessary.

Weary

should

Wilson offered to get American troops back

if he could request a specific n u m b e r ,,48
48Lloyd George,

The Truth

, I, 676,.

44House Pa p ers, IV, 476-77 .
45F R U S , VI, 501-09, 523, 543-52.
The seven day ulti
matum eventually given Germany stemmed from the fact that, the
Armistice would expire on June 23„
Lord Hankey, pp. 174-75..
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On June 13, with C l e m e n c e a u 's vigorous approval,
George

Lloyd

"advocated a renewal of the blockade in the event of

the Germans refusing to sign as if this were known in Germany
beforehand,

it would have a great effect."

President Wilson

preferred a military occupation; with arguments strangely akin
to those of the German Foreign Minister he said that "he did
not believe in starving women and children," and that "the
imposition of the blockade would shock the sense of mankind."
He added that "starvation would only bring about Bolshevism and
chaos."

it was decided that day that ostentatious preparations

for the re-imposition of the blockade should be made,

for in

the opinion of Lloyd George,
the mere noise of preparing a blockade would do more
to make the Germans sign than the military occupation.
There were important elements in the population such
as the rich industries and the wealthier classes of
Berlin who would probably welcome an occupation as a
means of ensuring order.
The mere threat of a block 
ade, however, would terrify the whole p o p u l a t i o n .48
The final reply of the Allies reached the German Delegation on June 16, reiterating Germany's war guilt.

The "re

vised" Treaty contained minor changes hand written in red ink;
a plebiscite granted in upper Silesia,
to be returned after fifteen years,

and the Saar mines were

if a plebiscite so decreed.

Other than this and a previous promise to admit Germany to the
International Labor Organization before her undetermined entry
into the League of Nations,

46F R U S , VI,

A7
no other changes were m a d e .

Ger-

371-7 2 .

47Luckau, pp. 89-90; Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dok umente, p.
171; Novak, pp. 261-62.
In a letter to Clemenceau dated June
20, Brockdorff-Rantzau pointed out that there were several
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many had five days to sign or the Allies would invade.

The

Delegates now had to consult their Government before a final
decision was made,

and two extra days were granted in view of

the distance from Woimar*

That evening,

the German Delegation

left Versailles in a shower of stones thrown by the local
populace .48
Defeat in Weimar
Aboard the train,

they drafted a memorandum to be

presented to the National Assembly,
of the Treaty as it stood.

The unanimous opinion of the Dele

gation was against signing--the
tial.

recommending the rejection

"revisions" were inconsequen

Nothing altered the spirit of the Treaty or alleviated

any of the economic pressures and humiliating conditions 0

The

Delegation held that the Allies neglected to consider that the
greatest burden would fall upon the working class, whose rights
were ignored.

G e r m a n y ’s entrance into the League depended

upon her "good conduct 35 in regard to the Treaty,

but that docu

ment's impossible demands provided the Allies with the means
of excluding Germany from the League as long as they wished.
It would be better to refuse to sign a Treaty which,

in the

discrepancies in the texts of the Allied reply to the German
counterproposals, the copy of the revised Treaty, and the Treaty
which the Germans had received on May 7.
Luckau, pp. 473-7 4 0

48 Stern-Rubarth, p 0 106; Riddell, p. 92; Novak, p„ 263.
A lady secretary was hit on the head and permanently disabled.
See Schi.ff, pp. 125-26, and New York Times, June 18, 1,919, p.
1, which has the following triple headline: "GERMANS INSIST
THEY WILL NOT SIGN; PARIS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THEY WILL; VER
SAILLES MOB STONES DELEGATES 0

126
considered opinion of the Delegation and their: experts,
intolerable,

unf ulf illable, unjust,

was

and dis hone st,
, than to

accept the impossible and then be held accountable for it.49
By this time, violence and unrest gripped the city of
Weimar.

The very night before the Delegation arrived from V e r 

sailles,

an attempt, had been made to storm the Weimar Schloss

and murder President Ebert and all the other M i n i s t e r s .^8

On

the morning of June 18, a car carrying Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dr.
Simons,

and others, made its way from the Weimar station to

the Sch lo ss .
automobile,

An armed soldier stood on either side of the

since the possibility of assassination or a Putsch

was very much feared by those in Weimar.8!

The Foreign Minister

soon presented the D e l e g a t i o n ’s unanimously approved report to
the Cabinet.
For two days that body sat in almost continuous session,
arguing over the alternatives of signing,

not signing or

signing without accepting Articles 227-231, which was Erzber
ger 's

inspiration

139-40.

.52

The final Cabinet vote was so close that

4 ^Brockdorff-Rantzau,
8 8 Erzberger,

pp.

Dokumente, pp.
_ _ _ _ _

171-82; Schiff, pp.

37 5-76; Noske, p. 169f.

5 LB M S , 1690H/1013/397 240.
52LUCkau? p. 106.
Questioned by Noske on June 19, Hi.n=
denburg and Groener considered military resistance on the
western front out of the question.
They finally agreed to the
Erzberger acceptance formulae
Ibid,, pp„ 110-11 . C f - Goerlitz,
pp. 216-17.
Brockdorff-Rantzau would have nothing to do with the
Erzberger plan.
It had no prospect of success, as it attempted
to cut out Article 231, which was a cornerstone upon which the
Treaty demands were based.
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Ebert said the decision must be referred to the National Assem
bly.

Chancellor Sch eid ema nn1s Cabinet resigned on the 19th,

without the Foreign Minister having a last chance to present
his case to the National Assembly.

His carefully prepared but

undelivered speech held that the Allies would try to exact
every tarthing it Germany signed and that they would condemn
her as a peace breaker if, as was certain,
every condition to their satisfaction.

she could not fulfil

The written speech

ended with an appeal to the German people for one last sacri
fice of the Great War — at stake now was peace and their own
freedom:
Will the enemy governments really dare to commit the
crime of shamefully humiliating and oppressing the
German people, because they have refused to meet with
our representatives in honest oral negotiations con
cerning the restoration of the war damages? Will
they commit the madness of requiring new and unpre
dictable military burdens of their own people in
order to extort from the German people more than the
great offer made to them of their own free will? Well,
in that case these peoples will not support their
g o v ernments ” demands to the bitter end; then the time
will come, when it will be possible for peoples to
speak to peoples and to establ.i.sh the workers 1 asso
ciation without which the new Europe cannot arise.
The peroration alluded to the fateful hour in
duty involved not only the German people,

which Germany's

but all Europe.

It

was now a question ofs
a world-mission which the German people is called
upon to fulfil, but whxch it. can only fulfil if it
does not give itself up.
The German people fights
no longer for the laurels of war, but
for the vic
tory of peaceful democratic ideals in
the w o r l d . 8 3
8 3 Stern~Rubarth, pp. 113-1.7. The text of this speech,
found among his papers after his death in 1928, was not made
public until then.
Brockdorff-Rantzau believed, and Dr. Simons
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With this last opportunity to

appeal for unity lost, the

of Scheidemann's Cabinet,

support crumbling away

hour passed,

and

fall
aseach

Brockdorff-Rantzau submitted his resignation to

Ebert on June 2 0th.
President Ebert wanted the Count to reconsider his
resignation.

A messenger came on the afternoon of the 20th to

ask Brockdorff-Rantzau to present his views once more,

this

time to a meeting of the Minister-presidents and representatives
from the various parts of Germany.

This the Count did,

and his

own memorandum covering the events of that turbulent day
includes his last appeal to refuse the Treaty as it stood:
The Entente would not survive this extra stress
/Belastunqsprobe 7 and would break up.
I believe
that after two or at most three months we could
come to oral negotiations leading to truly accept
able conditionso
To strengthen my position I read
an expose of the situation and state of mind in the
enemy countries.
In closing I read a telegram from
the Minister, Adolf Muller, in Bern, which ended
with the words, "We would, by accepting the Treaty,
not only make ourselves disliked abroad, b u b con
temptible."
I closed saying that the prospect of
being disliked did not dismay me, in any case we were
already disliked.
The limit of my attitude was our
honor, which I had already stressed in my first
policy speech, and I will not overstep these bounds
under any circumstances*
I have already submitted my
resignation, but I am, ready to carry on further in
this office if the gentlemen here will agree with my
agreed, that he and the Delegation members were prevented by the
maneuvering of the political parties from appearing before the
National Assembly's apparently brief meeting.
BMS, 1690H/1013/
3 9 7 226, 249„
Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that Germany should have laid
up supplies of coal and food after the Armistice and during the
weeks gained by the Peace Delegation in Versailles, in order to
be better able to wait out the hard times which would follow a
refusal to sign.
He thought a treaty imposed by actual force
would provide Germany with a more potent legal basis for later
rectification o See BMS, 1690H./1013/397 248, 250.
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judgment and declare for refusal /of the Treat
I do not need to add that I intend to give myself
over entirely to the support of this position (mit
meiner ganzen Person ftir die Durchfuhrunq einzutreten) .
I appeal strongly to you gentlemen, in this fateful
hour for the Reich and the German people, to: follow
me and not deny me your c o n f i d e n c e . 54
In their policy of refusing to sign and holding out
for a few months,

Brockdorff-Rantzau and the Peace Delegation

reckoned that disagreements among the Allies and the general
longing for peace would lead ultimately to an acceptable nego
tiated settlement.

Months of bitter hardship might be in

store for Germany until more just terms were evolved, but
signing now meant the economic destruction of the country and
enslavement of the people.
policy a "gambler's throw"

Matthias Erzberger called this
(Vabanquespiel) and feared political

dissolution of the country as its result.
to any terms m

54BMS,

He urged signature

preference to the horrors of military invasion.

169Oh/1013/397 202-03.

^ S t e r n - R u b a r t h , p. 107; Novak, p. 267.
Still another
alternative to signing or not signing was the extreme, solution
proposed by Walther Rathenau,.
Writing for Zukunft on May 31,
he said that if the Allies made no concessions. Count BrockdorffRantzau, as plenipotentiary, should hand over to the Allied
Governments the decree of dissolution of the German National
Assembly together with the resignations of President Ebert and
the Cabinet, thus forcing the Allies to take over the sovereignty
and government of Germany and the responsibility for her 60,000,000 people.
See Harry Graf Kessler, Walther Rathenau, Sein
Leben und sein Werk (Eerlin-Grunewalds Hermann Klemm, 1928), p.
2 83; Eric C. Kollmann, "Walther Rathenau and German Foreign
Policy," Journal of Modern H i s t o r y , XXIV (1952), 133.
Other
prominent German scholars, Max Weber and Hans Delbruck* shared
this view.
See F R U S , XII, 127.
Weber and Delbruck, together
with Count Max Montgelas and Alfred Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, com
prised the German committee to investigate the causes of the
war's outbreak.
Dr. Simons also expressed a similar thought in
a letter on May 20, 1919s "Perhaps the one thing left is to put
Germany wholly in the hands of the League of Nations and let the
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War weariness,

hunger,

berger 's acceptance plea.

and chaos all sustained Erz

There were those who were glad to

see a Foreign Minister who put dignity and ethics above po li 
tics, but as the hours ticked away, most of those who hesitated
were swayed by Erzberger's dire predictions.

For more than a

day, Germany had no Cabinet and no Foreign Minister.
ment with their Chief,

In agree

the members of the Peace Delegation and

Dr. Simons had resigned also.
Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter of resignation as Foreign
Minister is noteworthy,
ance of the Treaty.

in view of Germany's ultimate accept

"The foreign policy which I have led," he

wrote to Ebert on June 20,
could only depend on intellectual weapons.
Through
military defeat, political r-evolution, and the econo
mic demands of the armistice, Germany was eliminated
as a material power factor.
Despite this, I believe
I can say that it was possible for me to raise her
political credit abroad.
The discussions in Weimar made it obvious,
in view of the suffering of the people,
his policy no longer existed.

continued the Count,

that solid backing for

"For the present," he said,

must turn back at the threshhold of success."

"I

He explained

his view to Ebert that an official of state did not ordinarily
have the right to refuse his cooperation whenever circumstances
forced a change in policy, but in the case of a Foreign M i n i 
ster it was different.

Should he go along with such a rever-

League extract from Germany, economically, as much as they care
to be responsible for."
See Luckau, p. 122.

88Luckau, p. 109.
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sal, after publicly denouncing it, he "would endanger the dig
nity and credit of the R e i c h ."

G e r m a n y ’s world-mission was now

to stand for democracy and social justice in the place of the
capitalistic and imperialistic designs of the present peace
document.

"If Germany accepts the peace conditions," he con

cluded,
the political result of this enormous sacrifice should
be the easing of /tensions_/, . . . the withdrawal of
enemy troops, and the preparation of the way for real
peace negotiations.
This would be endangered, and per 
haps entirely in vain, if the new conditions had to be
accepted by the same man /as Foreign Minister// who
had opposed them so s h a r p T y / ^
Brockdorff-Rantzau traveled almost immediately from
Weimar to Berlin, where he put affairs at the Foreign Office in
order after his resignation.

On the third of July he left Ber

lin and retired to Annettenhoh,

his unpretentious estate in

Schleswig.

He had hoped that the days of "a scrap of paper"

were over.

in G e r m a n y ’s name, he would sign "neither our

death sentence nor the abnegation of our national h o n o r ,"88 and
in the German D e l e g a t i o n ’s opinion the Treaty of Versailles de
manded Germany's public admission of war guilt and extorted
terms ruinous to her existence.
lent Hun;
nity.

To the Allies he was the inso

to many Germans the Count, remained a symbol of dig

Over the doorway of Annettenhoh,

arms surmounts the plattdeutsch motto;

the Brockdorff coat of
b u m m e r de Kopp b a b e n "

— "Never bow your h e a d ."88
^ B r o c k d o r f f-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp.

58 I b i d ., p. 135.

89Klatt,

p. 14.

183-86.

CHAPTER VII
AFTER THE TR EA T Y : 1919-1922
German Acceptance of the Treaty
After the resignation on June 20, 191.9, of the Scheidemann Cabinet in which Brockdorff-Rantzau had been Foreign Mini
ster,

only three days remained for the German Government to

reorganize and make its decision on the Treaty,
like "a madhouse" during those days.

In the National Assembly

furor mounted as the choice was weighed?
matter of hours before

Weimar was

it was soon only a

"the enemy /would__/ march, " and politi

cal conviction gave way before the t u m u l t /
President Ebert had wished to resign also,

Opposing the Treaty,
but after party col

leagues convinced him that his presence meant continuity in
stead of complete chaos,

he remained in office as the Weimar

Government's polestar02
A new Cabinet, with former Minister of Labor Gustav
Bauer as Chancellor,

tried to accept the Treaty without the

"points of honor," Articles 227-231, which was the formula
devised by Erzberger and accepted by the Republic's military
leaders.

It did not work*
^BMS,

The P a n s

Peace Conference shot

1691H/1013/397 240; Erzberger,

382-83.
2Luckau,

p. 108; Schiff,

pp.

E rlebnisse, pp.
“

140-41.

^Luckau, pp. 110-11.
Cahen, p. 331, says Erzberger
claimed that Conger assured him the Allies would accept this. On
132
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back a reply refusing anything but unconditional acceptance of
the complete Treaty within the next twenty-four hours.

The

possibility of German military resistance having been ruled out
of the question on June 19,

the Bauer Government could do

nothing but y i e l d .4
The actual affixing of signatures to the Treaty on
Germany's behalf was done by two members of the Bauer Cabinet,
who traveled to Versailles for that unhappy duty.

Representing

the German Republic at the famous ceremony in the Hall of
Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles on June 28,

1919, were

Social Democrat Hermann Muller, who was now the new Foreign
Minister,

and Catholic Centrist Dr. Johannes Bell.

In Paris,
many's

Colonel House had noted on June 2 3 that Ger

"signified intention of sending only one /sic_/ unimpor

tant and unknown representative here to sign is indicative of
temper and unreliability . . . "

But five days later,

House

wrote of the Hall of Mirrors ceremony;
When the Germans had signed and the great Allied
Powers had done so, the cannons began to boom.
I had
a feeling of sympathy for the Germans who sat there
quite stoically.
It was not unlike what was done in
olden times, when the conqueror dragged the conquered
at his chariot wheels.
To my mind it is out of keeping
with the new era which we profess an ardent desire to
June 3, Erzberger had said vividly; "Suppose someone tied my
arms and placed a loaded pistol against my chest, and asked me
to sign a paper obligating me to climb to the moon within 48
hours.
As a thinking man I would sign to save my life, but would
say openly that the demand simply could not be fulfilled." Ep
stein, p. 318.
4with but two hours to spare, the Bauer Government tele
graphed to Clemenceau: "Yielding to overpowering might, /the
German Republic accepts__/ the peace treaty imposed by ±Jie Allied
and Associated governments.
But in so doing / G e r m a n y / in no
wise abandons its conviction that these conditions of peace rep
resent an injustice without example."
Luckau, p. 112.
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promote.
I wish it could have been more simple and
that there might have been an element of chivalry,
which was wholly lacking.
The affair was elaborately
staged and made as humiliating as it well could b e .^
In her memoirs twenty years later,

President Wilson's widow

recalled some frivolous, but interesting,

impressions of that

tense scene;
Then fell a silence, broken at length by the sound
of footsteps as the German signatories were conducted
to their place. . . . They seemed embarrassed and
ill at ease, and were uniformly stolid, uninterest
ing- looking men,
I
could not help feeling had I
been sending men, 1 would have selected more impressive-looking ones.
They reminded me of prisoners
before the bar of justice <.6
Germany was the first nation to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles.

In the National Assembly on July 9, 1919,

the

action passed by a vote of 208 to 115, with 99 deputies abstaining.

7

The same day, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, at his desk

at Annettenhoh, wrote:
The whole work of the /German Peace__7 Delegation was
directed toward improving the draft Treaty and then
to sign /TtJ 7 . . . «
,
But now that the representatives of Germany . „ „
have signed the Peace, and ratification is imminent,
now we must not allow the suspicion to arise that
5House Papers, IV, 484, 487 . House 8s first observation
was probably influenced by the scuttling of the German fleet.,
interned at Scapa Flow, on June 21st.
6Edith Bolling ^/SaltJ7 Wilson, My Memoir (Indianapolis;
The Bobbs-Merrill Co,, 1939), p. 269.
After the ceremony,
Muller suffered a nervous collapse in his hotel room.
See
Schiff, p. 171.
^Literary Digest History of the World W a r , X, 350.
This was done even before the~NaO'ona1 Assembly ratified the
German Constitution on July 31, 1.91.9.
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Germany signed the Peace in order to sabotage it
later through secret dealings.
Where it is unfulfillable must be proved to the other side.
Now that the Treaty was an obligation accepted by the Republic,
he advocated a new post-Versailles rationale for Germany.

As

the embodiment of resistance to the Treaty, he felt that he
must remain in the background.

His version of Erfill lung spoil-

tik was intended to demonstrate the economic impossibility of
the treaty conditions,
negotiations.

leading eventually to more realistic

But his original stand against the Treaty had

rested upon what he thought was much firmer ground.

Had the

Treaty been imposed upon Germany by the Allies with actual
military force, the judicial case for ultimate revision of the
harshest and most humiliating terms would have been much
stronger than under the existing circumstances whereby Germany
had accepted the Treaty under the mere threat of fo rce .9
While still in Versailles at the end of May,

the Count

had made a portentious statement to the press at the end of
the same interview in which he characterized the new economic
"Einkreisungspolitik" against Germany,

as revealed in the

Treaty;
Among the economic experts of our opponents, the
socializing of economic life ought to be compared
with the now destroyed Prussian militarism. , . .
a danger to world peace could develop if a nation
alistic socialism were to replace a nationalistic
^Brockdortf-Rantzau,
26; Rosenbaum, p. 13.

Dokumente und Geda nk en , pp. 125-

9BMS, 169l.H/1013/397 250.

1.36

capitalism; if nationalism, organized down to the
finest detail, were to manifest itself as a weapon,
as an army.
Each force generates a counter“ f or ce . . . „
He carried this argument further by prognosticating that ag
gressive nationalistic socialism in Germany would represent a
threat to the capitalist structure of England and the United
States.

Yet the threat of latent militarism in a national

socialist society "organized down to the last detail" is here
the salient thought.
Brockdorff-Rantzau1s Retirement
The German Republic's whole struggle for existence
after November,

1918,

together with the humiliations and frus

trations of Versailles and the mental travail under pressure
of time, had worn down the C o u n t ’s health and strained his
nerves to the lim.it.

From the standpoint of his own health

and personal affairs, both of which he had necessarily neglec
ted for many months,
tenhoh.

he needed a period of recovery at Annet

The first weeks at home were difficult? he brooded

over past events and Germany's uncertain future,
from insomnia at this time.

and suffered

Letters and expressions of con

gratulation and approval arrived daily, but in August he wrote
to Dr. Simons that?
. . . here in solitude I am often overcome with
very bitter moods, especially since /the departure
of_7 my brother, whose efforts to distract me were

^Brockdorff-Rantzau,
Chapter VI, p. 113, s u p r a „

Dokumente, pp.

148-49.

See
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touching.
The thought, to have been so near to
success and have to give way to stupidity and
vileness gnaws at me more than I care to admit
He continued to lead a secluded life, writing articles, but he
kept in touch with important, events and persons in German
politics by occasional visits to Berlin where he would stay at
his twin brother's house in the Viktoriastrasse.
The Republic wished to avail itself of Brockdor ff™
Rantzau's service and authority after Versailles.

The rela

tionship between him and President. Ebert continued to be one
of mutual respect and confidence.

Ebert soon offered the Count

the post of Ambassador in Vienna, but he declined it.
refused similar positions in Rome and M a d r i d .3-3

He later

After the

frightening rightist-military Kapp Putsch in March,

1920, Ebert

asked Brockdorff-Rantzau to become Foreign Minister again,
which Ebert thought would strengthen the government's flagging
domestic authority.

Turning this offer down,

the Count ex

plained he knew the results of feelers in London about his
taking that office again.

Lord Hardinge of the British Foreign

Office had told the German Ambassador in London, Dr. Friedrich
Sthamer,

that it would be regarded as an "unfriendly" act.

The Count also knew "that the French would move Heaven and Hell
to obstruct my appointment ."33

33BMS, 1691H/1013/397 256, 259.

Cf. Rosenbaum, p. 13.

3 ^BMS, 1691H./1013/397 264; Stern-Rubarth, p. 123.
13BMS, 1691H/1013/397 267, 269.
Earlier that month
Brockdorff-Rantzau had declined the same offer because he con
sidered the Bauer Cabinet "transitional."
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After the adoption of the R e p u b l i c ’s new Constitution,
the possibility of a presidential election arose in January,
1920,

since Ebert had been elected by the National Assembly,

not the people.

The Democrats sought Brockdorff-Rantzau as their

^candidate, but he declined,

although he appreciated this honor.

"The Social Democrats will want to put up their own candidate
doubtlessly," he said, and he did not want to run against
Ebert.

14

n o

election was held;

the National Assembly decided

that Ebert should complete the five year presidential, term,
Brockdorff-Rantzau retained only his position as Chairman of
the Red Cross Central Committee and the welfare positions re
lated to it, which he had taken on as Foreign Minister,
however,

This,

could always be a clever means of engaging in polit

ically "unofficial" missions,

if such occasions a r o s e .33

Brockdorff-Rantzau had written a memorandum on his
meeting with Ebert right after his resignation as Foreign M i ni 
ster in 1919,

Ebert had praised his stand in Versailles,

saying it "would later be fully appreciated by history."
Count then took his leave,
andum,

explaining,

The

according to his memor

"that I did not have the intention of withdrawing from,

political life and was ready, whenever the Reichspresident
believed he had a mission for me,
posal."

to place myself at his dis

Yet he had been reluctant to accept any of the posts

34BMS, 1691H/1013/397 274.
15BMS, 1691H/1013/397 263, 3 0 7 0 Rosenbaum, p. 2 0 f dis
cusses a talk between Brockdorff-Rantzau and Ebert on April 25,
1921, when the Count said he "would be willing to go to Moscow,
as a prominent member of the Red Cross, to ascertain whether it
was possible to resume relations."
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offered in the next, year and a half.

In March,

1920,

the

Count explained to Ebert his current views on re-entering
political life.
him:

A difficult job, he said, would never deter

this he had proved i.n December,

"I have decided,

1918.

But now, he added,

after the part I played at Versailles, which

was tragic but at least not insignificant,

to accept only a

post in which I would be inwardly convinced that I could accom
plish something p os it i v e ."36
At Annettenhoh the Count wrote a defense of his V e r 
sailles policy,
in two editions,

and the resulting volume,
in 1920 and 192 2.

Dokumente, appeared

As the name implies,

work is a chronological presentation of documents,

the

interviews,

and statements from the time of his appointment as Foreign
Minister to the fall of S ch eidemann's Cabinet and his own
resignation.
following.
selves.

The commentary extends into the years immediately
"Documents," he concluded,

"should speak for them

The less they require commentary,

they are.

the more convincing

. . . /Readers cannot deny that_7 my policy was con-

s istent."3^
In the summer of 1920 and the first two months of 1921
numerous conferences took place attempting to implement the
various clauses of the Treaty and solve the many problems pl a
guing Europe after the war.

So far, an acceptable reparations

36BMS, 1691H/1013/397 267, 397, 333-339,* Rosenbaum, p. 15
3 ^Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, p. 187.
The second
edition had the same title, and a third edition, Dokumente und
Gedanken urn Ver s a i l l e s , with much additional commentary by the
C o u n t , appeared in 1925.
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figure eluded statesmen and experts, while bitterness on all
sides increased.,

A meeting in Paris in February,

1921, eventu

ally placed G e r m a n y 8s debt at 226 milliard gold marks.

All the

old arguments against the German Delegation's offer of 100 m i l 
liard gol4 marks in 19.19 were brought up again.
From Annettenhoh emanated more trenchant remarks during
the 1921 Paris Conference.

The 100 milliard offer at V e r 

sailles, wrote the Count, had been attacked at the same time
as an attempt to becloud the issue by mixing ^/erquickung) the
questions of reparations,

economic clauses,

tion of German borders all together.

and the determina

On February 12,

1921,

he wrote bitterly of the opportunity which had been missed in
May and June of 1919:
At that time the German Peace Delegation in Versailles
actually represented the honest desire of more than
three-fourths of the German people for voluntary rep
aration and disarmament.
The Allies had the best op 
portunity to come to an honest understanding with the
German republican parties.
They willfully scorned
this possibility.
They preferred the Versailles
Treaty and this drove great masses of the German peo 
ple into the arms of the extremist, parties.
Today it
will be very much harder to win the millions, who
have defected to nationalism or communism, over to a
policy of voluntary sacrifice and a sincere desire
for understanding„
The entire article of February 12 is a classic example of Brock
do rf f-Rantzau's sarcasm and penetrating commentary.

^Brockdorff-Rantzau,
Stern-Rubarth, pp. 121-22.

Dokumente und G ed an k e n , p. 134;
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Germany was invited

to send delegates to a conference

in London at the beginning of March,
Paris plan might be put into effect <>
and associate at Versailles,

1921,

in order that the

There the Count's friend

Dr. Walter Simons, who had been

German Foreign Minister for almost a year, protested G e r m a n y 0s
inability to pay the 226 milliard decided upon in Paris.

De

tails given in newspaper accounts suggest that it was almost
Versailles all over again.

The German Delegation encountered

hostility upon arriving in London,

and Dr. Simons delivered an

ill-received speech on the first of March, offering to pay a
total of 50 m i l l i a r d . ^

Indeed,

the London Morning Post

averred that "Count Brockdorff-Rantzau,
arrogance at Versailles,

in his insolence and

did much to stiffen the Allied yraver-

ers, but Dr. Simons in London has outdone even that supercil
ious and unbending protege of Potsdam."20

Blaming Germany for

the war, France and Britain refused to consider the German case
The New York. T im es , March 1, p. 1, related how the
railway porters refused to carry the Germans 8 luggage, and how
"at the /savoy_7 hotel the Germans met with equal coldness from
the servants and generally their reception was formal."
On March 8 , the New York T i m e s , p. 1, mentioned General
von S e e c k t 's presence ’in~ful1 Prussfan uniform," which certainly
didn't help matters.
20
As reported in the New York T i m e s , March 3, 1921, p. 2.
See also Eyck, I, 17 7.
Dr. Simons actually offered only thirty
milliard, maintaining that twenty milliard had already been paid
in kind.
This was extremely irritating to the statesmen of the
former Allied nations.
Ibid., pp. 174-75.
Lloyd George's reaction was reminiscent of Wilson on
May 7, 1919.
After Dr. Simons's speech he said to Lord Riddells
"What a people they are!
They always do the wrong thing!
Their
proposals are absurd.
They have done their best to alienate the
sympathies of those who were in favour of moderation.
We are
not going to be jack-booted by the Germans!"
Riddell, p. 282.
C f . Introduction, p. 4, s up ra .
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or modify their demands.

Dr. Simons left London with the famil

iar words

of May and June, 1919s

"There is only one

range our

difficulties--by conference."2^

way to a r 

Since Germany had failed to accept the Paris sum by the
March 7th
burg,

deadline, France marched troops into Dusseldorf,

and Ruhrort the following day.

in April, Dr.

Duis

Simons ap

pealed to the new President of the United States, Warren G. Hard
ing,

to be an impartial mediator on the reparations question,

but Harding agreed only to transmit information regarding any
new German proposals.

At the beginning of May the President

rejected the revised German figures as insufficient,

leaving no

doubt that America would not oppose the Allies on the question
of

r e p a r a t i o n s .

22

Meanwhile Germany was experiencing early indi

cations of the economic distress which

led" to inflation and the

downward plunge of the mark in 1922 and 1923.
The aftermath of the London Conference was a reparations
figure of 132 milliard gold marks,

served upon Germany as a sec

ond ultimatum on May 6, with no economic restrictions removed,
Germany was given six days to accept it or the Ruhr would be occu
pied.
to

Once again,

as at Weimar in .1919, a new Government had

be formed for the purpose of acceding to the Allied demands.

^ N e w York T i m e s , March 9, 19 21, p. 1. Before leaving
for London” Dr. Simons had given a very moving speech in Ger
many, promising "never to give in to the impossible " New
York T i m e s , March 25, 1921, p. 3.
22Erich Eyck, I, pp. 172-79, presents a good assessment
of the pressures on Simons from all sides and concludes that
"the Allies assembled at the London Conference regarded Simons
in a much less favorable light than his ethics and his politics
d eserved."
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Cn the occasion of President. Harding's inauguration
during the course of the conference in London, Brockdorff-Rantzau pondered over what the future held for Germany and wrote
his impressions 2
I d o n ’t believe in miracles in po li t i c s „ But I
believe in justice and understanding. . „ . No reason
able person in Germany expects that the new president
will, pursue a policy that is not in the interest of
the United S ta t e s „ But the interests of America em
brace the entire world,,
The United States has a
world-mission 7
* it is called upon, after having decided
the outcome of the war, to give the world peace again.
. . . Mr, Earding has indeed not presented fourteen
points to the world as did Mr, Wilson,
We do not know/
what he intends, but we have faith that he will uphold what he has promised.
Justice and understanding
implies a program worthy of the leader of the might
iest nation, and I am sure, that the realization of
these two points will bring greater blessings than
fourteen points that were not carried out.
The rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the United
States Senate in March,

1920,

and the election of Harding, who

seemed to be Woodrow W i l s o n ’s antithesis,

indicated that Amer

ica's post-war desire was to disentangle herself from the web
of Europe 3s problems.

This suggested the possibility of

changes in the Germ.an-Ameri.can relationship and might even have
been an opportunity promising enough to induce Brockdorff-Rantzau to come out of. retirement..

At the beginning of 1921, he

was alleged to be among the candidates being considered for
2 3grockdorff-'Rantzau, Dokumente und G ed an ke n, p. 201.
Harding gave his inaugural address on March 4, 1.92.1«
In his
commentary, Brockdorff-Rantzau refers to the two points
"Recht und V e r n u n f t „" H a r d i n g ’s speech includes both terms
(rendered here as "justice and understanding") singly through
out the speech.
See U„S„, Senate, 67th Cong.,, Special Sess.,
S D
1 1921 p p 4-6, passim.
o

.
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the future post of German Ambassador

in Washington,

D„C.^

But

the very real, question of his acceptability in Washington never
arose, because his interests and energy were directed strongly
eastward after the events of early 1921.
The Road to Moscow
Because of Germany's location between East and West,
the German relationship with Russia had always been one of the
Count's primary considerations.

He was a follower of the old-

time Bismarckian tradition of insuring Russian friendship.

All

during the first half of 1919, Brockdorff-Rantzau had sought to
keep a way open to the East while working toward a peace settleNew York T i m e s , February 17, 1.921, p. 5.
This article
said in pa r t , "B r oc kdor: ff-Rantzau visited Berlin recently, it
is stated, for the express purpose of urging his own candidacy.
He is believed to have the support of the Centrists and Demo
crats, and possibly eventually that of the Socialists, and may
be regarded as having the best chance, unless, for reasons not
yet apparent some outsider should be appointed."
Other candi
dates mentioned were % von Haniel, Dr, Albert, Admiral von Hintze,
and Maximilian Harden,
After a separate Treaty between the United States and
Germany in August, 1921, restored diplomatic relations, the
post of German Ambassador in Washington was given in May, 1922,
to Otto Ludwig Wiedfeldt, "a board member of the Krupp works."
Holborn, "Diplomats," p, 1.53. Wiedfeldt had also been Chair
man of the Economics Commission of the German Delegation, at
V e r s a i l l e s „ Luckau, pp„ 60, 190, 192,
Brockdorff-Ra.ntzau 1s lack of English would certainly
have been a major obstacle if there was any truth in the
allegation that he was on the list, of candidates.
Bernstorff,
in My Three Years in America, pp. 18-19, observed that "The
English language exercis*es_rfore absolute power in the United
States than even in England itself. . . .it would never occur
to any diplomat in Washington to transact his business in any
other language than English .. . .”
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ment with the western powers .^5

He feared a premature commit.”

ment to either the western powers or Soviet Russia after the
war's

e n d « 2 6

Germany, he wrote,

against Bolshevism,

needed to defend herself

"an overpowerful Russia," and Poland.

Re

alizing the dangers inherent in the now explosive Polish ques
tion, he recommended in a policy memorandum the establishment
of "neighborly relationships" and the "creation of an economic
field of activity, without revealing whether both of these p r o 
gram points concern Russia or the eastern countries in g.ent
eral „"27
The Count had hoped that the very real Bolshevist
threat to Germany could be used to advantage since the Allies
had a vested interest in making peace with a non-Bolshevik
Germany if they expected to collect extensive reparations.

But

the negotiated settlement for which he strove never material
ized.

The Versailles terms, plus the London ultimatums,

con-

0R

Before the war ended, Brockdorff-Rantzau urged that
Germany conclude a peace with Russia "that would leave no b i t 
terness on either side," instead of harsh demands such as
those of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
"Nachlass B - R , " 9101E/
3439/H232 315; BMS, 1689H/1012/396 927 and 1690H/1013/396 941.
See also Chapter II, p„ 37, supra
^ " N a c h l a s s B-R, " Memorandum of April 4, 1919, 9.105H/
3443/H235 186-89; and Brockdorff-Rantzau to Langwerth, May 3,
1919, 9.105H/344.3/H235 264-65.
^ S e e undated memorandum, by Brockdorff-Rantzau, "Nach
lass B - R , " 9105K/3443/H235 177.
Herbert Helbig, p. 21, says
this memorandum was written sometime before May 7, 1919.
It
ends with a paragraph which bears this out; "It must be recog
nized that the general lines which Germany must follow in or
der to reach these goals are difficult to outline, because of
the indistinctness of the relationships in the East, and in
view of our own uncertain situation, and finally because of the
vacillating decisions on the side of the Entente."
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vinced Brockdorff-Rantzau that the only way to combat, the
Vernichtunqswi 1 len and what he termed f'Erpresserpolit.iki; of the

-------------------------------------------------------------^

—r.-
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Entente powers would be to establish better relations with
Soviet Russia

Opinion was divided, but certain members of the

Foreign Off ice, and General von Seec k t , also thought this might
be mutually advantageouso23
the Allies were not unmindful of the Russian problem,
either„

International conferences continued with the purpose

of establishing the bases of European peace,

After the W as h

ington Disarmament Conference at the end of .1.921, the European
powers discussed the world's financial problems at Cannes,
France,

in 1922, and then met again in Genoa,

Italy,

in April.

The Genoa Conference, which German representatives also at
tended,

sought to resolve the economic questions and the tick

lish problem of relations with Soviet Russia, represented
there by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgi V. Chicherin.
The Germans feared that the French would work, toward a
rapprochernenf with Russia by offering her the Russian share of
German reparations under Article 116 of the Treaty of V e r 
sailles

on the other hand,

the Russians had long sought

official German recognition of the Soviet regime to forestall
any danger of Germany -s participation in counter-revolutionary
23BMS, 1691H/.L013/397 291.-97; Eyck, I, 169-70, 204-07;
Rosenbaum, pp.. 1.3-21 <, Brockdor ff-Rantzau thought in terms of
economic and commercial, ties, not military collaboration or an
alliance

29EM:S g 169iK/1013/397 3.1.7 ; Bliicher , pp.. 154,
Rosenbaurn, p * 26,

160-6.1;
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m ov em en t s..30
opened,

Less than a week after the Genoa Conference

Soviet Russia and Germany carried the results of dis

cussions earlier in the year to fruition.,

Represented by their

Foreign Min is te rs , Chicherin and Walter Rathenau,

the two

countries signed a treaty at nearby Rapallo, mutually renounc
ing war damages and officially restoring diplomatic relations.,
Needless to say,

the former western Allies became

alarmed at the .Rapallo event.

BrockdOrff-Rantzau was disturbed

also, because of the flagrantly 111.1loyal.I! appearance it gave
Germany in western e y e s .

He had long favored a German-Soviet

rapprochement, but not in this open and brazen manner.

The

proper time for it in his opinion had been missed--right after
the London ui t.imaturns .31

Brandenburg described the Genoa Con

ference as "the first time that Germany appeared at an inter
national meeting as an equal participant„
ferences,
debtoro"32

she was treated as the accused,

At all previous con
the defaulting

Talking with Ebert a month after Rapallo, .Brock

dor ff-Rantzau put it much more succinctly.

In a rather tele

graphic memorandum of this meeting on May 10, he wrote of the
Rapallo Treaty?
Will net criticize, do not know what I myself would
have d o n e 0 Believe in any case, I would not have
allowed myself to depart from, a line of action once
taken c, Appears to me, no politique was evolved in
3®Eyck,

I, 2 04-05.

3 :B M 3 , 169.1H/1013/397 317 -21; Rosenbaum , pp,

3 23M S , 16 91H / 1013/3 9 7 317,

19, 26, 30.
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Genoa, rather, things were handled rashly.
It is
clear that Erf tillungs men like Rathenau and /chancel.lor_7 Wi.rth brought the whole so-called trust
of us by the Entente into question because of the
Rapallo Treatyo
We were actually invited for the
first time on an equal, basis and behaved ourselves
like a "man who spits on the c a r p e t . 33
Although Brockdorff—R.antzau referred many times to the
Treaty of Rapallo as a liability, or “burden"
revealed to Ebert that “despite this,
signify a turning point in our policy,
stand, when it is ratified,
factso"34
ity of

for Germany, he

the Rapallo Treaty can
and we must take our

upon the slippery ground of given

jjow that Rapallo was a fait accompli, the possibil

'accomplishing something positive" had materialized.

The Count wanted to be offered the post of first German Ambas
sador to Soviet Russia, believing he could manage and maintain
such a delicate relationship to G e r m a n y ’s advantage.

President.

Ebert, whose confidence in Brockdorff-Rantzau never waned,
ported his candidacy for Ambassador in Moscow,

sup

although others,

such as Chancellor Joseph W.i.rth and General von Seeckt., vigor
ously opposed it at first.-.

The whole story of the battle over

Brockdor ff-Rantzau 's appo.rnt.ment is brilliantly portrayed by
D r = Rosenbaum.35

^BMS,

1691H./1013/397 333

Cf_, Rosenbaum, p. 3Ct,

34BM.S, 16919/1013/397 321, 333, 353, 392,

398..

General von Seeckt. feared that Brockdorff-Rantzau
would not countenance secret military collaboration between
Germany and Soviet Russia.
Wirth had hesitated because of
rumors about the C o u n t ’s eccentric habits '-'nocturnal working
hours, extreme nervousness, cognac drinking, and the unfounded
rumor that he was a morphine addict.,
See B.M.S* 1691H/1013/397
386, and Rosenbaum., Chapter I, “From. Brest-Litovsk to Rapallo,"
pp. 26-48.
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On their part,

the Soviets actually preferred to deal

with ''conservative professional diplomats“ instead of a Social
Democratic representative of Germany,

Indeed,

they were not

averse to welcoming ul!a member of the high nobility „"^6

Brock-

dorff“Rantzau served in this capacity from autumn of 1922
until his death six years later.
viously,
M o s c o w .

"I believe," he had said pre 

“that the disaster of Versailles can be corrected from

"37

H j_s

experience and tactics in Copenhagen offer many

parallels with his later policies in Moscow.
36'Eyck, I, 205; Biticher, p. 149; George W„F. Hallgarten,
“General Hans von Seeckt and Russia 1920-1922," Journal of
Modern History, XXI (March, 1949), 32.
o

n

'8 tern.~R.ubar t h , p. 123.

CHAPTER VIII
RETROSPECT t

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU AT VERSAILLES
The Allied Attitude

After a war of unprecedented size and involvement,
would expect an unprecedented peace.

A peace,

one

however, based

wholly and amicably upon political and economic precepts such
as President Wilson's Fourteen Points embodied,

would indeed

have been an innovation in the history of international rela
tions.

Instead,

the "Book" presented to the German Delegation

at Versailles on May 7, 1919, was a harsh document of 440
Articles— the result of war-engendered hatred and four months
of disagreement among the Allied and Associated Powers,

finally

molded into tangible form by the arduous toil of the various
drafting committees.
The chief representatives at the Peace Conference were
admittedly in Paris to punish Germany;
sor Shotwell,

in the words of Profes

"it was fear of political opposition back home

which more than any other influence prevented the statesmen in
Paris from recasting,
Treaty."^

in part at least,

the terms of the

other writers speak of Europe's dread of facing the

!James T. Shotwell, What Germany Forgot (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1940), pp. 84-85.
Clemenceau's government fell
in 1920 because he had not engineered a harsher treaty or suc
ceeded in obtaining sufficient guarantees against future German
aggression.
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post-war economic problems without American help.

It was

largely due to this apprehension that the League Covenant was
made an integral part of the Treaty as Wilson insisted, while
Wilson

eventually agreed to certain demands of the others,

devoutly hoping that the millenium promised by the concept of
the League of Nations would offer an ultimate means of solution
for present and future international p r o b l e m s ,2
The finished text of the Treaty,

kept strictly secret

until just a few hours before its presentation to the Germans,
prompted outspoken criticism from prominent American and Brit
ish Delegates in Paris,

among them Herbert Hoover, General

Tasker H. Bliss, Robert Lansing,
John Foster Dulles,
Smuts,

Colonel House,

Bernard Baruch,

John Maynard Keynes, General Jan Christian

and Harold Nicolson.

Hoover's story of a preoccupied

stroll at dawn on May 7th is often mentioned in memoirs and
histories of the Peace Conference.
the final form, of the Treaty,

Meditating unhappily about

a copy of which he had just

received and read, Hoover met Smuts and Keynes, both equally
depressed and worried.

"We agreed," wrote Hoover,

"that it was

terrible and we would do what we could among our own nationals
to make the danger c l e a r ."3
3m Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Pea ce , p. 180, Thomas
A. Bailey has characterized Clemenceau's agreement to the
League Covenant as a part of the Treaty of Versailles as an
attempt to "humor a rich uncle."
53

Hoover, M e m o i r s , I, 461-62.
In his D i a r y , Lord Ri d
dell quotes Lloyd G e o r g e ’s Secretary, Philip Kerr, who said on
June 3, 1919; "It is most desirable that the Press should not
comment upon the attitude of the British Delegation in refer
ence to German concessions."
The next day Kerr told Riddell

1.52

How did the Treaty of Versailles becone the rigid docu
ment upon which Wilson's mind "closed with a snap"?

Many his

torians and diarists reveal that the concept of a "preliminary
treaty" to be negotiated instead of imposed,
Peace Conference convened,
this in jnid-Marcho

existed as the

and Wilson himself still considered

Harold Nicolson of the British Delegation

has described the process of "drift" from a preliminary to a
final text.
of a

He wrote that "subconsciously we thought in terms

'Conference' of Allies,

belligerents and neutrals,"

followed bv a "Congress' of all
As the technical clauses in each

article of the Treaty were laboriously drafted,

"the conception

of a Preliminary Treaty merged gradually into the conception of
one final Treaty covering the whole,. "4
Many agreed at the time that Paris,

the capital of

justified war hatred, was not the place for the .peace Conference
to be held.

Germany's first thought i.n September,

1918, was

that President Wilson should "call a peace conference at W ash
ington,

at the same time asking for an immediate cessation of

hostilitieso"^
Lausanne,

Other possible locations included Brussels,

The Hague,

and Geneva.^

that "Smuts is very weak on the Peace Terms. 0
» He is 0 » „
so obsessed with the necessity for making concessions that the
effect is a pro-German attitude."
Riddell, pp. 85-86.,
^Nicolson, pp. 96, 98-99.
See also Shotwell, At the
Paris Peace Conference, pp. 38-39.
Spreliminary History of the Armistice, p. 6., This
appears in a dispatch from Foreign Secretary-von Hi.nt.ze to the
Foreign Office, September 29, 191.8 u
^Nicolson, pp. 76-77 o Ni.cc.lson writes that Wilson un
accountably ruled out Geneva as "saturated with every poisonous
element and open to every hostile influence."
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The press,

as the only means of penetrating the secrecy

and censorship of the Conference,

trafficked in hearsay and

conjecture, when nothing more reliable could be found.
Conference continued and bitter arguments developed,
one was spared vilification«
as February 11th:
the

1F i g a r o . 1

As the

almost no

Wrote Harold Nicolson as early

"A dreadful attack on Wilson yesterday in

I hear he is furious and threatens to transfer

the Conference to Geneva.

It would be a good thing if he d id .n/

Lloyd George and Clemenceau did not escape severe criticism,
either.

And when the French newspapers turned their fire on

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and the German Delegation there were
no restraints.

There was no fear of contradictory material,

for the Germans could make no public reply in the press.
Little truthful information regarding the German Delegation
was available,

and had there been more,

it would doubtless

have been ignored or slanted to suit the overwhelming antiGerman attitude fostered by the most influential sector of the
French press.®
The German Republic fared no better than its Peace
Delegation at the hands of the French.
can Governments had received,
Denmark,

The British and Ameri

from their Ministers in Holland,

and Switzerland and their missions into Germany at

^ Ibi d., p. 261.
A good description of the secrecy and
censorship of the Paris Peace conference is found in E,J. Dillon,
The Inside Story of the Peace Conference (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1920), pp. 117-35.
®One of the finest treatments of this aspect of the
Peace Conference is George Bernard Noble, Policies and Opinions
at Paris, 1 9 1 9 . See especially Chapter X, "Peace Conditions
and the Tr eaty," pp. 353-88.
Only the left wing papers admitted
any validity of the German position.
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the close of the war,

frequent advice to accept and encourage

the leaders of the Republic in view of the collapse of the
Empire and the desperate internal conditions within Germany.
But the French politicians and press scorned the who!e idea
of German "democracy"--it. was a bluff,

a subterfuge,

a shame-

less fraud.^
Indeed, when only outward appearances counted,

"in

Brockdorff-Rantzau the young German Republic had picked the
worst possible representative 0

Though he undoubtedly was an

able man, he was the very image of the Prussian Junker as
depicted in Punch.n10

Completely unaware of Brockdorff-Rant

zau 8s more Danish than Prussian background, his past record
of independent views, his liberal and anti-militaristic
leanings,

the Allied leaders saw only the arrogant, high-

collared Junker.
ner,

stern and,

"Ramrod straight,

abrupt in speech and m a n 

at the moment, overflowing with hatred and

frustration, his very presence seemed to link the German
Republic with the authoritarian Imperial Reich .the Allies had
g
Writing m 1930, Clemenceau spoke of the new German
Government and its representatives at Versailles; "I was not
sufficiently well acquainted with the people we had to deal
with.
Later on, when at Versailles Brockdorff-Rantzau addressed
me in the language of the bearer of a challenge, I was forced
to realize that the German Revolution was mere window-dressing,
and that, with the aggressor of 1914 not a whit cured of his
insane folly, we should continue without,respite to be sub
jected, in a new setting, to the same attack from the same
enemy."
Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of V i c t o r y ,
tr . FoMo Atkinson
(New York; Harcourt., Brace and Co., 1930),
p. 106.
lOFerdinand Czernin, Versailles. 1919 (New York; G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 339.
Cf„ Cahdn, p. 136.
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been f ighting0n 1^

Ferdinand Czernin,

son of the last Austro-

Hungarian Foreign Minister, has said it well in his recent,
book, Versailles,

1919,

Commenting in his Diary that Brock

dor ff-Rantzau appeared to be ill and under a great nervous
strain on May 7th, Lord Riddell continued his first visual
impressions of the Count;
industrious, mechanical.,

"He strikes one as a stiff, precise,
tactless sort of

m a n

."12

Brockdorff-Rantzau cs Qualifications
This,

then,

is the heart of the matter.

BrOckdorff-

Rantzau met the peculiar qualifications of Germany in her hour
of need at the end of the war from the German standpoint o n l y .
Although his appearance and demeanor were automatically m i s 
understood by the Allies, he was a high-ranking, professional
diplomat who had broken with the old regime.

Describing h i m 

self often as "an optimist with faith in the future of the
German people," he looked toward Germany's resurgence through
democracy and economic recovery and was determined to secure
that chance for his country.

He was a diplomat of the old re

gime, but unsoiled with the planning and intensification, of
the E m p i r e ’s war p o l i c i e s „

Never a sycophant at the Court of

Kaiser Wilhelm II, Brockdorff-Rantzau was actually disliked

1 1I b i d . Actually, his posture is usually described as
"a little stooping„" See, for instance, Bonn, p. 228.
He often
leaned on his ebony walking stick, and the occasional limp was
probably due to a riding accident in his youth.
G f . SternRubarth, p. 35.,
- ^ R i d d e l l ,
p c 71• see the preceding part of Riddell's
comment in Ch. y, supra, p. 100„
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by the military,

the Pan-Germans,

and most conservatives.

He

was affiliated with no political party,, but actively willing
to back the Social Democrats and the Weimar Coalition after
the war.

As a result of his connection with the German Repub

lic he became estranged from many of his social class,
1o
members of his own family^

including

Though they tried it,, the Count was a man that the
German Generals and Admirals could not push around or m a n a g e ,
Well before the war's end he had criticized Ludendorff to his
face and opposed the Admiralty on many occasions.
Rantzau did not accept the military's

Brockdorff-

"stab-in-the-back" accus

ation against the post-war civilian government-.

He repudiated

this "DoIchstosslegende 11 on the evening of April 4, 1919, when
he said to General Groener that "the disaster which has broken
over Germany originated with the Army;
collapse took place."

Groener,

the Republican Government,

it was there that the

although he cooperated with

of course maintained the opposite

view that the military collapse was a result of happenings on
the home front
Pelvis, 1961H./.1013/397 386.
There is a story, possibly
apocryphal but very much in character, that after the war the
Count had been asked by members of the Brockdorff family to
give up that name.
Brockdorff-Rantzau is said to have answered
that the Rantzaus had already requested that he no longer use
the name of Rantzau.
"What should I call myself, then," asked
the Red Count-,
"Perhaps Graf Bi.ndest.rlch?" The hyphen was all
that was left.
Klatt, p. 28,

14 ”Nachl.ass B - R , ” 9105H./3441/H234 212.
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The Count's disagreement with General Groener was
relatively minor, but his feuds with Generals von Seeckt and
Ludendorff lasted for years.

At Versailles,

Seeckt had openly

accused Brockdorff-Rantzau of sacrificing Germany's national
honor by denouncing German militarism in his support of the
Republic and his refusal to press for a German Army far in
excess of the 100,000 men permitted under the Treaty26th of May,
effect,

1919, General von Seeckt wrote a letter to this

sending copies of it to the Count,

Delegates,

On the

and to Weimar-

the other German

"Since your Excellency has not con

sidered it necessary," Seeckt flung at Brockdorff-Rantzau,
to seek the advice of the military experts in these
military matters, j must conclude that only pure
political considerations have determined the stand
of the Delegation. . . . I consider myself duty-bound
and justified to speak out that Germany has, through
this act of disarming brought about by political judg
ments of the moment, sacrificed her last and highest
possession, her national honor.15
For the Count it must have been a tremendous inner struggle to
retain his temper,

but he was determined to allow no indica

tions of discord and animosity among members of the German
Delegation to reach the ears of the A l l i e s I n s t e a d ,

the

Delegation voted unanimously to remove Seeckt from the mili
tary commission present at Versailles
^R ab e n a u ,

and

the

Count made

p- 1.78 „

^ I b i d . C f . Ch - V, supra» p. 90 and p., 9.1n, where
Dr. Simons referred to the "silent battle" between Brockdorff-Rantzau and the German military representatives at
Versailles.
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a request to the Government that this be done. 1 7

On June 1,

1919,

(also his

Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote to Baron Langwerth

cousin)

in the Foreign Office::

"It is too bad that in these

times we have to knock about, with such psychopaths /as von
Seeckt JT. "18
Brockdorff-Rantzau especially disliked and distrusted
General Ludendorff, who wrote an article in a weekly military
publication in February,

192.1, accusing the Count of fomenting

the revolution in Russia and collaborating with

"the eastern

Jew Parvus-Helphand" to put the Bolsheviks in power.
article implied also,

The

said Brockdorff-Rantzau, that from Copen

hagen he had worked toward inducing a collapse in Germany—
nothing less than an accusation of high treason.

He replied in

the press with a vitriolic open letter to Ludendorff containing
the incontrovertible fact that the General had assured Chancel
lor Hertling in May,

1918,

of the complete confidence which

the Supreme Command and Ludendorff himself had in the "Impe
rial Minister Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau,

The Count would leave

it to history to decide whether Lu de nd or ff 1s actions during and
after the war were,

in the end, more useful than his own,

17

Un

Rosenbaum, p, 36; Rabenau, p e 180,
According to
Rabenau, p, 178, Seeckt had expected a challenge to a duel at
Versailles.
Three years later Seeckt objected to the appoint
ment of Brockdorff-Rantzau as Ambassador to Soviet Russia,
saying that his conduct at Versailles had been "unpatriotic,"
This time the Count was indeed ready to meet Sccckt with pis
tols, but the difference was settled peacefully although with
great difficulty.
See Holborn,
Diplomats,5’ p, 170, and, for
a more detailed account, Rosenbaum, pp, 35- 4 80
1 8 rlNachlass B-R," 9105H/3443/H255 351,
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fortunately I was called too late to the position of leadership,"
Brockdorff-Rantzau concluded,
or I would have attempted to make it easier for your
Excellency to admit that after the failure of the
offensive in July, 1918, if not before, that mili
tarily for us the war was l o s t „ Whether or not your
Excellency knew this consciously or subconsciously I
do not know; not to have come to this decision re
mains as the monstrous responsibility which you bear
before the German people and history^ ^
When the General retracted nothing,

Brockdorff-Rantzau issued

a challenge to a pistol duel which was also declined,,
let the matter drop,

He then

but wrote prophetically in a letter to

Professor Delbrucks
In the present situation I see in General
Ludendorff one of the greatest danger^ to our poor,
misguided, apolitical people.
Z.TIleY_-/ can only, if
ever, be free of their idolatry / Gbtzenglauben /
when they recognize how frivolously many demi-gods
assume the heaviest responsibilities and how deplor
ably they behave when one day they are actually
called to a c c o u n t , ^
While he was

"a resolute hater of generals meddling in

foreign affairs," 21 Brockdorff-Rantzau was able and willing to
get along with the politicians,
intellectuals,

businessmen,

bankers,

and

many of them Jewish, who were prominent in the

Republic"s early days,

His social eminence,

tion as a gentleman and an intellectual,

his own reputa

together with his

economic and legalistic approach to national problems facil
itated such cooperation.

There is no doubt that he had tremen-

19BMS, 1691H/1.013/397 277.
^Holborn,

20 BMS, 1691H/1013/397 284.

"Diplomats," pp. 132-33.
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dous personal arrjb.ition which transcended party politics,
that some found him. a "difficult colleague, 11
1919,

and

But in early

this remarkable man acted as a sort of catalyst in the

process of establishing the Republic's authority,

Although

he was not without, critics in the. new Germany, his presence
signified prestige and continuity when the Republic needed it
m o s t .22
Discussing Brockdorff-Rantzau1s approach to democracy,
Professor Hajo Holborn says;

"The Russian and German revolu

tions impressed him with the strength of the masses and,
though he was no genuine democrat, he considered the intro
duction of democracy as inevitable and as the only bulwark
against

b o l s h e v i s m .

"2 3

democratic principles.

therefore took steps to apply
Especially for the foreign press the

Count stressed the importance of the fact that decisions in
the new Germany were now made by the Reichstag majority.
22

Dur-

A. member of the German Delegation informed Brock
dor ff-Rantzau that Matthias Erzberger was loudly declaring
"in the beer halls of W e i m a r ” that the Count was a man who
"must be dismissed from office as quickly as possible— his
policy is dangerous to the State."
BMS, 1691H/1013/397 220;
Epstein, p. 302.
Count Anton von Monts, another nobleman and ex-lmperial Ambassador who realized the importance of the working
man in the modern nation, wrote of Brockdorff-Rantzau in a
letter to his nephew in early 1919: "When even B . shines as
a light, the darkness must be enormous.
The intelligence of
Count Rantzau is indisputable.
But can he not be compared
to a puffed-up frog „ . .? The man has managed affairs very
badly and continues to do so, with the help of falsehood and
deceit „11 "Nachlass B - R , ” 9.105E/3441/H234 177 . On Monts,
see David Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1964), pp. 270-71.
2^Holborn,

"Diplomats," p„ 133.
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ing his tenure as Foreign Minister,
needed reform of the Foreign
However

O

f

f

i

c

e

he initiated the long.

24

he may have appeared to

the Allies, Brock

dor ff-Rantzau was quite aware of the extent of G e r m a n y ‘s mili
tary defeat.

He approved the idea of a league of nations,

be established after the conclusion of a just peace.

to

His pre 

ferred term;., Vblkergemeinschaft, or "community of nations,"
implied economic cooperation as well as the league's primary
position as an international arbiter,25

when presented,

the

Treaty of Versailles included the League Covenant inextricably
bound up with the stringent peace terms,

all based upon the

assumption of Germany's war guilt.
German Weaknesses
Operating under great pressure at Versailles,
mention the humiliations to which they were subjected,

not to
the

experts of the German Delegation repeated the errors already
made by the framers of the Treaty.

They overstated their case

2^ I b i d ,, p. 150.
The reorganization, under the direc
tion of Geheimrat Edmund Schuler, was intended, among other
things, t o liceralize the selection of personnel.
See also
Brockdor ff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp., 43, 83-94, 96-97 .
Paul Seabury, The Wilhelmstrass e, A Study of German
Diplomats under the Nazi'''''Regime Tbnlversity of California
Press, 1954), pp, 11-21, describes the "Schuler Reforms" and
notes that the program faced resistance from, the right and
that "the aim of 'democratizing' German diplomacy seriously
failed of its mark."
O c:
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dokumente, pp. 13, 105-07.
See also Stern—R u b a rt h, p. 77,
The accepted German term
for the League of Nations was Volkerbund.
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and overwrote,

and the resulting reply of over 300 pages

solidified their stand just as the Treaty had crystallized that
of the Allies.
Once again,

The result was intensified anger on both sides.

the words of Professor Shotwell are relevant to

each situation.

His observation that "the failure in states

manship lay in the fact that when one added all the parts of
the treaty together

'the whole was greater than the sum of the

parts'" can certainly be applied to the German effort as w el l. 2^
Oral negotiations over the financial and economic
clauses of the Treaty were the unswerving goal of the German
Delegation.

Handled by like-minded men on both sides, who

realized the grave necessity for a settlement,
could well have resulted in agreement.

such meetings

On May 2, 1919,

the New

York Times reported a meeting of German and Allied representa
tives held in the Trianon Palace Hotel several days before the
formal Treaty presentation.

Those present included the Ameri

can financial experts Thomas W, Lamont and Henry F, Davison,
and the German bankers Max Warburg and Karl M e l c h i o r .2”
7

Al

though he was very unimpressed with the general ability and
2^See S ho t w e l l 1s Preface in Luc.kau, p, vi „
27New York Times, May 2, 1919, p. 2. The article reads
in part; rtA meeting of the German and Inter Allied Finance C o m 
mission was held this morning at the Trianon Hotel.
The German
Delegates,, numbering eight, arrived on foot, walking across the
park under the escort of a French Captain,
The American and
other inter-allied delegates drove from Paris in automobiles.
The delegates embarked on a prolonged discussion, apparently a
continuation of the negotiations at the Chateau Plessis-Millette,
at Senlis, near C o m pi eg ne ."
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training of the German businessmen, present in Versailles with
the Delegation,
especially,

Professor Moritz J. Eonn considered Melchior,

a highly capable,

Allies and Germans alike.

reasonable man, respected by the

Bonn also mentions some furtive

meetings of German experts,

including himself, with French and

British representatives in spite of the ban on communication
with the G e r m a n s .28
thesis,

As pointed out in Chapter VI of this

the desirability and possibility of oral negotiations

over the technical financial clauses of the Treaty was actually
considered by the "Big Three," and abandoned largely due to the
influence of Clemenceau.

Others realized that the psychologi

cal effect of even relatively minor oral negotiations would
have palliated the Germans'

indignation and cleared the air.

It is often pointed out that the Germans believed W i l 
son's position at Paris to be much stronger than was actually the
case.

Perhaps,

as Professor Brandenburg has suggested,

the

fact that no American had been present at the Armistice pr o
ceedings nourished the illusion that Wilson would be stronger
vis-a-vis Clemenceau and fight for the principles of the Four
teen P o i n t s .28

The very fact that "German foreign policy and

propaganda under Count Brockdorff-Rantzau represented the Ge r
mans as the true champions of pure and unadulterated Wilsonianism"30 contributed to Allied hostility and weakened the
German position.

Holborn discusses how the extreme German

interpretation of the war-guilt clause obliged the Allies to

28B o n n , pp. 231-37.
88Holborn,

29BM S # 1691H/1013/397 048.

"Diplomats," p. 134; Rosenbaum,

p. 7.
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stand firm, on Article 231, which:
had been written to cap a delicate political c o m 
promise among themselves which would have been
endangered if they had disavowed its text c M or e 
over in public they would have appeared as betray
ing a main tenet of common faith.
For everybody
in the Allied camp was convinced of Germany's war
g u i l t .31
Clemenceau never wavered in his idea of how to deal with
the B o c h e .

The unimaginable strain of the Peace Conference

caused Wilson to become ill in April,

after which he was less

and less inclined to cope with the physical and mental, demands
of the problems of peace and wanted only to preserve
been accomplished.
prevail:

In the end,

what

had

ironically, Wilson's views did

the Treaty was signed without any changes to speak of.
In addition to overstating their cases,

other parallels

appear in the actions of the Allies and the Germans at V e r 
sailles.

Each group was aware of disunity on the opposite side

and hoped, while not exploiting it oveitly,

to benefit from it.

In Germany, Brockdorff-Rantzau's whole Versailles policy de
pended upon a solid majority, which indeed existed to start
with, but crumbled as Matthias Erzberger's agitation,
became vociferous and known to the Allies,

especially,

When Brockdorff-

Rantzau presented the report of the Delegation to the Cabinet
in Weimar on. June 18, 1919, and recommended the refusal, of the
Treaty as it stood, he remarked ironically that:
during three years of the war I have fought against
two slogans; one was "hold out," and the other was
"time is on our side."
Today I must declare my
deepest conviction that both sayings are really
applicable now, and that with a refusal /to sign_J7
^Holborn,

.."Diplomats," pp.

143-44.
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we will split the bloc of the A l l i e s „ Through
the institution of oral negotiations in the course
of which the impossibility of carrying out the
Treaty conditions will become apparent we will
surely be able to arrive at a feasible p e a c e .32
Both the Allied and German stands required "holding out" and
for Germany this proved to be impossible.
Later Years
In the words of Edgar Stern-Rubarth, Versailles was

"a

personal Amfortas wound in the soul of Brockdorf f-Rantzau „1133
In later years he became morose about it, expressing once to his
brother that had he been killed during the stoning of the German
Delegates at Versailles, perhaps the German people would have
united behind a firm stand for treaty revision„

He died in B e r

lin at the age of fifty-nine, on leave from his post in Moscow,
a victim of long-neglected heart trouble and incurable throat
c a n c e r j n

his last hours he had said to his brother,

"The

only thing that upsets me is how the English and French, when I
die, will rejoice over my d e a t h ."35

in actual fact,

the London

Times obituary was scrupulously correct in its detailed account
of his life, ending,

"Brockdorff-Rantzau will long be remembered

here as the Foreign Minister who resigned, with the other mem
bers of the government of the day, rather than sign the Peace

32BMS,

1691H/1013/397 197,

£f. Novak, p. 264.

33Stern-Rubarth, p. 152.
In Wagner's Parsifal, Amfortas,
chief of the Knights, suffered from a wound which could only be
healed by a eacred spear,
^ S t e r n - R u b a r t h , pp. 106,
33Ibid., p. 156.

149-63; Helbig, pp.

147-48.

166
T r e a t y ."35
tence,

The New York Times ended its article with the sen

"With his passing, Germany loses one of the most fearless

figures of her h i s t o r y ."37

Hermann Lutz notes that in 1940 the

French historian and political philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel,
"interpreted the Count's conduct as 'an effort of dignity on the
Oo
part of the vanquished.8"
Perhaps the most striking reference
at the time, however, was the French newspaper which, with its
obituary,

ran a picture of the Count with the caption:

"The man

who offered us 100 milliard marks at Versailles, which we un
luckily r e f us ed ."35
In subsequent years,
in Germany,

too.

some strange things have happened

The history of the Weimar Republic, blackened

by the acceptance of the punitive Treaty of Versailles,
buried under the rubble of Hitler's Third Reich,
gotten.

and

is all but for

"Oftener than one would expect," said a recent article

in the historical journal Beitrage zur Schleswiger Stadt<geschichte, "is Brockdorff-Rantzau mentioned as the signer of
the Treaty of

V e r s a i l l e s

."40

A modern emotional historical

novel by Bruno Brehm portrays him as a signatory in the Hall
of Mirrors.41

article in the Schleswiger Nachrichten in

35The Times

(London),

September 11, 1928, p.

17.

37New York Times, September 10, 1928, p. 25.

3^Lutz, p. 209, n25.

35Schiff, pp. 110-11.

^ 5Klatt, p. 33.
^ B r u n o Brehm, Die Throne Sturzen, Romantrilogie
Buchgemeinschaft Donauland, 1951), pp. 679-82.

(Wien;
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April,

1961, mentioned the Count as co-signer of the Treaty with

Dr. Bell.

The following edition, however,

correct this error;

ran an article to

“Count Brockdorff-Rantzau did not sign the

Friedensdiktat gf Versailles, which /was_ / signed by Reichskanzler /s'ic___/ Hermann Muller and Dr.

B e l l . " 4 3

"That man who placed his services at the disposal of the
Republic," wrote the German Socialist journalist Victor Schiff,
who was a Secretary of the Delegation at Versailles,

"who made

for all future generations one necessary gesture of protest

. , .

is worthy of a place of honor in German Republican chronicles.
Did anything, then, result from this symbolic gesture?

In San

Francisco in 1951, American Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles concluded with Japan "a final peace treaty which repre
sented the greatest unity for peacemaking the world has ever
known.

. . ."

The Japanese Prime Minister added,

"This is not

a treaty of vengeance but an instrument of reconciliation."
Dulles then..continued,
I had seen the handiwork of the so-called "realists"
in other treaties.
Most notable of their achieve
ments was Versailles.
I remember vividly how, there,
the members of the German peace delegation were put
in a barbed-wire enclosure, exposed as animals in a
zoo, denied any personal contact with Allied dele
gates.
We know the consequences of that realism.
What happened at San Francisco showed, at a time when
it needed showing that not merely physical, but moral
law has reality and p o w e r .44
4 3Schleswiger Nachrichten, April 1, 1961; April 3, 1961

43 Schiff, p. 44.
44Stanley High, "The Momentous Aim of John Foster
Dulles," The Reader's Digest, January, 1955, pp. 66-67.
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In Conclusion
After almost fifty years,

the events of Versailles

have begun to fall into historical perspective.,
made clear in the preface,

As hopefully

this thesis is not an attempt to

"whitewash" Germany's Count Brockdorf f-Rantzau ,
7 nor to exon
erate him from the mistakes in strategy which he unquestion
ably made.

Such mistakes were indeed made on both sides of

the fence at Versailles.

But little factual information re

garding him has thus far been easily available to the American
student.

What does exist in English is often strongly biased

and incomplete,

or simply ignores his ability and the very

real qualifications which he brought to the j o b Q
few exceptions,

With a

all extensive material, abides in hard to ob

tain German sources„
In his recent book Gustav Hilger has discussed Brock
dorf f-Rantzau ’s philosophy at the close of the Great War;
Rantzau had no illusions of turning back the wheel
of history.
His conception of the well born leader's
function was a positive one of leading a German peo
ple 0s state toward better d a y s 0 Beneath these con
siderations a deep pessimism and despair were hiding;
he seems to have been dimly aware that his idea of
leadership in democracy was the last conceivable task
left for the aristocracy before it would disappear
altogether.
Moreover, he must have had semiconscious
doubts concerning Germany's ability to make a comeback .43
After Philipp Scheidemann hastily proclaimed the German Repub
lic amidst the chaos of November 9, 1918,

it was still, uncer

tain what forces would fill the political

void left by the

collapse of the Monarchy and the revolution.

43Hilger, p. 89.

Brockdorff-Rant-
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z a u 9s long-standing relationship with the Social Democratic
leaders was instrumental in replacing anarchy with the author
ity of the Majority Socialists and their plan for a National
Cons LiLuent Assembly.

He was of the caliber of a statesman;

his singular role as "Count and Democrat"

facilitated Ger

many's transition from a defeated Empire to a people's Republic.
But he failed the Republic in several respects.

Amaz

ing as was his ability to work constructively with the demo
cratic forces of the future,

his concept of the nature and pur

pose of diplomacy was incompatible with democracy in operation.
His idea of foreign policy never changed--it was to be formu
lated at the top level and carried through by the Foreign Mini
ster without interference.

This suited the time of Bismarck,

but in a twentieth century democracy public opinion could be
expected to have some bearing on diplomatic decisions.
Brandenburg points out,

the Count sincerely believed in the

rights of the common people,
to them in daily life.

As Erich

but he had never really been close

Believing that only those ablest and

best qualified should and would attain positions of leadership
in a democracy,

Brockdorff-Rantzau also accepted the principle

that the people had the right to remove from office anyone who
no longer retained their confidence.
with high office,

this

As long as he was entrusted

"stubborn Holsteiner 1
(
1 demanded complete

authority in a carefully predetermined sphere of activity and
expected full cooperation from his subordinates.
advice of colleagues and experts,
were his own.

He sought the

but final policy decisions

He was often impatient with those who hesitated
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on decisions,

and once he had formulated a clear-cut policy,

he seldom deviated from it.

As a minister of state he was an

exacting and uncompromising chief;
however,

it must not be forgotten,

that he was equally determined to assume full and

complete responsibility for his actions and decisions.
Although Brockdorff-Rantzau was a capable,

adaptable,

and brilliant man, his many-sided personality had insuperable
deficiences.

Dr. Simons once characterized him as "our some

what overcivilized Count.

It was a good assessment of his

exceptional and compelling personality.
innate aloofness and egoism,
nature,

Brockdorff-Rantzauas

his aesthetic and high-strung

and his unremitting feudal sense of honor and dignity,

all combined with a lawyer's meticulous intellect, made him
irascible and unrelenting when he felt that his own or Germany's
honor was threatened.
the policy of his

He continued to believe fervently in

"ephemeral Min is t ry ," and the historic signi

ficance of his tragic role at V e r s a i l l e s / ^
Someone had to face the ordeal for Germany

when the

chiefs of the Paris Peace Conference requested German plenipo
tentiaries to come to Versailles.
the German Foreign Minister,

Logically,

the task fell to

and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had

been peculiarly suited to serve in this capacity in the German
Republic's first turbulent months.

But when Germany sent her

"last Knight" into the lists at Versailles,

he sought honorable

treatment on equal terms and was hopelessly misunderstood.
46L u ckau, p. 124.
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P ress, 1954.
This book deals with the changes in the Foreign
Office between the Monarchy and the Third Reich.
It
discusses briefly the "Schuler Reforms," initiated
when Brockdorff-Rantzau was Foreign Minister, and
opposed by right-wing elements.
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Seymour, Charles.
Letters from the j?ar.i.s Peace Conference.
E d . Harold B . Whiteman, Jr.
New Haven, Conn„s Yale
University Press, 1965.
Seymour's letters from December, 1918 through
July, 1 91 9o
Shotwell, James T. At the Paris Peace Co nference. New York
The Macmillan Co., 1937.
Shot we ll ’s memoirs and reflections on the Paris
Peace Conference.
A work, quite similar to that of
Harold Ni co l s o n „
_________ o What Germany F o r g o t . New York:
The Macmillan
Co., 1940.
Shotwell, a noted historian of the Peace Confer
ence and the aftermath of the Treaty, discusses Ger
many and the Treaty.
Here he disputes some of the
German arguments against the Treaty, discusses the
evolution of war guilt, etc.
Stern-Rubarth, Edgar.
Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Wanderer
zwischen %wei Welten.
Ein LebensbildT B e r l i n :
Reimar-Hobbing, 1929.
Published in the year after the Count's death,
this biography is laudatory and artistically written
Count Ernst zu Rantzau supplied Dr. Stern-Rubarth
with much material, but not all could be used at
that time.
Swope, Herbert Bayard.
Inside the German Empire, In the
Third Year of the War.
New York;
The Century Co.,
1917 .
Swope's first-hand account of life in war-time
Germany, which earned him. the first Pulitzer Prize
ever awarded for reporting.
Taylor, Edmund.
The Fall of the Dynasties.
The Collapse
of the Old Order 1905-1922^ New York; D o u b l e d a y a n d
C o ., Inc o, 1963„
A popular history, from the assassination at
Sarajevo to the years following the Paris Peace set
tlement.
Very well written, it traces the fall of
the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman,and Romanov dyn
asties.
Brockdorff-Rantzau receives the usual
;
shallow treatment.
Tillman,

Peace
Seth P. Anglo-American Relations at the Par.
Conference o?~ 1
5
pr 1nceton Uni.versityHpFess
1961
Chap
A very fine study of the Peace Conference,
ter XIII, "The Anglo-American reaction against the
Draft Treaty and Lloyd George's proposals for revision
May 7-June 28," was especially helpful here.
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Walworth, Arthur.
Woodrow W i l s o n , Vol. II: World Prophet.
2 vols.
N ew York ? Longman s , Green and Co., 1956 A very fine biography of Woodrow Wilson, with the
usual superficial mention of Brockdorff-RantzauWilson, Edith Bolling ./Galt__/„ My Memoir * Indianapolis, Ind.:
The Bobbs-MerrTl .1 Co., 1939 .
The very interesting reminiscences of President
Wilson's second wife.
Mrs. Wilson recalls much about
the end of the war and the Peace Conference.
Zeman,

Z.A.B., (Ed.)
Germany and the Revolution in Russia
1915-19.18,
Documents from the Archives of the German
Foreign Ministry.
London: Oxford University Press,
1 9 5 8 ---- *"
A valuable collection of documents tracing German
interest in the course of the Russian Revolution.
Includes several dispatches from Brockdorff-Rantzau
in Copenhagen to the Foreign Office.

Zimmermann, Ludwig.
Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Ara der W e i marer Rep ublik. Gottingen; Musterschmidt-Verlag, T958.
A detailed study of foreign policy of the Weimar
period.
Very good on the revolution and the early days
of the Republic.
Articles and Periodicals
Binkley, R.C.
"The 'Guilt' Clause in the Versailles Treaty,"
Current History, XXX (May, 1929), 294-300.
A good discussion of how Article 231 of the Treaty
of Versailles was evolved in the drafting sessions.
Brandes,

Dr. Edvard.
"Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau und die danische
Neutralitat," Europaische Gesprache, VII (January, 1929),
30-35.
A tribute, full of interesting facts, from the for
mer Danish Minister of Finance in the Zahle cabinet.
The first 47 pages of the January, 1929, issue of
Europaische Gesprache comprise a symposium, entitled;
'In Memoriam Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau."

"Brockdorff-Rantzau: Man of the Hour in Germany," Current Opinion,
LXVII (July, 1919), 20-21.
A personality sketch of the Count, drawn largely
from French newspapers.
Sarcastically written, it is
accurate in many respects and also contains some curious
misinformation«
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"Die K.riegsschuldfrage auf der Friedenskonferenz von Paris 1919," Historische Zeitschrift., CXCVII
(August, 1963), 1-101„
A recent and intensive treatment of the war-guilt
clause o Has much material, on Brockdorf f-Rantzau at
Versailles and as Foreign Minister, from which its
author draws some enlightening conclusions,,
Fischer, Fritz,
"Deutsche Kriegsziele, Revolutionierung
Separatfrieden im Osten 1914-1918,"
Historische
schrift, CLXXXVIIX (1959), 249-310,
A study of German policy, stressing what led
Lenin's trip to Russia through Germany in April,
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Hahlweg, Werner.
"Lenins Reise durch Deutschland im April 1917,"
V i e r t e i i a h r h e f t . fur Zeitqeschichte, Heft IV (October
1557)/ 307-333.
An excellent discussion of Germany's plan to end
the war by removing Russia from the ranks of the E n 
tente.
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revolution in Russia and using Lenin to spark it.
Hallgarten, George W.F.
"General Hans von Seeckt and Russia
1920-1922," Journal of Modern H i s tory, XXI, No. 1
(March, 1949), 28-34.
Concerns the resumption of German-Soviet diplomat
ic relations after the Rapallo Treaty and General
von S e e c k t 1s part in establishing clandestine mili
tary collaboration.
High,

Stanley.
"The Momentous Aim of John Foster Dulles,"
The Reader's D i g es t, (January, 1955), pp. 63-68.
Discusses John Foster Dulles at San Francisco in
1951, when the peace treaty between Japan and the
United States was signed.
A high moral influence
characterized the event.

Hoetszch, Dr. Otto.
"Botschafter Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau,"
Europaische Ge spr ach e, VII (January, 1929), 8-17.
"
An interesting discussion of the Count., especially
his years as Ambassador in Moscow.
H&lzle,

Erwin.
"Lloyd George im Weltkrieg," Historische
Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937), 40-70.
A very fine German study of Lloyd George during
World War I and his qualities of leadership.
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discusses British influence on Colonel House.

"In Memoriam Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau," Europaische Gesprache,
VII (January, 1929), 1-47.
An interesting symposium of articles and collection
of material concerning the Count as a foremost German
dip lomat„
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Klatt, Helgo.
"Die Brockdorffs in der Stadt Schleswig und
auf Annettenhoh, " Beitraqe zilr Schleswiger Stadtgeschichte, Heft 7 (1962), 3-34.,
An engaging history of the Brockdorff family from
the 1 7 0 0 's to the 1 9 6 0 Ss and the Estate of Annettenh o h . it has much interesting material and several
little known anecdotes about. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau.
Kollmann, Eric c.
"Walter Rathenau and German Foreign Policy,"
Journal of Modern Hi st or y, XXIV (1952), 127-42.
This includes some discussion of R a t h e n a u ‘s atti
tudes at the time of the Versailles Treaty.
Outlook, CXXII (May 7, 1919, and May 14, 1919).
This bound volume of Outloo k, pa ssim, is very use
ful. as an indication of the American view of the Paris
Peace Conference and the problem of post-war Germanyo
Robinson, Dr. Douglas H.
"Zeppelins in the German Navy, 19141918," United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
LXXXII (July, 1956), 742-61.
”
A short history of Zeppelin development and the
German Naval Airship Service in World War I, and the
raids on England.
includes many interesting photo
graphs .
Stadelmann, Rudolf.
"Friedensversuche im ersten Jahre des
Weltkrieges," Historische Zeitschrift, CLVI (1937),
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Presents the Czarist Russian, aims at the war's
beginning, and discusses the first and unsuccessful
German efforts to ascertain the possibility of a sep
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